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ABSTRACT
OPTIMIZING INCENTIVES FOR SYSTEMS WITH
HETEROGENEOUS AGENTS
by
Chen Chen
This dissertation explores new models and applications based on the game theory
of incentives. This exploration starts with controlling an invasive insect problem to
address one of the most significant challenges facing our forests, the invasion of the
Emerald ash borer (EAB), a non-native, wood-boring insect that threatens to kill
most ash trees in North America, through designing two new cost-sharing programs
between the landowners and local governments. Ash trees are one of North America’s
most widely distributed tree genera and a vital part of the green infrastructure of
cities, where they provide residents with numerous social, economic, and ecological
benefits.
Current strategies to slow ash mortality due to the EAB infestation include
surveillance of ash tree health coupled with insecticide treatment and/or removal of
infested trees. Most ash trees grow on private land, and the growing spread of EAB
infestation is largely due to the lack of a private-public partnership in its control.
Local governments need programs to induce landowners to undertake actions to slow
ash mortality.
A principal-agent modeling framework is presented to design two new programs
in which a local government offers reimbursements to landowners to cover a portion
of their management costs. Two mathematical models are designed for each program:
one in which the reimbursement is based on the number of infested trees and another
in which reimbursement is based on the number of treated trees. The numerical
analysis shows that neither the optimal treatment decision nor the reimbursement in
both programs is in general monotonic concerning the initial infestation level; rather,

they depend on treatment effectiveness and the likelihood of the new infestations.
Compared to the infestation-based reimbursement program, the treatment-based
reimbursement program induces the landowner to treat more trees through a higher
reimbursement and provides a higher overall benefit. The approach shown in this
dissertation is expected to inspire other private-public partnerships to solve various
environmental and societal spatio-temporal problems through better resource sharing,
such as the management of water, land, and wildfire.
Given the required reimbursement assigned to private lands, the government
needs to address the problem of budget allocation among public and private sites.
An integrated game theory-mixed integer framework is designed to allocate resources
to the management decisions on both public and private sites over space and time
to maximize the profit of the government. The attack rate of EAB of this integrated
model is validated by predicting the real attack rate based on the real infestation
EAB data.
The dissertation then focuses on studying the implications of emissions policies
in a Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) system. The excessive emission of CO2
is supercharging the natural greenhouse effect, which causes the rise of temperature,
further affects climate and sea levels, and even increases extreme weather and natural
disasters. In order to induce emitters to capture as much as possible CO2 , the
principal-agent framework is designed between the CCS operator and emitters.
Specifically, the principal (CCS operator) offers a menu of contracts to agents
(emitters) whose demand may follow different distributions, and the government may
or may not introduce the cap-and-trade policy (free allocated allowances given to
emitters) into the market. Two scenarios are examined: 1) the cap-and-trade policy
is lunched, and 2) the cap-and-trade policy is not lunched. The principal-agent
framework is presented to design optimal contracts for emitters by the CCS operator.
The principal prefers to offer efficient quantities to the agents regardless of the demand

levels when there is only one type of agent with no carbon allowance assigned by the
government; however, emitters are induced to capture all their emissions when the
cap-and-trade policy is launched. When there are two different types of agents, mostly
the emitters are induced to capture all their emissions with the allowance assigned
by the government; however, they always do not have enough incentive to capture all
emissions when the cap-and-trade policy is not implemented on the market.
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Chen Chen, Wenbo Cai, Esra Büyüktahtakın Toy, and Robert G. Haight, “DataDriven Integrated Game Theory-Optimization Framework for the Optimal
Resource Allocation for an Insect Infestation”, Working Paper, 2022
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

This dissertation mainly focuses on two aspects of environmental sustainability. One
is the non-native invasive species controlling and management problem. Invasive
species are a major threat to the economy, the environment, health, and thus
human well-being. Infestations by non-native insects, in particular, can severely
affect valuable trees and have cascading effects on other species in the environment.
Preventing the growing spread of invasive alien species has been one of the United
Nations (U.N.) Sustainable Development Goals due to the threats to biodiversity
from invasive species [29, 102].
Another focus of my dissertation is on emissions management, specially the
Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) system. Carbon emissions play a critical role in
global warming and climate change, which has significant and costly effects on our
communities, our health, and the climate. In particular, global warming is disrupting
national economies of many countries and affecting lives due to rising sea levels and
extreme weather events [103].
In this chapter, we provide the research motivation and objectives of each topic
as well as the organization of the rest of the dissertation.

1.1

Motivation

The larvae of EAB are the destructive stage of the pest. EAB adults are present from
late May through August. They are roughly a half-inch long and dark metallic green.
They feed on ash leaves throughout the 3-6 week lifespan. Even though their feeding
does not damage or affect the tree, their eggs are laid on the surface of the bark, in
bark cracks and crevices, or just under the outer bark of ash trees. With 2-3 weeks
in the hatch, the larvae from the eggs immediately begins chewing through the outer
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bark to the phloem. Larvae begin feeding in late July, but most feeding and growth
occur from August to October. Larvae feed in S-shaped tunnels, called galleries, in
the phloem. As the larva feeds and grows, the galleries get larger. The galleries
disrupt the transport of nutrients and water within the trees. Most larvae overwinter
as prepupae in cells found about a half-inch into the sapwood or outer bark. So, at
the beginning of infection, the infected trees are very hard to be distinguished by
observing.
The emerald ash borer (EAB) is a wood-boring insect in Asia. Those invasive
species were found first in southeastern Michigan in 2002. Since those wood-boring
insect spread rapidly after their introduction and has been found in most states
(35 states) of the eastern U.S., south to Louisiana and Georgia, and west as far as
Colorado. So far, the EAB has already killed uncountable millions of ash trees in
the USA as well as Canada, and biological control has become a major focus of the
Emerald Ash Borer Program of USDA and its cooperators.
Private landowners have a great number of ash trees in cities. For example,
75% of the ash trees belong to private property owners in the city of Aberdeen (City
of Aberdeen Parks, Recreation and Forestry Department, 2018). For dealing with
infected ash trees by EAB, different private owners have a different attitude. Some
private owners intend to treat their own trees and there exist some landowners who are
unwilling to treat infected trees, which may impact ash trees in neighboring areas.
One main challenge in addressing the EAB problem is that current management
options lack collaboration between the city and private landowners (City of Aberdeen
Parks, Recreation and Forestry Department, 2018).
Most previous studies on forest invasive species have considered the case of a
central planner, typically the government, which is relevant for public lands in the
western U.S (e.g. Horie et al. [69], Epanchin-Niell et al. [54], Hauser and McCarthy
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[62]) while ignoring the fact that more than half of U.S. forests are owned or managed
by private parties [8].
Siriwardena et al. [117] is the only exception. They consider the effects of
the private landowners and examine the scope for bargaining between adjacent
governments to control and slow the spread of an invasive species across the
boundaries of jurisdictions with mixed public and private landowners. However, their
focus was on studying cooperative bargaining across a mix of public and private land
within municipalities to control EAB spread. Furthermore, former studies provided
models and information to evaluate the costs and benefits of ash search, treatment
and removal [85, 95], yet there is no principal-agent game-based model of contract
design in the literature that addresses the government-private landowner dynamics
and helps evaluate the costs and benefits of private landowners’ potential contribution
to the EAB intervention planning.
Global warming is another issue that needs our attention, which has significant
and costly effects on our communities, our health, and the climate. For example,
global warming causes the rise of sea level and the melting of ice which will give rise
to sea level as well as the increasing of coastal flooding. Wildfires are increasing and
wildfire season is getting longer in the Western U.S., and more destructive hurricanes
occur as temperatures rise. What is more, the rise of the global average temperature
leads to extreme climates. Further, a changing climate affects the range of plants
and animals, changing their behavior and causing disruptions up and down the food
chain. The range of some warm-weather species will expand, while those that depend
on cooler environments will face shrinking habitats and potential extinction. Global
warming does have a bad effect on the whole world.
According to NASA, the global average surface temperature rose 0.6 to 0.9
degrees Celsius from 1906 to 2005. Moreover, as Figure 1.1 shows, despite ups and
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downs from year to year, the global average surface temperature is rising. And the
temperature is certain to go up further.
Unless we take immediate action to reduce global warming emissions, these
impacts will proceed to intensify, grow ever more catastrophic and damaging, and
progressively affect the entire planet like rising seas, increased coastal flooding, more
extreme weather events and so on.

Figure 1.1 The changing of the global mean surface temperature.

Carbon dioxide plays a critical role in global warming. The 2017 annual report
of the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) stated that carbon
dioxide contributed 81% of greenhouse gas emission. Figure 1.2 displays the increase
of CO2 and Since the Industrial Revolution began in about 1750, carbon dioxide
levels have increased by nearly 38 percent as of 2009 [60]. Further, the average of
global atmospheric carbon dioxide was 405.0 ± 0.1 ppm, a new record high, and
there was a 2.2 ± 0.1 ppm increase between 2016 and 2017, according to the State
of the Climate in 2017 [19]. However, Compared to the pre-industrial era, the global
average temperature growth must be limited to 2℃. Or it will cause many disasters
around the world. The world will be a lot drier, impacting economies, agriculture,
infrastructure, and weather patterns. To achieve this, we need to produce a scale of
effort to carbon dioxide reduction.
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Figure 1.2 The changing of the global annual mean of carbon dioxide.
Table 1.1 Technology Area Contribution
Technology
Efficiency
CCS
Fuel switching
Renewables
Nuclear
Total

to Global Cumulative CO2 Reductions
Percentage
34%
32%
18%
15%
1%
100%

Table 1.1 displays the main technologies contributing in percentage to carbon
dioxide mitigation [2].

Among those technologies, carbon capture and storage

technology is ranked as the second most effective technology in reducing carbon
dioxide emissions.
Carbon capture and storage, or CCS, is a family of technologies and techniques
that enable the capture of carbon dioxide (CO2 ) from fuel combustion or industrial
processes, the transport of CO2 via ships or pipelines, and its storage underground, in
depleted oil and gas fields and deep saline formations preventing the carbon dioxide
from entering the atmosphere. Currently, there are 21 large-scale CCS projects in
operation that capture over 37 million tones of CO2 per annum (Mtpa) globally.
Some recent projects include:
• Petra Nova Carbon Capture, operational since January 2017, is the world’s
largest post-combustion CO2 capture system presently in operation. Production
unit 8 of the W. A. Parish power plant near Houston, Texas, was retrofitted
with a 1.4 Mtpa post-combustion CO2 capture facility. The captured CO2 is
transported via pipeline to an oil field near Houston for enhanced oil recovery.
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• Illinois Industrial CCS. This project integrate newly built compression and
dehydration facilities with an existing corn-to-ethanol plant in Decatur, Illinois.
The captured CO2 is transported to a nearby injection well for dedicated
geological storage, and injection operations commenced in April 2017. The new
facilities, when combined with existing facilities constructed under the (now
completed) Illinois Basin Decatur Project, can achieve a total CO2 injection
capacity of approximately 1 Mtpa.
• Ji Lin Oil field CO2 EOR. It injects CO2 for enhanced oil recovery (EOR) in
low permeability reservoirs of the Jilin oil field in northeast China. The CO2 is
captured from a nearby natural gas processing plant at the Chang Ling gas field
and transported by pipeline. The cumulative CO2 injection was 1.12 million
tonnes for pilot and demonstration-scale operation. After 12 years of pilot and
demonstration tests, the commercial operation began in 2018. The injection
capacity reaches 600,000 tonnes of CO2 per annum.
To meet the Paris 2℃ target, we need 2500 CCS facilities with an average
capacity of 1.5 Mtpa by 2040. Clearly, the adoption of CCS technology needs to
increase drastically. The wide adoption of CCS technology, however, faces many
challenges: (1) technological development is required to reduce the costs of CCS
technologies; (2) a marked increase in government commitment to deploying CCS;
(3) the strategic need for CO2 transport and storage infrastructure; and (4) policies
that support CCS deployment and CCS pricing mechanism in terms of practical
economics.
We mainly focus on designing a principal-agent (PA) framework between CO2
emitters and a CCS operator who is willing to transport and store captured CO2 as a
service. When emissions are free, as they currently are in the U.S. and other countries,
emitters are unwilling to adopt the CCS technology as it is costly. Therefore, we must
assume that there is either a quantity-based penalty (or tax) for emissions or there is
a cap on the overall allowed emissions.
We initially take the perspective of the CCS operator and design mechanisms to
induce emitters to participate in a CCS system run by the CCS operator. We adopt
the principal-agent framework in designing the mechanisms, where the principal is the
CCS operator and the agent is an emitter. However, the information structure differs
6

from the classical principal-agent model in the following: (1) the agent’s demand is
uncertain and thus they are modeled as a demand distribution with discrete demand
levels; (2) the agent privately observe his demand distribution (or ”type”) when
contracting, but the actual demand is realized after committing to a contract; (3) the
principal does not observe the agent’s demand distribution, but s/he forms a prior
belief of the likelihood over some demand distributions.

1.2

Summary of Research Objectives

In Chapter 2, we develop a principal-agent contracting model to incentivize the
participation of private landowners with heterogeneous types, based on the number
of ash trees, infection level, and treatment. We consider the infestation-based and
treatment-based reimbursement models to identify optimal treatment decisions under
various conditions.
In Chapter 3, we integrate the principal-agent contracting model with the
resource allocation model for EAB surveillance and control in order to determine
the optimal budget allocation among public trees and private trees. To avoid the
non-linearity and solve our problem, we consider different linearization methods to
address the non-linearity.
In Chapter 4, we design a principal-agent mechanism framework with heterogeneous demands of the agents (emitters) who are incentivized to participate in all
periods once they have selected their contracts. We construct a cap-and-trade model
to optimally allocate a set of emissions permits among the CCS operator and the
emitters, and compare the cap-and-trade model with the quantity-based emission
penalty model in terms of the total quantity sequestered, the aggregated utility of
the agents and the profitability of the principal.
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1.3

Organization of the Dissertation

The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows.

Chapter 2 builds a

principal-agent framework to study the collaboration between the government and
private landowners to control the impact of an invasive insect (Emerald Ash borer).
Chapter 3 builds a data-driven integrated game theory-optimization framework to
allocate resources to different management decisions in both public and private lands.
Chapter 4 presents an incentive mechanism to induce the emitters to capture more
CO2 with or without a cap-and-trade policy, and the conclusion and future directions
are discussed in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 2
A GAME-THEORETIC APPROACH TO INCENTIVE
LANDOWNERS TO MITIGATE AN EMERALD ASH BORER
OUTBREAK

2.1

Introduction

Invasive species are alien plants, animals, or pests, which cause significant economic
and environmental damage by harming biodiversity and degrading the environment
[87, 125]. The cost of invasive species to the United States’ economy is estimated
to be more than 120 billion dollars each year, and the associated costs continue
to increase [110]. The national and international communities, such as the United
Nations’ Global Invasive Species Program (GISP) and National Invasive Species
Council (NISC) have called for rapid management and control of invaders to minimize
their harmful impacts on sustainability and human well-being [29].
One prime example of an invasive species is the emerald ash borer (EAB), a
non-native forest insect, which causes close to 100% mortality of native ash trees.
They are not only one of North America’s most widely distributed tree genera,
but also invaluable commodities with an expected life span of 120 to 260 periods
[68]. Municipalities endeavor to maximize the number of live ash trees because
trees continue to provide numerous social, economic, and ecological benefits, such as
providing a habitat for many animal and insect species, producing oxygen, improving
soil quality, and reducing pollution [124]. Unfortunately, EAB has spread to 35
states in the U.S. and five Canadian provinces [52] and killed millions of ash trees,
costing homeowners and cities millions of dollars. EAB is likely to extirpate ash
trees, resulting in devastating economic and ecological impacts [84, 63]. In cities and
communities, EAB is projected to cost homeowners and local governments billions of
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dollars for treatment or removal and replacement of landscape ash trees over the next
decade [84]. In response, cities and communities develop EAB management plans,
including the application of systemic insecticides to kill EAB adults or larvae and the
preemptive removal of infested trees before larvae can complete development
[63]. Some of the limited intervention budget should be allocated to discovering the
location of infestations in the early stages by surveying ash trees for the existence of
EAB larva before any application of treatment or removal [63].
Typically, through Parks and Recreation’s Forestry Division, the City Forester
is responsible for management and intervention planning for EAB invasion in
community forests involving public trees [43]. As stated by [118], tree surveys suggest
that each city has approximately 250,000 green and white ash (formally known
as Fraxinus Pennsylvanica and Fraxinus Americana), 30% of which are on public
property [85, 120]. A significant number of ash trees in cities is privately owned.
For example, 75% of the ash trees belong to private property owners in the city of
Aberdeen. When addressing private trees, removing trees as they die is currently the
only option the city has. Property owners are responsible for treating privately owned
trees. However, every landowner makes their decisions based on their own goals and
desires and does not consider the impact of their management action or no-action on
the neighbor’s location.
One main challenge to address the EAB problem is that current management
options lack collaboration between the city and private landowners [43]. The problem
is exacerbated by the fragmented private forest landowner-ships, which can act as
drivers of biological invasions at the landscape level [8].
Most previous studies on forest invasive species have considered the case of a
local government, who manages public lands [69], while ignoring the fact that the
majority of U.S. trees is owned by private parties [8]. The study of [118] is the only
exception; however, it focuses on studying cooperative bargaining across a mix of
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public and private land within municipalities to control EAB spread. Furthermore,
former studies provided models and information to evaluate the costs and benefits of
ash search, treatment, and removal [85, 95, 79], yet there is no work in the mechanism
design literature that addresses the public-private dynamics and helps evaluate the
costs and benefits of the landowners’ potential contribution to the EAB intervention.
We use a principal-agent framework where a local government (i.e., a principal)
incentivizes a landowner (i.e., an agent) to mitigate the negative impact of the
EAB on ash trees through a cost-sharing program. The local government offers a
reimbursement to cover a portion of the landowner’s costs of inspection, treatment,
and removal. We analyze two models, where the reimbursement is based on the
infestation level (or the number of infested trees) in one and on the treatment decision
(or the number of treated trees) in the other.
Each model considers a two-period planning horizon to capture the evolution of
infestation status of the private land based on the landowner’s decisions of whether
or not to participate in the cost-sharing program, how many ash trees to treat based
on the initial infestation level, and the costs associated with the anticipated outcome.
If the landowner does not participate in the program, he is assumed not to inspect
or treat any ash trees. Because infested trees that are not treated will die with
certainty, and dead trees are considered hazardous, the landowner will bear the cost
of removal. If participating, the landowner will first identify the infested ash trees
through surveillance. Next, the landowner will decide whether to mitigate or not
in the first period, with the understanding that his treatment decision affects the
infestation level in both periods. Specifically, the infested trees that are successfully
treated in the first period would not be infested in the second period since healthy
ash trees that are treated would develop EAB resistance which lasts two periods [96].
Unsuccessfully-treated ash trees, on the other hand, would die and incur removal
costs. Further, if all of the infested ash trees are treated in the first period, the
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remaining healthy ash trees would be infested at a lower rate in the second period.
If, however, none or only some of the infested trees were treated in period one, the
remaining healthy trees would be infested at a higher rate in period two [79, 31].
The local government’s utility is the valuation of the expected number of
surviving trees at the end of the second period minus the reimbursement required to
incentivize the landowner’s participation. Because the utility function of an agent who
participates in the cost-sharing program is not monotonic in the number of infested
trees, both the optimal treatment decision and the reimbursement vary with the input
parameters, such as the treatment effectiveness and the second-period attack rates.
In the infestation-based reimbursement, the local government offers a payment
based on the landowner’s reported infestation level. After receiving the payment,
the landowner decides on how many trees to treat. This is a moral hazard problem
and thus the local government must design the award based on the infestation level
such that if the landowner treats the desirable number of trees post-reimbursement,
his utility will be maximized. We find three possible treatment decisions that can be
optimal: treating all (infested and healthy) trees, treating only the infested trees, and
treating none of them. We provide the analytical solution for optimal reimbursement
and characterize the conditions under which each of the treatment decisions can be
optimal. Additionally, we show through numerical analysis that neither the optimal
treatment decision nor the reimbursement is in general monotonic with respect to the
infestation level.
The local government announces a reimbursement schedule, which is nondecreasing in the number of treated trees in the treatment-based reimbursement
model. Upon finding out the infestation level, the landowner decides on how many
trees to treat based on the reimbursement schedule.

After presenting a service

receipt to the local government, the landowner receives the reimbursement. Since the
infestation level is not reported by the landowner, the local government deals with
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an adverse selection problem in which the reimbursement schedule must be designed
to induce the landowner to make the desirable treatment decision prior to receiving
the reimbursement. We find eight optimal reimbursement schedules and identify the
conditions under which each can be optimal.
We use scenario analysis to compare the efficacy of the two cost-sharing models
and conclude that the treatment-based reimbursement program is superior. Despite
the higher reimbursement required, the treatment-based reimbursement program
induces the landowner to treat more trees, and as a result, the local government
can achieve a higher expected objective function value.

2.2
2.2.1

Literature Review

Management of Invasive Species and the EAB

Several optimization models have been presented to study the surveillance [97, 20,
106, 22, 13, 69, 54, 79] and control [4, 26, 65, 70, 77, 85] of invasive species. For
a detailed background in invasive species management and a review of optimization
models to detect and control biological invasions, see, e.g., Büyüktahtakın and Haight
[29].
Previous work has presented optimization studies on the surveillance and control
of the EAB and other similar forest invasive pests under a limited management budget
[85, 97, 69, 133, 79, 22, 21]. Among those, Kovacs et al. [85] develop a spatio-temporal
optimization model, in which a local government determines the quantities of public
and private trees to treat and remove over time, to maximize the benefits of surviving
trees minus the net costs of management, subject to constraints on municipal budgets
and access to private trees. Kıbış et al. [79] address the cost-effective allocation of
resources to jointly optimize the surveillance and control decisions to maximize the
benefits of healthy ash trees by saving as many trees as possible over multiple periods.
Later, Bushaj et al. [21] extend the formulations of [79] and [22] to a risk-averse
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multi-stage stochastic program and solve the complex formulation using a scenariodominance cuts algorithm and insights into risk-averse management.
There are multiple stakeholders in the management of forest pest species (i.e.,
government, cities, forester, landowners). Because the infestation of an invasive
forest pest is dynamic and spatial, an outbreak may impact all stakeholders involved.
Therefore, the effective management of invasive species, including non-native forest
insects, requires increasing collaboration and coordination among stakeholders. Most
studies in invasive species management have considered a local government, which
is often the government while ignoring other parties impacted by the government’s
decisions [69]. Furthermore, the government is responsible only for the public lands,
while private properties are typically managed by the landowners.
There is an increasing trend in the game-theoretical research that addresses
the dynamics between multiple stakeholders in invasive species management in
recent periods [25, 91, 17, 9, 44]. For example, Liu and Sims [91] also address
spatially-connected decision-makers (i.e., individual landowners, state and federal
agencies, etc.), and provide a corrective mechanism in which individuals compensate
invaded individuals for control actions that preserve uninvaded areas. Specifically,
the authors develop an economic model to identify the timing and sequence of sidepayments in which uninvaded and fully invaded individuals compensate individuals
currently engaged in control for actions. Bhat and Huffaker [17] develop a two-person
differential game model to characterize a dynamic contract that allows renegotiation
and variable transfer payments between owners of two independently-harvested,
ecologically-dependent mammal populations.
Atallah et al. [9] use non-cooperative and cooperative games to determine aggregate
payoffs between two managers whose independent production processes are spatially
connected through a network. Siriwardena et al. [118] develop a dynamic model of
cooperative Nash bargaining to examine how the mix of land ownership within each
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municipality affects the path of a negotiated transfer payment from the uninfested to
the infested jurisdiction. Cobourn et al. [44] employ a Nash bargaining framework to
examine the scope for bargaining between two municipalities, one of which is infested
with an invasive species and the other is not.
There is a growing interest in using game theory for designing transfer or subsidy
payments in invasive species management between the stakeholders. However, to the
best of our knowledge, the partnership of government and private landowners in
controlling and managing an invasive pest has not been addressed in the mechanism
design literature.

2.2.2

Incentive Design using the Principal-Agent Framework

The Principal-Agent framework was developed to better align the interest of two
parties who have conflicting interests and achieve a better outcome via incentive
structuring when there is information asymmetry. It has been widely adopted in
many studies, mostly in the coordination of decentralized players in supply chain
management [123, 130, 131, 81, 40] and in production [71, 42].
However, there is a growing body of literature on public-private partnerships
or authority-led initiatives, such as funding and auditing of non-profit organizations
[112], information sharing among farmers [128], emissions mitigation through carboncapturing [36], infrastructure development [108], container-inspection policy [12], and
performance-based contracts in health service [58, 72, 5, 7].
In the context of invasive species management, the private information is how
many trees are already infested, which is learned only after the private landowner (an
agent) pays for surveillance by a professional. The local government (the principal)
may require the landowner to submit such information prior to distributing the
reimbursement. In this case, the local government faces a moral hazard problem
because the landowner decides on how many trees to treat after receiving the
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reimbursement. Alternatively, the local government may ask the landowner to submit
the receipt from the professional tree care company that performed the treatment.
The local government thus faces an adverse selection problem. Traditionally, adverse
selection occurs when one party has more information than the other and therefore
has an advantage in entering a contract. Here, the landowner knows the infestation
level but the local government does not. Therefore, the reimbursement schedule,
which is a function of the number of trees treated, must induce the landowner to
treat the desirable number of trees prior to receiving the reimbursement.

2.2.3

Key Contributions

To the best of our knowledge, this work is among the first that adopts the
principal-agent framework in the management of invasive species to induce the
collaboration between a local government and a private landowner. We hypothesize
that government subsidy can be used to motivate the participation of landowners
and as a result, improve the outcome of reducing the harmful impacts of an invasive
forest beetle. Our game-theoretic models could also be adapted to a variety of other
public-private relationships that require joint resource contributions over space and
time, such as the management of water, land, and wildfire.
Next, our models differ from an assumption in the classic principal-agent
framework in that the agent’s utility function does not satisfy the single-crossing
property. Specifically, when the infestation level is high in the first period, it may
be desirable to not treat any trees, especially when the treatment is ineffective,
which leads to fewer trees being successfully treated. On the other hand, when the
infestation level is low initially, it may be desirable not to treat only infested trees (and
not more) because the treatment is not very effective. It may also be advantageous
to treat all trees in order to prevent any new infestations. Consequently, the optimal
treatment decision in our models differs from the seminal result of [94].
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Recall that in the optimal solution of their work, the quantity offered to the
agent is non-decreasing in his type. Further, the highest type receives the efficient
amount, which is computed without the presence of information asymmetry. Lower
types, however, receive less than efficient amounts. In certain cases, the lowest types
may not be served. In the context of invasive species management, this would mean
that a landowner with a higher infestation level will be induced to treat more trees.
However, we show that the optimal number of trees to be treated is, in general,
non-monotonic at the infestation level in either the infestation-based reimbursement
model or the treatment-based reimbursement model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce the infestation-based
reimbursement model where the infestation level is verifiable by the local government
in Section 2.3. Here, both analytical solutions and insights from numerical results
are provided. In Section 2.4, we present the treatment-based reimbursement where
the number of trees treated is verifiable instead. Several sets of optimal treatment
decisions are identified. In Section 2.5, we compare the efficacy of the two models
against the case when no cost-sharing programs are offered. Section 2.6 concludes
this chapter.

2.3

The Infestation-based Reimbursement Model

In the infestation-based reimbursement (IBR) model, we assume that the local
government (she henceforth) can verify the infestation level, i.e., the number of
infested trees, of the private land. This can be achieved by requiring the landowner
to submit a surveillance report issued by a professional tree service. Based on the
reported infestation level, she selects a payment (or reimbursement) to maximize
her expected utility. Because the landowner (he henceforth) receives a payment
before treating any trees, the local government must consider what he would do after
receiving the payment. The landowner is assumed to be rational; thus, his optimal
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decision depends on the reimbursement, the evolution of the number of infested trees
in the two periods, and the consequences of each possible treatment decision.
Characterization of the infestation level of private property. Let n
denote the number of ash trees a landowner has on his private land. This information
is considered common knowledge because it can be counted along the curb and
without accessing the landowner’s property. The likelihood of an ash tree being
infested by the EAB is π, which is assumed to be an input parameter. We also refer
π as the attack rate, which can be computed based on the proportion of infested tree
in nearby lands, to the landowner’s property if such information is available. The
local government, such as [104], may have databases and websites that keep track of
the infested trees. The infestation level, denoted by i, is only identifiable through
surveillance, such as visual inspection or lab testing, by professional tree services.
Here, we assume thorough surveillance that involves lab testing. Let α denote the
surveillance cost per tree. Its value depends on the surveillance method, with lab
testing being more costly than visual inspection. We assume that i follows a binomial
distribution with the rate π. We consider the marginal cost of surveillance, treatment,
and removal as constants, and public and private sites share the same marginal cost
in the IBR and TBR models. Because each private site is likely to have small number
of ash trees, a professional tree company would likely to quote per unit costs. Though
it is possible for public sites to incur lower costs due to economy of scales, assuming
these costs as a function of number of infested ash trees would create non-linearity
that would complicate the models. In future work, we may want to explore non-linear
functions. See Section 5.2 for more discussions. Table 2.1 summarizes the notation
used in both models.
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The landowner’s available options. Left untreated, an infested tree will die
with certainty within four years. Further, a dead tree is hazardous and thus, must be
removed at the cost of c. Treatments, such as soil injections or trunk injections, can
be applied to target the EAB larvae residing in the tree and stop them from killing
the ash trees. The cost of treatment is β per tree. Unfortunately, treatment is not
effective when a tree is in a late stage of infestation or after two years of the initial
infestation. Therefore, the treatment’s success rate is assumed to be ρ. Further,
treated trees for which the treatment is unsuccessful will die and must be removed at
the landowner’s expense.
Evolution of the infestation level. Let q(i) denote the number of treated
trees in the first period. If no trees are infested (i = 0) or if all of the infested trees
are treated (q(i) = n ≥ i) in the first period, the chance of a healthy, untreated tree
becoming newly infested in the next period is assumed to decrease from π to π l . On
the other hand, if any of the infested trees are left untreated (q(i) < i), the attack
rate in the second period increases from π to π h . Further, any healthy tree that is
treated in period one becomes EAB resistant for the next two years; that is, it will
not be infested in period two. If all of the trees are already infested (i = n), there
will be no new infestation in the second period.
The landowner’s expected utility if he does not participate in the
cost-sharing program. In this case, he is assumed to neither inspect nor treat any
trees in either period. Otherwise, he should participate to offset the cost by getting
reimbursement from the local government.
Let θ denote the landowner’s marginal value of a healthy ash tree. His value of
having w surviving trees at the end of the planning horizon, denoted by V (w), is thus
θ · w. Let a0 denote the decision of not participating in the cost-sharing program,
then his expected utility given the infestation level (i) is as follows:
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Table 2.1 Notation
Input parameters:
n
The number of ash trees a landowner has.
π
The first-period attack rate, i.e., the probability that an ash tree is
infested with the EAB. π̄ = 1 − π.
i
The infestation level in period one follows a binomial distribution
with rate π: i ∼ B(n, π).
c
Cost of removing a dead tree due to the EAB infestation.
α
Cost of inspecting an ash tree.
β
Cost of treating an ash tree.
ρ
Treatment success rate. ρ̄ = 1 − ρ.
θ
Marginal value of a landowner having a surviving ash tree.
s
Marginal value the local government has for a healthy ash tree.
πh
The high (resp. low) second-period attack rate, i.e., the probability that
a healthy ash (resp. π l ) tree will become infested in period two if the
number of treated trees in period one is less than (resp. greater than
or equal to) the number of infested trees.
π l < π < π h ; π̄ h = 1 − π h ; π̄ l = 1 − π l .
Value function:
v(w, d) The value function of the local government of having w surviving ash
trees while losing d trees either untreated or unsuccessfully-treated
at the end of the second period: v(w, d) = s · w − β · d.
V (w) The value function of the landowner having w surviving ash trees
at the end of the second period: V (w) = θ · w.
Decision variables only applicable to the infestation-based reimbursement model:
q(i)
The number of trees a landowner will treat given i out of n ash
trees are infested. q(i) can be greater than, equal to, or less than i.
r(i)
Reimbursement offered by the local government for having i infested
ash trees.
Decision variables only applicable to the treatment-based reimbursement model:
q
q = [q(0), q(1), · · · , q(n)] is a (n + 1)-tuple that prescribes the number
of trees to be treated based on infestation level i, where q(i) ∈ [0, n].
r
r = [r(0), r(1), · · · , r(n)] is a (n + 1)-tuple that prescribes the
reimbursement scheme based on the treatment decision q(i).
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θπ̄ l n − cπ l n
if i = 0



ϕ(a0 |n, i) =
θπ̄ h (n − i) − c(i + π h (n − i)) if 0 < i < n




 −cn
if i = n,

(2.1)

where π̄ l = 1 − π l and π̄ h = 1 − π h .
First, if there are no infested trees (i = 0) in the first period, the attack rate
in the second period is π l , and therefore, π l n trees are expected to be infested and
die without treatment. The term θπ̄ l n in Equation (2.1) is the landowner’s value of
having π̄ l n surviving trees while cπ l n is the cost of removing π l n dead trees. Second,
if some trees are infested (0 < i < n) in period one, inaction will lead to an increased
attack rate (π h ), the expected trees to be infested in period two is π h (n − i). A total
of i + π h (n − i) trees will die, and the removal cost associated is c · (i + π h (n − i)).
The landowner’s expected utility is thus the difference between the value of healthy
trees, θ · π̄ h (n − i), and the removal cost. Last, if all trees are already infested in
the first period, a lack of treatment would result in the death of all. The landowner
would incur a removal cost of cn.
The landowner’s expected utility if he participates in the cost-sharing
program. In this case, he will first pay for an inspection to identify the infested
trees. The inspection cost of all trees is αn, where α is the unit cost. Upon learning
the infestation level i, the landowner decides on how many trees to treat, denoted
by q(i). He considers the evolution of the infestation, which depends on his firstperiod treatment decision. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 depict the two possible progressions
of infestation.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the consequence of not treating all infested trees in the first
period, i.e., q(i) < i. When q(i) out of the i infested trees are treated, the i − q(i)
untreated ones will die and must be removed. Further, the ρ̄q(i) unsuccessfully-
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n

infested
I1 : i
treated
T1 : q(i)
successful

healthy
H1 : n − i

not
treated

NT1 : i − q(i)
un-successful

IST1 : ρq(i)

IUT1 : ρ̄q(i)

EAB resistant

dead

infested
I2 : π h (n − i)

dead

successful

H2 : ρq(i)

D2 : ρ̄q(i)

healthy

IST2 (H2 ):
ρπ h (n − i)

D2 :
i − q(i)

un-successful
IUT2 (D2 ):
ρ̄π h (n − i)

H2 :
π̄ h (n − i)

It denotes the number of newly infested trees in period t, where t = 1, 2. Ht denotes the
number of healthy trees in period t, Tt the number of treated trees in period t, ISTt the
number of infested trees that are successfully-treated in period t, IUTt the number of infested
trees that are un-successfully-treated in period t, NTt the number of trees that are not
treated in period t, and Dt the number of dead trees in period t.

Figure 2.1 Progression of infestation in two consecutive periods when some
infested trees are not treated in the first period (q(i) < i).

treated trees will also not survive, whereas the ρq(i) successfully-treated ones will
recover and stay healthy in the second period. Because not all infested trees are
treated, the attack rate among the n − i healthy trees increases to π h in the second
period. As a result, π h (n − i) trees may become infested in period two while π̄ h (n − i)
ones remain healthy. For simplicity, we assume that all newly infested trees will be
treated, then ρπ h (n − i) trees will become healthy, but ρ̄π h (n − i) trees may die
because the treatment is unsuccessful.
To summarize, the overall number of treated trees is t = q(i)+π h (n−i), the total
number of trees survived by the end of period two is w = ρq(i)+ π̄ h (n−i)+ρπ h (n−i),
and the aggregated number of dead trees is k = i − q(i) + ρ̄q(i) + ρ̄π h (n − i). The
landowner’s expected utility when q(i) < i is
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ϕ(q(i), r(i)|n, i, q(i) < i) = θ · w + r(i) − α · n − β · t − c · k
= θ · [ρq(i) + π̄ h (n − i) + ρπ h (n − i)] + r(i) − α · n
−β · [q(i) + π h (n − i)] − c · [i − ρq(i) + ρ̄π h (n − i)].
(2.2)
The first two terms in Equation (2.2) are the landowner’s value of having w surviving
trees and the reimbursement received from the local government. The next three
terms represent the inspection cost, the treatment cost, and the removal cost,
respectively.
Similarly, Figure 2.2 shows the outcome of treating not only infested trees but
some healthy trees in the first period, i.e., q(i) ≥ i. Because all infested trees (i)
are treated, the successfully-treated trees (ρi) will survive and stay healthy in the
second period, while the unsuccessfully-treated ones (ρ̄i) would die. The healthy
trees that are treated (q(i) − i) in the first period become resistant to EAB. Further,
the attack rate among the healthy, untreated trees (n − q(i)) decreases to π l in the
second period. Therefore, π l (n − q(i)) trees are expected to be infested in period two,
while π̄ l (n − q(i)) trees are expected to remain healthy. Since all newly infested trees
in the second period are assumed to be treated, ρπ l (n − q(i)) of them are expected
to be successfully-treated and survive, while the rest are expected to die.
The landowner’s expected utility when q(i) ≥ i is
ϕ(q(i), r(i)|n, i, q(i) ≥ i) = θ · w + r(i) − α · n − β · t − c · k
= θ · [q(i) − ρ̄i + π̄ l (n − q(i)) + ρπ l (n − q(i))] + r(i)
−α · n − β · [q(i) + π l (n − q(i))] − c · [ρ̄i + ρ̄π l (n − q(i))].
(2.3)
The terms in Equation (2.3) are similar to those in Equation (2.2), except that the
total number of treated trees is t = i + (q(i) − i) + π l (n − q(i)), the aggregated number
of trees survived by the end of the second period is w = (q(i) − i) + ρi + π̄ l (n − q(i)) +
ρπ l (n − q(i)), and the overall number of dead trees is d = ρ̄i + ρ̄π l (n − q(i)).
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It denotes the number of newly infested trees in period t, where t = 1, 2. Ht denotes the
number of healthy trees in period t, Tt the number of treated trees in period t, ISTt the
number of infested trees that are successfully treated in period t, IUTt the number of infested
trees that are un-successfully-treated in period t, NTt the number of trees that are not
treated in period t, and Dt the number of dead trees in period t.

Figure 2.2 Progression of infestation in two consecutive periods when all of the
infested trees are treated in the first period (q(i) ≥ i).

Let µi be an indicator such that µi = 1 when q(i) < i and µi = 0 otherwise.
µ̄i = 1 − µi . The landowner’s expected utility from participating in the cost-sharing
program is
ϕ(q(i), r(i)|n, i) = µi · ϕ(q(i), r(i)|n, i, q(i) < i) + µ̄i · ϕ(q(i), r(i)|n, i, q(i) ≥ i).
(2.4)
Sequence of events. Figure 2.3 illustrates the interactions between the local
government and the landowner over two consecutive periods if he participates in the
cost-sharing program. At the beginning of the first period, both parties have the same
knowledge about the ash trees on the landowner property: there are n ash trees, and
the attack rate is π. The landowner pays for a tree care professional to inspect these
ash trees and finds out the number of trees (i) that are already infested. He reports
the information to the local government, who then offers a financial award (r(i))
that depends on the infestation level (i). Upon receiving the reimbursement r(i), the
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landowner then decides how many trees (q(i)) to treat. If he does not treat all of the
infested trees (q(i) < i) in the first period, then the outcome of his decision over the
next two periods is depicted in Figure 2.1. On the other hand, if he treats not only all
of the infested trees but also some healthy trees, the outcome follows Figure 2.2. It is
worth noting that the local government neither verifies how many trees were treated
at the end of the first period nor offers an additional financial award in the second
period.
FS
offers
LO r(i)

Period
1

common
knowledge:
LO has
n ash trees,
attack rate
is π

LO
finds
i trees
are infested
& reports i

Period
2

if q(i) < i,
remove (i − q(i)) INT
& ρ̄q(i) IUT trees;
ρq(i) IST trees will
be EAB resistant

attack rate
↑ to π h among
(n − i) HNT trees

if q(i) ≥ i,
remove ρ̄i IUT trees;
(q(i) − i) HT & ρi IST
trees will be
EAB resistant

attack rate
↓ π l among
(n − q(i)) HNT trees

LO treats
q(i) trees
after
receiving
r(i)

LO stands for landowner, FS for the local government, INT for infested trees that are not treated, IST for infested
trees that are successfully-treated, IUT for infested trees that are unsuccessfully-treated, HT for healthy trees that
are treated, and HNT for healthy trees that are not treated.

Figure 2.3 Sequence of events for the infestation-based reimbursement model.
The forester’s optimization problem. We assume that both the forester
and the landowner are rational and make decisions to maximize their utilities over a
two-period planning horizon to maximize their utilities. Let v(w, d) = s · w − β · k
denotes the local government’s value function. The first term is the local government’s
value of having w surviving trees, where s is the marginal value of a tree. The
second term, β · k, is the local government’s penalty of having d infested trees either
untreated or unsuccessfully-treated. This penalty is included because if an infested
tree on the landowner’s parcel is not treated or not successfully treated, then ash trees
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in nearby parcels would be more likely to be infested in the following period. The
local government’s goal is to maximize her utility function, which is the difference
between her value function and the reimbursement. In the case where q(i) < i, as
shown in Figure 2.1, the number of surviving trees at the end of the period is w =
ρq(i) + π̄ h (n − i) + ρπ h (n − i), while the number of untreated or unsuccessfully-treated
tree is k = i − ρq(i) + ρ̄π h (n − i). Similarly, in the case where q(i) ≥ i, w =
q(i) − ρ̄i + π̄ l (n − q(i)) + ρπ l (n − q(i)) and k = ρ̄i + ρ̄π l (n − q(i)), as illustrated in
Figure 2.2.
The local government’s problem is as follows:
 



max Ψ(q(i), r(i)|n, i) = µi · s · ρq(i) + π̄ h (n − i) + ρπ h (n − i) − β · i − ρq(i) + ρ̄π h (n − i)
q(i),r(i)




l
l
 s · q(i) − ρ̄i + π̄ (n − q(i)) + ρπ (n − q(i)) 
+µ̄i · 
 − r(i)


−β · ρ̄i + ρ̄π l (n − q(i))
s.t.

ϕ(q(i), r(i)|n, i) ≥ ϕ(a0 |n, i)
ϕ(q(i), r(i)|n, i) ≥ ϕ(j, r(i)|n, i)

and

(IR)
∀0≤j ≤n

q(i), r(i) ≥ 0

(ICij )
(NNi )

(2.5)
The objective function in Equation (2.5) is the net expected utility of the local
government, considering two scenarios: (1) when q(i) < i (or equivalently, µi = 1)
and (2) when q(i) ≥ i (or µi = 0). The first line of the objective function is the value
of having w = ρq(i) + π̄ h (n − i) + ρπ h (n − i) surviving trees at the end of the second
period minus the penalty from loosing d = i − ρq(i) + ρ̄π h (n − i) trees when q(i) < i.
Similarly, the second line of the objective function is the difference between the value
of having w = q(i) − ρ̄i + π̄ l (n − q(i)) + ρπ l (n − q(i)) surviving trees and the penalty
from loosing d = ρ̄i + ρ̄π l (n − q(i)) trees when q(i) ≥ i. For simplicity, we assume
that the penalty associated with a dead tree is equal to the cost of its treatment. The
last term is the cost of providing the financial award to the landowner.
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The individual rationality (IR) constraint ensures the landowner is incentivized
to participate in the cost-sharing program.

The incentive compatibility (ICj )

constraints ensure that the landowner will prefer to treat the number of trees desired
by the local government q(i) based on the infestation level (i), rather than another
treatment decision (j). The non-negativity constraints (N Ni ) ensure that both q(i)
and r(i) are greater than or equal to zero.

2.3.1

Analytical Solutions

We define the following parameters and conditions in order to characterize the optimal
solutions analytically.
First, let a1 := β − ρ(θ + c) and a2 := β − ρ(s + β + θ + c). It is apparent
that a1 > a2 . Further, let ρ̇ :=

β
s+β+θ+c

and ρ̈ :=

β
,
θ+c

then 0 < ρ̇ < ρ̈. Because the

cost of treatment is generally much lower than the sum of the valuation of a live ash
tree and the removal cost, ρ̈ is likely to be small. We can categorize the treatment
effectiveness (ρ) into three levels.
Definition 1. As summarized in Table 2.2, the treatment is considered to be less
effective if 0 ≤ ρ < ρ̇, somewhat effective if ρ̇ ≤ ρ < ρ̈, and very effective if ρ̈ ≤ ρ ≤ 1.

Table 2.3 Classification of the Low
Second-period Attack Rates (π l )

Table 2.2 Categorization of
Treatment Effectiveness (ρ)
Condition
a1 > a2 > 0
a1 > 0 ≥ a2
0 ≥ a1 > a2

or 0 ≤ ρ < ρ̇
or ρ̇ ≤ ρ < ρ̈
or ρ̈ ≤ ρ ≤ 1

ρ
Less effective
Somewhat effective
Very effective

Condition
b1 > b2 > 0
b1 > 0 ≥ b2
0 ≥ b1 > b2

or 0 ≤ π l < π̇ l
or π̇ l ≤ π l < π̈ l
or π̈ l ≤ π l ≤ 1

πl
low
medium
high

Second, let b1 := β − π l [ρ̄(θ + c) + β], b2 := β − π l [ρ̄(s + β + θ + c) + β], and
b1 > b2 . Further, let π̇ l :=

β
ρ̄(s+β+θ+c)+β

and π̈ l :=

β
,
ρ̄(θ+c)+β

which are used to classify

the different levels of the low second-period attack rate (π l ). Since s+β +θ+c > θ+c,
0 < π̇ l < π̈ l < 1.
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Definition 2. As shown in Table 2.3, the low second-period attack rate (π l ) is
considered low if 0 ≤ π l < π̇ l , medium if π̇ l ≤ π l < π̈ l , and high if π̈ l ≤ π l ≤ 1.
Third, let π̇ h (i) := max{0, min{1, π l +
π̈ h (i) := max{0, min{1,

π l (ρ̄(θ+c)+β)+α
θ+c

a1
ρ̄(θ+c)+β

·

α+a1
θ+c

·

and

1
+ α+a
· i }} when π l when π l is low or medium
θ+c n−i

(0 ≤ π l < π̈ l ). Further, let π̇ h (i) := max{0, min{1,
π̈ h (i) := max{0, min{1, β+α
+
θ+c

i
}}
n−i

i
}}
n−i

β
ρ̄(θ+c)+β

+

a1
ρ̄(θ+c)+β

·

i
}}
n−i

and

when π l is high (π̈ l ≤ π l ≤ 1). Both π̇ h (i)

and π̈ h (i) are valid for 0 < i < n, and they describe the different levels of the high
second-period attack rate (π h ). As shown in Appendix A.1.1, π̈ h (i) ≥ π̇ h (i) when the
treatment is either less effective or somewhat effective (0 ≤ ρ < ρ̈). π̇ h (i) increases
(decreases) in i when a1 is positive (negative), while π̈ h (i) increases (decreases) in i
when α + a1 is positive (negative).
Definition 3. We classify the high second-period attack rate (π h ) under two
scenarios. In the first scenario, the treatment is less effective or somewhat effective
(0 ≤ π l < π̈ l ). π h is considered low if 0 ≤ π h < π̇ h (i), medium if π̇ h (i) ≤ π h < π̈ h (i),
and high if π̈ h (i) ≤ π h ≤ 1. In the second scenario, the treatment is very effective.
π h is considered low when 0 ≤ π h < π̈ h (i) and high if π̈ h (i) ≤ π h ≤ 1. Table 2.4
summarizes the conditions used to define these levels.
Table 2.4 Classification of the High Second-period Attack Rate (π h )
Levels of π h when 0 ≤ ρ < ρ̈
Condition
πh
0 ≤ π h < π̇ h (i)
low
π̇ h (i) ≤ π h < π̈ h (i) medium
π̈ h (i) ≤ π h ≤ 1
high

2.3.1.1

Levels of π h when ρ̈ ≤ ρ ≤ 1
Condition
πh
0 ≤ π h < π̈ h (i)

low

π̈ h (i) ≤ π h ≤ 1

high

General characteristics of optimal solutions. We find three types of

optimal treatment decisions in the first period: treating no trees (N as an abbreviated
notation), treating only infested trees (I), and treating all trees (A). As shown in
Figure 2.4, the optimal treatment decision depends on the infestation level (i), the
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treatment effectiveness (ρ), and the two second-period attack rates (π l and π h ). At
the top level, the tree diagram is split into three nodes based on how many trees
are infested in the first period. The treatment decision is simple when there are no
infested trees (i = 0). In this case, the value of the low second-period attack rate (π l )
governs whether to treat all trees or to treat none. Recall that a healthy tree, if not
treated in the first period, may become infested in the second period with probability
π l . If π l is high, treating all trees in the first period will prevent them from becoming
infested in the second period. On the other hand, if π l is low or medium, healthy
trees are unlikely to be infested in the second period, and thus, there is no need for
the landowner to treat them in the first period. Similarly, when all trees are infested
(i = n), the treatment decision is solely driven by whether or not the treatment is
very effective. If so, it is worth the landowner’s effort to treat the infested trees.
Otherwise, the landowner is better off removing all.
i
i=0

0<i<n
ρ

πl
L or M
N

i=n
ρ

LE or SE

H

VE

πl

A
L or M

LE or SE

πl

A

H

L or M

H

N

VE

A
π

h

L

π

h

M or H

L

N

I
M or H
A

I

N

L stands for low, M stands for medium, H stands for high, LE stands for
less effective, SE stands for somewhat effective, and VE stands for very
effective.

Figure 2.4 The optimal treatment decision vs. key parameters.
When some (but not all) trees are infested, the treatment decision is jointly
determined by ρ, π l , and π h . Therefore, the middle branch of the tree is further split
29

into multiple levels. Rather than discussing each branch separately, we summarize
the results based on the optimal treatment decision. First, it is optimal for the
landowner not to treat any trees (N ) if the treatment is not very effective and π h is
low. As illustrated in Figure 2.3, not treating all of the infested trees will lead to a
higher attack rate in the second period. However, because π h is low, the chance of
a healthy tree becoming infested is still small. As a result, the infestation level will
not increase significantly in the second period. On the other hand, trees that are
infested have a slim chance of surviving after treatment when the treatment is not
very effective. Therefore, the benefit of treating infested trees does not outweigh the
cost of treatment, and the landowner is better to remove the infested trees.
Second, treating only infested trees (I) is optimal for the landowner if π l is
low or medium, and either the treatment is very effective or π h is medium or high.
Because π l is low or medium, healthy trees in the first period are less likely to get
infested in the second period, and thus, they do not require preventative treatment.
In the first case where the treatment is very effective, an infested tree that is treated
has a high chance of surviving at the end of the case. In the second case, where π h is
medium or high, I is beneficial even when treatment is not very effective because it
prevents the infestation level from increasing significantly in the second period.
Third, the landowner is induced to treat all trees (A) otherwise. First, when the
treatment is very effective and π l is high, treating all trees will not only enable the
infested trees to survive but also allow the healthy trees to become EAB resistant.
Second, when the treatment is not very effective, π l is high, and π h is medium or
high, the landowner still treats all trees to ensure that none of the healthy trees will
become infested in the second period.
In the next sections, we discuss the optimal solutions in detail under three
settings: when no trees are infested (i = 0), when all trees are infested (i = n), and
when some trees are infested (0 < i < n).
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2.3.1.2

Optimal solution characteristics when no trees are infested.

Because there are no infested trees (i = 0) in the first period, the second-period
attack rate is π l no matter what the landowner chooses to do in the previous period.
Let q ∗ (i) and r∗ (i) denote the optimal treatment option selected by the landowner
and the reimbursement from the local government, respectively. The characteristics
of the optimal solution when no trees are infested are summarized in Proposition 1.
See Appendix A.1.2.1 for the proof of Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. When no trees are infested in the first period, the optimal treatment
decision and the optimal reimbursement depend on the low second-period attack rate
(π l ), as shown in Table 2.5.
If π l is low or medium (0 ≤ π l < π̈ l ), the landowner is induced to not treat
any trees (N ) in the first period. The reimbursement decreases in the treatment
effectiveness (ρ). Moreover, it is less than or equal to the inspection cost (αn) if the
treatment is very effective (ρ̈ ≤ ρ ≤ 1) and greater than the inspection cost otherwise.
Table 2.5 The Optimal Solution When i = 0
Conditions Optimal Treatment
Optimal Reimbursement

l
l
∗
∗
0 ≤ π < π̈
q (0) = 0 (N)
r (0) =max 0, αn + a1 π l n 
π̈ l ≤ π l ≤ 1
q ∗ (0) = n (A)
r∗ (0) = max 0, αn + β − (θ + c)π l n
If π l is high (π̈ l ≤ π l ≤ 1), the local government encourages the landowner
to treat all trees (A).

The reimbursement decreases in π l .

Further, it is less

β
than the inspection cost when π l is very high (π l > max{ θ+c
, π̈ l }). Otherwise, the

reimbursement is greater than the inspection cost.
Insights from Proposition 1. First, even though the local government does
not want the landowner to treat any trees (N ) in the first period when π l is low or
medium, the reimbursement must include the future cost or benefit from treating
newly infested trees in the second period. If the treatment is not very effective
(0 ≤ ρ < ρ̈), the net loss for the landowner is a1 = β − ρ(θ + c) per infested tree.
31

Anticipating π l n trees to be infested in the second period, the local government needs
to reimburse the net expected loss from unsuccessful treatment, a1 π l n, to induce the
landowner to participate in the cost-sharing program. Therefore, the reimbursement
is greater than the inspection cost, i.e., r∗ (0) > αn. As the treatment effectiveness
(ρ) increases, a1 decreases. When ρ becomes very effective, a1 turns negative and
represents the landowner’s net gain per infested tree. As a result, the reimbursement
becomes lower than or equal to the inspection cost (r∗ (0) ≤ αn) and can even be
reduced to zero. Therefore, the operator max{0, αn + a1 π l n} is used to prevent the
reimbursement from being negative.
Second, the local government’s strategy changes drastically when the possibility
of a tree becoming infested in the second period is high (π̈ l < π l ≤ 1). The local
government prefers the landowner to treat all trees (A) in the first period. This is
because not only do all of them become resistant to EAB in the second period but also
the reimbursement is likely to be smaller than the inspection cost since β − (θ + c)π l
can also be negative when π l is greater than

2.3.1.3

β
.
θ+c

Optimal solution characteristics when all trees are infested. In

the case where all trees are already infested in the first period, any untreated trees
will die, while the successfully-treated ones will be EAB resistant in the next period.
We summarize the results in Proposition 2. The proof of Proposition 2 is in Appendix
A.1.2.2.
Proposition 2. When all trees are infested in the first period, the optimal treatment
decision and the optimal reimbursement are driven by the effectiveness of the
treatment (ρ), as presented in Table 2.6.

If the treatment is less or somewhat

effective, the local government only reimburses the landowner’s inspection cost, and
consequently, the landowner will not treat any trees (N ).
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Table 2.6 The Optimal Solution When i = n
Condition Optimal Treatment
Optimal Reimbursement
0 ≤ ρ < ρ̈
q ∗ (n) = 0 (N )
r∗ (n) = αn
∗
∗
ρ̈ ≤ ρ ≤ 1
q (n) = n (A)
r (n) = max {0, αn + a1 n} < αn
If, on the other hand, the treatment is very effective, the local government
can induce the landowner to treat all trees (A) with a reimbursement less than the
inspection cost.
Insights from Proposition 2. The most notable characteristic of the optimal
solution is that the reimbursement is always less than or equal to the inspection cost.
If the treatment is not very effective, the landowner would not treat any trees, and
consequently, all trees would die. Since the landowner is ultimately responsible for
removing the dead ash trees, the local government only needs to compensate the
landowner with the inspection cost.
The landowner would treat all trees if the treatment is very effective. Therefore,
the cost of the inspection is offset by the landowner’s utility from successfully-treated
trees and consequently the local government only covers a portion of the inspection
cost to induce the landowner to participate.

The reimbursement monotonically

decreases as ρ increases, and it can be reduced to zero when ρ is really high, or
equivalently, when ρ ≥

2.3.1.4

α+β
.
θ+c

Optimal solution characteristics when some trees are infested.

We divide our discussion into two scenarios based on the treatment effectiveness.
First, we discuss the scenario where the treatment is very effective. Proposition 3
summarizes the key results. See Appendix A.1.2.3 for proof of Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. If the treatment is very effective, the optimal treatment decision is
driven by the low second-period attack rate (π l ) while the reimbursement depends on
the high second-period attack rate (π h ), as shown in Table 2.7.
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When π l is low or medium (0 ≤ π l < π̈ l ), the landowner is induced to treat all
infested trees (I). The local government offers a positive reimbursement when π h is
low or medium. Otherwise, the reimbursement is reduced to zero.
Table 2.7 The Optimal Solution When 0 < i < n, and the Treatment is Very
Effective (ρ ≥ ρ̈)
Condition
0 ≤ π h < π̈ h (i)
π̈ h (i) ≤ π h ≤ 1
Condition
0 ≤ π h < π̈ h (i)
π̈ h (i) ≤ π h ≤ 1

π l is low or medium: 0 ≤ π l < π̈ l
Optimal
Optimal Reimbursement
Treatment
q ∗ (i) = i (I) r∗ (i) = αn + a1 n − [a1 π̄ l + (θ + c)(π h − π l )](n − i) > 0
q ∗ (i) = i (I)
r∗ (i) = 0
Optimal
Treatment
q ∗ (i) = n (A)
q ∗ (i) = n (A)

π l is high: π̈ l ≤ π l ≤ 1
Optimal Reimbursement
r∗ (i) = αn + a1 n − [a1 − β + (θ + c)π h ](n − i) > 0
r∗ (i) = 0

When π l is high (π̈ l ≤ π l ≤ 1), then the landowner chooses to treat all trees
(A). The local government may offer a positive reimbursement when the value of π h
is low or medium.
It is worth noting that because the landowner will at least treat the infested
trees in the first period, π h would not be realized in the next period. However, the
reimbursement decreases as π h increases. When π h is high, the reimbursement is
zero. This is because as the risk of healthy trees getting infested in the second period
increases, the landowner would have to treat the trees anyhow. Therefore, the local
government needs to offer a small award to induce the landowner to participate.
Next, we present the optimal solution when the treatment is not very effective.
Proposition 4 highlights the key results. The proof of Proposition 4 is in Appendix
A.1.2.4.
Proposition 4. If the treatment is not very effective, the optimal solution depends
on both of the second-period attack rates (π l and π h ), as illustrated in Table 2.8.
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When π h is low (0 ≤ π h < π̇ h (i)), the landowner is induced not to treat any
trees (N ) regardless of the value of π l . The local government offers a reimbursement
that is higher than the inspection cost, that is, r∗ (i) = αn + a1 π h (n − i) > αn.
Table 2.8 Optimal Solution When 0 < i < n, and the Treatment is Not Very
Effective (ρ < ρ̈)
Condition
0 ≤ π h < π̇ h (i)
π̇ h (i) ≤ π h < π̈ h (i)
π̈ h (i) ≤ π h ≤ 1

π l is low or medium: 0 ≤ π l < π̈ l
Optimal Treatment
Optimal Reimbursement
q ∗ (i) = 0 (N )
r∗ (i) = αn + a1 π h (n − i) > αn
q ∗ (i) = i (I)
r∗ (i) = αn + a1 n − [a1 π̄ l + (θ + c)(π h − π l )](n − i) > 0
∗
q (i) = i (I)
r∗ (i) = 0

Condition
0 ≤ π h < π̇ h (i)
π̇ h (i) ≤ π h < π̈ h (i)
π̈ h (i) ≤ π h ≤ 1

π l is high: π̈ l ≤ π l ≤ 1
Optimal Treatment
Optimal Reimbursement
q ∗ (i) = 0 (N )
r∗ (i) = αn + a1 π h (n − i) > αn
q ∗ (i) = n (A)
r∗ (i) = αn + a1 n − [a1 − β + (θ + c)π h ](n − i) > 0
∗
q (i) = n (A)
r∗ (i) = 0

When π h is medium (π̇ h (i) ≤ π h ≤ π̈ h (i)), then the value of π l determines the
optimal solution. When π l is low or medium (0 ≤ π l < π̈ l ), the landowner is induced
to treat all infested trees (I). The reimbursement is positive. Further, r∗ increases
in i if a1 π̄ l + (θ + c)(π h − π l ) < 0 and decreases in i otherwise. When π l is high
(π̈ l ≤ π l ≤ 1), the local government prefers the landowner to treat all trees (A), which
includes both infested and healthy trees.
When π h is high (π̈ h (i) ≤ π h ≤ 1), the reimbursement is zero. The landowner
will treat all trees when π l is high and only the infested trees (I) otherwise.
Unlike the results from when the treatment is very effective, π h can be realized
in the second period when it is low (0 ≤ π h < π̇ h (i)). In such a scenario, the
local government prefers the landowner not to treat any trees in the first period
because the effectiveness of the treatment is not sufficiently high. Therefore, inducing
the landowner to treat infested trees is too costly for the local government, and it
outweighs the benefit. In the next period, the remaining healthy trees would be
infested with π h . Therefore, the local government offers a reimbursement that covers
not only the inspection cost but also part of the treatment cost in the second period.
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2.3.2

Numerical Insights

We illustrate the impact of key input parameters, such as the second-period attack
rates (π h and π l ), and the treatment effectiveness (ρ) on the optimal solution. Four
scenarios are created by varying (1) the low second-period attack rate (π l ) between
high and low or medium and (2) the treatment effectiveness (ρ) between very effective
and not very effective (less or somewhat effective). Additionally, in each scenario, we
pick one or two values of π h to show the relationship between the optimal solution
and the key input parameters.
2.3.2.1

Scenario 1: The low second-period attack rate is low or medium,

and the treatment is not very effective. We present two examples under the
scenario where the low second-period attack rate is low or medium (π l < π̈ l ), and the
treatment is not very effective (ρ < ρ̈) by varying the value of the high second-period
attack rate (π h ). The other values used in the numerical examples are summarized
in Table 2.9.
Table 2.9 Parameters Used under Scenario 1 (π l < π̈ l and ρ < ρ̈)
n
5

α
40

β
294

c
500

θ
50

s
100

ρ
0.20

π
0.29

πl
0.25

π̈ l
0.40

ρ̈
0.53

a1
184

b1
111

Example 1: The high second-period attack rate (π h ) is low for some
infestation levels and medium for others. Figure 2.5 illustrates the optimal
solution when π h = 0.45. It is optimal to treat the infested trees (I) only when the
infestation level is low (1 ≤ i ≤ 2) and not to treat any trees (N ) otherwise. We
use the notation of N00 I12 N35 to represent the optimal treatment decisions (OTDs),
where the subscript after each action (N or I) is the starting infestation level and the
superscript is the ending infestation level. N35 means not treating any trees when the
infestation level is between 3 and 5.
To better understand the optimal solution, we examine the values provided in
the table in Figure 2.5. First, when no trees are infested (i = 0), the optimal decision
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i
0
1
2
3
4
5

π̇ h (i)
0.31
0.42
0.63
1
-

π̈ h (i)
0.51
0.68
1
1
-

π h Level
medium
medium
low
low
-

q ∗ (i)
0
1
2
0
0
0

r∗ (i)
$430
$128
$376
$366
$283
$200

Figure 2.5 The optimal solution under Scenario 1 when π h = 0.45. Plot (left):
The optimal treatment decisions vs. infestation level (top) and the reimbursement
vs. infestation level (bottom). Table (right): Categorization of π h , the optimal
treatment decision, and the reimbursement for each infestation level.
is not to treat any trees in the first period (N ). Because all trees are healthy and the
low second-period attack rate (π l ) is either low or medium, it is unnecessary for the
landowner to treat any trees. However, the local government offers a reimbursement
of r∗ (0) = αn + a1 π l n = $430, as the analytical solution shown in Table 2.5. The
reimbursement is much higher than the inspection cost (αn = $200). Because the
treatment is not very effective (ρ < ρ̈ or a1 > 0), the local government needs to offer
a high enough incentive for the landowner to treat newly infested trees in the second
period.
Next, we examine the solution when some (but not all) trees are infested (0 <
i < n). As appeared in Figure 2.5, π̇ h (1) = 0.31 < π h = 0.45 < π̈ h (1) = 0.51 and
π̇ h (2) = 0.42 < π h = 0.45 < π̈ h (2) = 0.68. Therefore, π h is medium when i is 1 or 2.
Table 2.8 shows that it is optimal to treat only the infested trees (q ∗ (i) = i) and the
reimbursement is r∗ (i) = αn + a1 n − [a1 π̄ l + (θ + c)(π h − π l )](n − i), which increases
in i. On the other hand, π h is low when i is 3 or 4 because π h = 0.45 < π̇ h (3) =
0.63 < π̇ h (4) = 1. As per Table 2.8, not treating any trees (q ∗ (i) = 0) is optimal and
the reimbursement, r∗ (i) = αn + a1 π h (n − i), decreases in i. As a result, neither the
treatment decision nor the reimbursement is monotonic in the infestation level (i).
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Last, when all trees are already infested (i = n = 5), the local government only
reimburses the landowner the inspection cost. Even though the landowner is expected
to remove all trees because treatment is not very effective, none of the removal cost
is substituted by the local government.
In summary, a higher reimbursement is required when the local government
wants to induce the landowner to deviate from his best action when no reimbursement
is offered. In this example, the landowner receives the highest reimbursement when
there are no trees infested in the first period because he is encouraged to treat all
newly infested trees in the second period even though the treatment is not effective.
This decision would not be optimal for him if the reimbursement is not so high. On
the other hand, when there is only one tree infested in the first period, the landowner
receives very little financial award because his best action would be to treat the
infested tree to prevent a much higher chance (π h = 0.45) of having newly infested
trees in the second period.
Example 2: The high second-period attack rate (π h ) can be low,
medium, or high. As illustrated by Figure 2.6, the optimal treatment decision
when π h = 0.70 is very similar to that in the previous example. That is, it is optimal
to treat only the infested trees (I) when the infestation level (i) is low (between 1
and 3) while not treating any trees (N ) otherwise (at zero or above 3). N00 I13 N45 thus
representing the OTDs. Differently from the previous example, the landowner will
treat the infested trees without any reimbursement from the local government when
the infestation level is sufficiently low (i = 1 or 2).
We focus our discussion on the reimbursement when some trees are infested
(0 < i < n) because the optimal solution when none (or all) of the trees are infested is
the same as the previous example. Because π̈ h (1) = 0.51 < π̈ h (2) = 0.68 < π h = 0.70,
π h is high when the infestation level is low (i = 1, 2). As the analytical solution shown
in Table 2.8, the optimal treatment decision is to treat the infested trees (q ∗ (i) = i),
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i
0
1
2
3
4
5

π̇ h (i)
0.31
0.42
0.63
1
-

π̈ h (i)
0.51
0.68
1
1
-

π h Level
high
high
medium
low
-

q ∗ (i)
0
1
2
3
0
0

r∗ (i)
$430
$0
$0
$349
$329
$200

Figure 2.6 The optimal solution under Scenario 1 when π h = 0.70. Plot (left):
The optimal treatment decisions vs. infestation level (top) and the reimbursement
vs. infestation level (bottom). Table (right): Categorization of π h , the optimal
treatment decision, and the reimbursement for each infestation level.
and the optimal reimbursement is zero (r∗ (i) = 0). Given that the majority of the
trees are healthy (i ≤ 2) in the first period and not treating the infested trees will
result in a high chance (70%) of any healthy tree becoming infested in the second
period, the landowner must treat the infested trees. As a result, no financial incentives
are needed from the local government.
The optimal solution changes when the majority of the trees are already infested
in the first period (i ≥ 3). When the infestation level reaches 3, π h is medium (since
π̇ h (3) = 0.63 < π h = 0.70 < π̈ h (3) = 1), the local government will need to provide a
substantial reimbursement, higher than inspection cost, to induce the landowner to
treat the infested trees. When the infestation level is at or above 4, the landowner
would not treat any trees due to the treatment being not very effective. However,
the local government still needs to offer a reimbursement higher than or equal to the
inspection cost to induce the landowner to participate.

2.3.2.2

Scenario 2: The low second-period attack rate is high, and the

treatment is not very effective. Regarding the scenario where the low secondperiod attack rate π l is high (π l ≥ π̈ l ), and the treatment is not very effective (ρ < ρ̈),
we present the optimal solution under two values of π h . Table 2.10 provides the values
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used in this scenario. It is worth mentioning that even though π l is high, it is still
lower than the first-period attack rate (π l < π).
Table 2.10 Parameters Used under Scenario 2 (π l ≥ π̈ l and ρ < ρ̈)
n
5

α
40

β
294

c
900

θ
50

s
100

ρ
0.15

π
0.28

πl
0.27

π̈ l
0.27

ρ̈
0.31

a1
152

b1
-14

Example 1: The high second-period attack rate (π h ) is low for all
levels of infestation. The optimal solution when π h = 0.29 is shown in Figure 2.7.
Treating all trees (A) is optimal only when no trees are infested (i = 0). Otherwise,
it is best not to treat any trees (N ). The OTDs are thus A00 N15 . Given that π h is low
and π l is high, they are not sufficiently different. Therefore, whether or not to treat
the infested trees in the first period has very little effect on the possibility of healthy
trees becoming infested in the second period. Further, because the treatment is not
very effective, the treatment cost (and eventual removal cost when it fails) outweighs
the potential benefit of treating the infested trees. The only exception would be when
no trees are infested, as treating all trees allow them to be EAB resistant in the second
period.

i
0
1
2
3
4
5

π̇ h (i)
0.30
0.36
0.47
0.82
-

π̈ h (i)
0.40
0.49
0.65
1.00
-

π h Level
low
low
low
low
-

q ∗ (i)
5
0
0
0
0
0

r∗ (i)
$388
$376
$332
$288
$244
$200

Figure 2.7 The optimal solution under Scenario 2 when π h = 0.29. Plot (left):
The optimal treatment decisions vs. infestation level (top) and the reimbursement
vs. infestation level (bottom). Table (right): Categorization of π h , the optimal
treatment decision, and the reimbursement for each infestation level.
As the analytical solution presented in Table 2.5, the optimal treatment decision
and the reimbursement depend only on π l . In the case of π l ≥ π̈ l , the optimal solution
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is q ∗ (0) = n = 5 and r∗ (0) = αn + [β − π l (θ + c)]n = $388. When some trees are
infested (0 < i < n), the reimbursement, as per Table 2.8, is r∗ (i) = αn + a1 π h (n − i).
Because a1 is positive, the reimbursement decreases in i, as illustrated in Figure 2.7.
Example 2: The high second-period attack rate (π h ) can be low,
medium, or high. As shown in Figure 2.8, the OTDs are A30 N45 when π h = 0.48.
That is, treat all trees (A) so long as the number of infested trees is not large while
not treating any trees (N ) otherwise. In this example, π l is high and very close to π.
Further, π h is much higher than π l .
Treating all trees means some infested trees may survive while all healthy trees
would become EAB resistant in the second period. The potential benefit from treating
all trees far exceeds the sum of treatment cost and the expected removal cost when
the number of infested trees is small. Therefore, the reimbursement is zero (r∗ (1) =
r∗ (2) = 0). When i = 3, however, a positive reimbursement is needed from the local
government to balance the benefit from treating all trees and the expected costs. As
per the analytical solution in Table 2.8, r∗ (i) = αn+a1 n−[a1 −β+(θ+c)π h ](n−i) > 0.
When the number of infested trees is high (i ≥ 4), treating them is no longer
beneficial because the treatment is not very effective, and there are almost no healthy
trees to protect.

i
0
1
2
3
4
5

π̇ h (i)
0.30
0.36
0.47
0.82
-

π̈ h (i)
0.40
0.49
0.65
1.00
-

π h Level
high
medium
medium
low
-

q ∗ (i)
5
5
5
5
0
0

r∗ (i)
$388
$0
$17
$331
$273
$200

Figure 2.8 The optimal solution under Scenario 3 when π h = 0.48. Plot (left):
The optimal treatment decisions vs. infestation level (top) and the reimbursement
vs. infestation level (bottom). Table (right): Categorization of π h , the optimal
treatment decision, and the reimbursement for each infestation level.
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2.3.2.3

Scenario 3: The low second-period attack rate is low or medium,

and the treatment is very effective. Figure 2.9 presents the optimal solution for
the numerical example using the values listed in Table 2.11. The optimal treatment
is to treat only infested trees (I) regardless of the infestation level (i). The OTDs
are thus N00 I14 A55 . This result is primarily due to two factors. First, because the
treatment is very effective, the infested trees that are treated have a high rate of
survival. Therefore treating the infested trees is a viable and economic strategy.
Second, since π l is much lower than π̈ l (the cutoff value for the low second-period
attack rate to be considered high), the likelihood of a healthy tree becoming infested
in the second period is considered to be low or medium. Consequently, there is no
need to treat any of the healthy trees in the first period.

i
0
1
2
3
4
5

π̈ h (i)
0.42
0.45
0.50
0.66
-

π h Level
low
low
low
low
-

q ∗ (i)
0
1
2
3
4
5

r∗ (i)
$625
$77
$120
$164
$207
$250

Figure 2.9 The optimal solution under Scenario 3 when π h = 0.40. Plot (left):
The optimal treatment decisions vs. infestation level (top) and the reimbursement
vs. infestation level (bottom). Table (right): Categorization of π h , the optimal
treatment decision, and the reimbursement for each infestation level.
Because the treatment is very effective (ρ ≥ ρ̈), a1 < 0. The reimbursement
when no (resp. all) trees are infested, as per Table 2.5 (resp. Table 2.6), is r∗ (0) =
max{0, αn + a1 π l n} = $625 (resp. r∗ (n) = max{0, αn + a1 n} = $250) and less than
the inspection cost (αn = $750). This means that the local government only needs
to cover a portion of the inspection cost in order for the landowner to participate.
Further, since π h = 0.40 < π̈ h (1) = 0.42 < · · · < π̈ h (4) = 0.66, π h is low for all
infestation levels. As the analytical solution shown in Table 2.7, the reimbursement
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Table 2.11 Parameters Used under Scenario 3 (π l < π̈ l and ρ ≥ ρ̈).
n
5

α
150

β
294

c
738

θ
50

s
100

ρ
0.50

πl
0.25

π
0.30

πh
0.40

π̈ l
0.43

ρ̈
0.37

a1
-100

b1
122

when some trees are infested is r∗ (i) = αn + a1 n − [a1 π̄ l + (θ + c)(π h − π l )](n − i),
which is also less than the inspection cost as a1 < 0. As the number of infested trees
increases, however, r∗ (i) increases, and thus, the local government needs to offer a
slightly higher reimbursement to induce the landowner to participate. An increasing
pattern in reimbursement is thus observed in Figure 2.9.

2.3.2.4

Scenario 4: The low second-period attack rate is high, and the

treatment is very effective. We present the optimal solution using the numerical
values summarized in Table 2.12. As shown in Figure 2.10, it is optimal to treat all
trees (A) regardless of the infestation level, making A50 the OTDs. In this example,
π l > π̈ l (the cutoff value above which the low second-period is considered high), and
thus, the landowner reduces the possibility of any healthy trees from getting infested
in the second period to zero by treating all of them in the first period.

i
0
1
2
3
4
5

π̈ h (i)
0.32
0.33
0.34
0.38
-

π h Level
high
high
low
low
-

q ∗ (i)
5
5
5
5
5
5

r∗ (i)
$313
$0
$0
$18
$47
$75

Figure 2.10 The optimal solution under Scenario 4 when π h = 0.33. Plot (left):
The optimal treatment decisions vs. infestation level (top) and the reimbursement
vs. infestation level (bottom). Table (right): Categorization of π h , the optimal
treatment decision, and the reimbursement for each infestation level.
As per the analytical solution presented in Tables 2.5 and 2.6, the reimbursement
when no trees are infested and when all trees are infested are r∗ (0) = max{0, αn +
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(β − (θ + c)π l )n} = $313 and r∗ (n) = max{0, αn + a1 n} = $75, respectively. Both of
them are less than the inspection cost, αn = $500.
Table 2.12 Parameters Used under Scenario 4 (π l ≥ π̈ l and ρ ≥ ρ̈)
n
5

α
100

β
200

c
900

θ
50

s
100

ρ
0.30

π
0.30

πl
0.25

πh
0.33

π̈ l
0.23

ρ̈
0.21

a1
-85

b1
-16

When i = 1 or 2, π h is high since π h = 0.33 ≥ π̈ h (2) = 0.33 > π̈ h (1) = 0.32.
Therefore, the reimbursement is r∗ (1) = r∗ (2) = 0 as per Table 2.7. Because the
treatment is very effective, treating the infested trees reduces the chance of treated
infested trees from dying. Further, for the healthy trees that are treated, they become
EAB resistant in the second period. The benefit from surviving trees greatly exceeds
the cost of treatment, and thus the local government does not provide any financial
award to the landowner. However, when the infestation level is higher (i = 3, 4),
π h is low as π h = 0.33 < π̈ h (3) = 0.34 < π̈ h (4) = 0.38, the reimbursement is
r∗ (i) = αn+a1 i+β(n−i)−(θ+c)π h (n−i). This implies that the local government will
need to provide a positive, albeit very small, reimbursement to induce the landowner
to treat all trees.

2.4

The Treatment-based Reimbursement Model

In this section, we discuss the treatment-based reimbursement (TBR) model, where
the number of treatment trees (q) is verifiable. This can be achieved if the local
government requires the submission of a service receipt issued by a professional tree
care service who provided the EAB treatment. Differently from the previous model,
the infestation level (i) is assumed to be not verifiable. Moreover, the reimbursement
is given to the landowner after treatment, not prior to.
Sequence of events. The interactions between the local government and the
landowner over two consecutive periods if a landowner participates in the cost-sharing
program are illustrated in Figure 2.11. At the start of the first period, both parties
have the same knowledge about the ash trees: the landowner has n ash trees, and
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the attack rate is π. The local government announces a reimbursement schedule, r =
[r(0), r(1), · · · , r(n)], that prescribes the reimbursement corresponds to the number
of treated trees (q). As an example, r(0) is the reimbursement if no trees are treated
(q = 0). After inspection, the landowner finds out the infestation level (i); however,
he does not report this information to the local government. Instead, he decides
the number of trees to be treated (q(i)) based on the infestation level (i) and the
reimbursement schedule (r). After treatment, the landowner submits the service
receipt that shows the number of treated trees to the local government. He then
receives the reimbursement according to the prescribed schedule. If some infested
trees are not treated in the first period (q(i) < i), the consequence of his decision
over the next two periods is depicted in Figure 2.1. Otherwise, it follows Figure 2.2.
Similar to the assumptions made in the previous model, the reimbursement is only
available in the first period. Therefore, a landowner who wishes to participate must
sign-up before the infestation level is revealed. Further, for simplicity, we assume that
the landowner will treat all newly infested trees in the second period if he participates
in the program.
Landowner’s expected utility when he does not participate in the
program. Because the first-period attack rate is π, each tree is assumed to be
infested equally likely. If no trees are infested (i = 0) in the first period, the attack
rate in the second period decreases to π l . The expected number of trees infested in
period two is π l n. Consequently, these trees would die, and the landowner would
incur a removal cost of cπ l n. The expected number of surviving trees at the end of
the second period is therefore π̄ l n. The landowner’s utility is the difference between
the value of surviving trees and the cost of removal. Since π̄ n is the probability of
zero trees being infested in period one, the weighted expected utility if no trees are
infested is π̄ n · (θπ̄ l n − cπ l n). On the other hand, if all trees are infested (i = n), the
landowner incurs a removal cost of cn when all trees are infested. π n is the probability
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FS announces rebate
r for a LO
with n ash trees

Period
1

common knowledge:
LO has n ash trees,
attack rate is π

FS
reimburses
LO r(q(i))

Period
2

LO identifies
i infested trees
if q(i) < i,
remove (i − q(i)) INT
& ρ̄q(i) IUT trees;
ρq(i) IST trees will
be EAB resistant

attack rate
↑ to π h among
(n − i) HNT trees

if q(i) ≥ i,
remove ρ̄i IUT trees;
(q(i) − i) HT & ρi IST
trees will be
EAB resistant

attack rate
↓ π l among
(n − q(i)) HNT trees

LO treats q(i)
and submit a
receipt to FS

LO stands for landowner, FS for local government, INT for infested trees that are not treated, IST for infested trees
that are successfully-treated, IUT for infested trees that are unsuccessfully-treated, HT for healthy trees that are
treated, and HNT for healthy trees that are not treated.

Figure 2.11 Sequence of events for the treatment-based reimbursement model.
that all trees are infested, and therefore the landowner’s weighted expected utility is
π n · (−cn).
If the number of infested trees is i (0 < i < n) in period one, the attack rate
is increased to π h in the absence of any treatment. The death toll is the sum of
the infested trees (i) in the first period and the expected number of trees that will
be infested (π h (n − i)) in the second period. The number of surviving trees at the
end of period two is π̄ h (n − i). Because the probability of i trees being infested in

the first period is ni π i π̄ n−i , the landowner’s weighted expected utility is therefore

 i n−i  h
n
h
π
π̄
·
θπ̄
(n
−
i)
−
c(π
(n
−
i)
+
i)
.
i
The landowner’s expected utility, Φ(a0 |n), can be computed as follows:
Pn

n
i



π i π̄ n−i · ϕ(a0 |n, i)
 P
n−1
= π̄ n · θπ̄ l n − cπ l n + i=1

Φ(a0 |n) =

0



n
i







π i π̄ n−i · θπ̄ h (n − i) − c(π h (n − i) + i) + π n · − cn .

(2.6)
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Landowner’s expected utility when he participates in the program. If
the landowner does not treat all infested trees (q(i) < i), his expected utility would
be


ϕ q(i), r(q(i))|n, i, q(i) < i = θ · [ρq(i) + π̄ h (n − i) + ρπ h (n − i)] + r(q(i))
−α · n − β · [q(i) + π h (n − i)] − c · [i − ρq(i) + ρ̄π h (n − i)].

(2.7)
The terms in Equation (2.7) are similar to those in Equation (2.2) except that r(i)
has been replaced by r(q(i)). Similarly, the landowner’s expected utility is


ϕ q(i), r(q(i))|n, i, q(i) ≥ i = θ · [q(i) − ρ̄i + π̄ l (n − q(i)) + ρπ l (n − q(i))] + r(q(i))
−α · n − β · [q(i) + π l (n − q(i))] − c · [ρ̄i + ρ̄π l (n − q(i))].

(2.8)
if he treats not only all infested trees but also some healthy trees (q(i) ≥ i). Recall
that µi is defined as an indicator such that µi = 1 when q(i) < i and µi = 0 otherwise.
µ̄i = 1 − µi . The landowner’s expected utility from participating in the cost-sharing
program is thus
Φ(q, r|n) =

Pn
0

n
i


 i n−i 
π π̄
· ϕ q(i), r(q(i))|n, i ,

(2.9)

where






ϕ q(i), r(q(i))|n, i = µi · ϕ q(i), r(q(i))|n, i, q(i) < i + µ̄i · ϕ q(i), r(q(i))|n, i, q(i) ≥ i .

(2.10)

Government’s optimization problem. The local government’s objective is
to maximize her net expected utility, which is the difference between her value from
the surviving trees and the reimbursement provided to the landowner. We can write
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the problem of the local government as follows:

max Ψ(q, r|n) =

Pn







n
i

 i n−i
π π̄ ·


µi · s · [ρq(i) + (π̄ h + ρπ h )(n − i)] − β · [i − ρq(i) + ρ̄π h (n − i)]


+µ̄i · s · [q(i) − ρ̄i + (π̄ l + ρπ l )(n − q(i))] − β · [ρ̄i + ρ̄π l (n − q(i))]

i=0

q,r

−r(q(i))

Φ(q, r|n) ≥ Φ(a0 |n)
s.t.








(IR)

ϕ(q(i)|n, i) ≥ ϕ(j|n, i)

∀ 0 ≤ i ≤ n,

0≤j≤n

r(q(i)) ≥ r(q(i) − 1)

∀ 1 ≤ q(i) ≤ n

(MONi )

q(i), r(q(i)) ≥ 0

∀0≤i≤n

(NNi )

(ICij )

(2.11)
The objective function in Equation (2.11) is the local government’s net expected
utility given a set of treatment decisions (q) and a reimbursement schedule (r). The
individual rationality (IR) constraint encourages the landowner to participate in the
cost-sharing program by ensuring the landowner’s expected utility is higher if he
participates. The incentive compatibility (ICij ) constraints induce the landowner to
pick the treatment decision (q(i)) desired by the local government. The monotonic
(MONi ) constraints ensure the reimbursement is non-decreasing in the number of
treated trees. Finally, both the number of treated trees and the reimbursement are
restricted to be non-negative (NNi ).

2.4.1

Optimal Solutions

Some parameters that were defined in the previous model, such as ρ̇, ρ̈, π̇ l , and π̈ l ,
are also used in this model. We introduce a few new parameters to characterize
the optimal solutions in addition to the former notation. All of them are used to
characterize the optimal solutions. First, let π̂ h := max{0, min{1, π l +
1)}}, which represents a cutoff value that classifies π h .
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a1 −b1
ρ̄(θ+c)+β

· (n −

Definition 4. As shown in Table 2.13, the high second-period attack rate (π h ) is
considered low if 0 ≤ π h < π̂ h and high if π̂ h ≤ π h ≤ 1.
Table 2.13 Categorization of the High Second-period Attack Rate (π h )
Condition
0 ≤ π h < π̂ h
π̂ h ≤ π h ≤ 1

πh
low
high

ρ(θ+c)
Next, let π̂ l (ρ) := max{π̇ l , ρ̄(θ+c)+β
} when the low second-period attack rate (π l )

is medium (π̇ l ≤ π l < π̈ l ), and the treatment (ρ) is somewhat effective (ρ̇ ≤ ρ < ρ̈).
π̂ l (ρ) is less than π̈ l because π̈ l −

ρ(θ+c)
ρ̄(θ+c)+β

=

β−ρ(θ+c)
ρ̄(θ+c)+β

> 0 and π̈ l > π̇ l . We use π̂ l (ρ)

to further classify π l .
Definition 5. The low second-period attack rate (π l ) is considered as medium-low if
π̇ l ≤ π l < π̂ l (ρ) and medium-high if π̂ l (ρ) ≤ π l < π̈ l , as illustrated by Table 2.14.
Table 2.14 Categorization of the Low Second-period Attack Rate (π l )
Condition
π̇ ≤ π l ≤ π̂ l (ρ)
π̂ l (ρ) < π l < π̈ l
l

2.4.1.1

πl
medium-low
medium-high

Optimal treatment decisions. As illustrated in Figure 2.12, we identify

eight sets of optimal treatment decisions (OTD). First, let N00 I1n−1 Ann denote not
treating any trees (N ) when no trees are infested, treating only infested trees (I)
when the infestation level (i) in the first period is between 1 and n − 1, and treating
n
all trees (A) when all are infested. Second, N00 I1j Nj+1
represents not treating any

trees when none are infested, treating only infested trees (I) when the infestation
level (i) is between 1 and j, and not treating any trees (N ) when the infestation level
is between j + 1 and n. Similarly, N00 I1j Anj+1 depicts not treating any trees when
none are infested, treating all infested trees (I) when the infestation level is at or
n
below j and treating all trees (A) when more than j trees are infested. N00 I1j An−1
j+1 Nn

represent the most complex set of decisions where only infested trees are treated (I)
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if the number of trees being infested is between 1 and j, all trees are treated (A) if
the infestation level is higher than j, but none is treated if either no trees or all trees
n
denotes treating all trees (A) when the infestation level is
are infested. N00 Aj1 Nj+1

between 1 and j while not treating any trees otherwise (i = 0 or j + 1 ≤ i ≤ n).
n
n
Aj0 Nj+1
deviates slightly from N00 Aj1 Nj+1
in that all trees are treated even when zero

trees are infested. An−1
Snn denotes treating all trees (A) so long as not of them are
0
already infested (i < n), but treating some trees (S) when all of them are already
infested. Last, An0 represents treating all trees regardless of the infestation level.
q(i): N
i:

0

I

I

i:

1
(c)

q(i): N

A

i: 0

1
(e)

I

A

j j+1

q(i): N

I

i:

1

0

(b)

N
n

I

I

n

i:

1

j j+1 n−1 n

0

N

q(i): A

j j+1

n

i:

A

(f)

A N

N

j j+1

n

n
Aj0 Nj+1

q(i): A

S

n−1 n

i:

An−1
Snn
0

A N

n
N00 I1j An−1
j+1 Nn

0

n
N00 Aj1 Nj+1

(g)

j j+1
n
N00 I1j Nj+1

(d)

A

N

q(i): N

A N

0

I

A

N00 I1j Anj+1

q(i): A
i:

A

n−1 n

1
(a) N00 I1n−1 Ann

q(i): N
0

I

A
n

0
(h)

An0

Figure 2.12 Eight sets of optimal treatment decisions (OTD).
Figure 2.13 shows when each set of OTDs can be optimal. At the top level, the
tree is divided into three branches based on the value of π l , the low second-period
attack rate.
First, let us discuss the left branch of the tree diagram as the results are
n
fairly intuitive. When π l is low, either N00 I1n−1 Ann or N00 I1j Nj+1
can be optimal. A

commonality between the two sets is to treat only the infested trees (I) when the
infestation level is at or below a cutoff value (j) in the first period. This is primarily
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πl
M

L
ρ
LE
n
N00 I1j Nj+1

H

ρ

SE
n
N00 I1j Nj+1
N00 I1n−1 Ann

SE

LE

VE
N00 I1n−1 Ann

πh

ρ

πl

VE

LE

An0
N00 I1j Anj+1

An−1
Nnn
0

SE
An−1
Nnn
0
An−1
Snn
0
An0

VE
An0

MH

L
H

ML

n
Aj0 Nj+1
0 j n
N0 A1 Nj+1
n
N00 I1j An−1
j+1 Nn
An−1
Nnn
0

An0
N00 I1j Anj+1

An−1
Nnn
0
An−1
Snn
0
An0

L, M and H stand for π l is low, medium and high, respectively. ML and MH stand for π l is medium-low and
medium-high, respectively. LE, SE and VE stand for the treatment is less effective, somewhat effective, and
very effective, respectively.

Figure 2.13 Optimal Treatment Decisions vs. Key Parameters.
because π l is low, and thus the chance of a healthy tree, not treated in the first
period, becoming infested in the second period is low. The difference between the
two sets of treatment decisions is what to do when the infestation level is above j.
If the treatment (ρ) is very effective, N00 I1n−1 Ann is optimal. The landowner treats
only infested trees in the first period regardless of the infestation level. On the other
hand, if the treatment is less effective, very few infested and treated trees will survive.
Therefore, the landowner would not treat any trees in the first period, and thus,
n
N00 I1j Nj+1
is optimal. Unfortunately, the remaining healthy tree(s) will face a higher

attack rate (π h ) in the second period. When the treatment is somewhat effective,
n
either N00 I1n−1 Ann or N00 I1j Nj+1
can be optimal. Therefore, a numerical enumeration

is needed in order to find the OTDs.
Next, we examine the OTDs when π l is high. As shown by the right branch of
the tree diagram in Figure 2.13, either one of the following sets can be optimal: An0 ,
An−1
Snn , An−1
Nnn . All three sets of decisions agree to treat all trees in the first period,
0
0
except when all trees are infested, to avoid the realization of a high π l in the second
period. When all trees are already infested in the first period, however, the decision
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depends on the treatment effectiveness. If the treatment is very effective, then treating
all trees is optimal because the chance of survival is high. On the contrary, if the
treatment is not effective, then all trees should be removed. Interestingly, when the
treatment is somewhat effective, it can be optimal to treat some (but not all) trees.
The OTDs when π l is medium, as shown in the middle branch of the tree
diagram in Figure 2.13, are driven by the treatment effectiveness. If the treatment is
very effective, either An0 or N00 I1j Anj+1 can be optimal. Both sets of decisions agree to
treat all trees if the infestation level is beyond some threshold j. Below that value,
the landowner may either treat only infested trees or treat all. If the treatment is
somewhat effective and π l is medium-low, then either An0 or N00 I1j Anj+1 is optimal,
which is the same as that when the treatment is very effective. On the other hand, if
the treatment is somewhat effective and π l is medium-high, then the set of optimal
decisions is the same as when π l is high and the treatment is somewhat effective,
which is to treat all trees except when all trees are already infested. If the treatment
is less effective, then the value of the high second-period attack rate (π h ) determines
n
the optimal treatment decisions. Specifically, when π h is low, either N00 Aj1 Nj+1
or
n
is optimal. The landowner would treat all trees if the infestation level is low,
Aj0 Nj+1

while not treating any trees if the infestation is high. This result is driven by the
fact that the treatment is less effective and therefore should be used mainly for the
prevention of trees becoming infested in the next period. When π h is high, either
n
An−1
Nnn or N00 I1j An−1
0
j+1 Nn is optimal. Both OTDs agree on treating all trees if the

infestation level surpasses a cutoff value (j), so long as not all of them are already
infested. Again, the main purpose of treating all trees is to prevent healthy trees in
the first period from becoming infested in the second.
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2.4.2

Numerical Insights

In this section, we further examine the impact of the second-period attack rates (π h
and π l ) and the treatment effectiveness (ρ) on the optimal solution. Three scenarios
are created by varying π l from low to high to medium.

2.4.2.1

Scenario 1: The low second-period attack rate is low. We present

two examples when the low second-period attack rate is low (π l < π̇ l ) by varying the
treatment effectiveness (ρ). The treatment is less effective in the first example while
it is more effective in the second. The other input parameters and calculated cutoff
values used in the two examples are listed in Table 2.15.
Table 2.15 Input Parameters Used and Calculated Cutoffs When π l is Low
Input Parameters
Calculated Cutoffs
n α
β
c
θ
s
π
πl
πh
ρ̇
ρ̈
π̇ l
5 40 294 738 50 100 0.30 0.20 0.4 0.25 0.37 0.24
Example 1: The treatment is less effective (ρ = 0.20 < ρ̇ = 0.25). The
optimal solution is shown in Figure 2.14. The table on the left presents the menu
of reimbursement based on the number of treated trees (q). The local government
announces this menu at the beginning of period one. The bottom plot on the right
illustrates the OTDs of the landowner are based on the infestation level (i) while the
top plot shows the corresponding reimbursement he would receive. The landowner
would only treat the infested trees (I) when the infestation level is at or below 3 while
not treating any trees (N ) when the infestation level is at 0 or above 3. Since π l is low,
treating infested trees when the infestation level is low is beneficial to the landowner
because the attack rate in the second period is decreased to 0.20. However, there is
little benefit in treating the infested trees when most trees are already infested, and
the treatment is less effective. Therefore, the OTDs in this example are N00 I13 N45 .
We observe that the reimbursement is a step function of the number of the
treated trees (q) in the first period: the landowner receives $64 for treating less than
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q
0
1
2
3
4
5

r∗ (q)
$64
$64
$64
$103
$103
$103

Figure 2.14 The optimal solution when π l is low and ρ is less effective. Table
(left): The optimal reimbursement schedule. Plot (right): The OTDs (top) and the
corresponding reimbursement (bottom).
three trees while receiving $103 for treatment more than that. Both reimbursement
amounts are much lower than the inspection cost (αn = $200).

Further, the

reimbursement the landowner would receive is non-monotonic in the infestation level
(i). In this example, the landowner only gets the higher reimbursement when the
infestation level is three. He would receive a smaller reimbursement otherwise.
Example 2: The treatment is very effective (ρ = 0.40 > ρ̈ = 0.37).
Figure 2.15 illustrates the optimal solution. The landowner would treat all infested
trees regardless of the infestation level. This result is quite intuitive because the
benefit from treating the infested trees sufficiently outweighs the cost. Moreover,
since π l is low, there is no need to treat healthy trees in the first period to prevent
more trees from becoming infested in the second period. The OTDs are thus N00 I15 A55 .
Interestingly, the reimbursement is zero for any number of treated trees, which
suggests that treating infested trees is a superior option for the landowner, and thus,
the local government does not need to provide any financial award.

2.4.2.2

Scenario 2: The low second-period attack rate is high. When π l

is high, the optimal treatment decision is to treat all trees (A) so long as not all
of them are infested in the first period. When all trees are infested, however, the
optimal treatment decision depends on the treatment effectiveness. To illustrate

54

q
0
1
2
3
4
5

r∗ (q)
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0

b

Figure 2.15 The optimal solution when π l is low and ρ is very effective. Table
(left): The optimal reimbursement schedule. Plot (right): The OTDs (top) and the
corresponding reimbursement (bottom).
this relationship, we provide two examples where the treatment is somewhat effective
(ρ = 0.30) in one and very effective (ρ = 0.38) in another. The other input parameters
used and calculated cutoff values in these numerical examples are listed in Table 2.16.
Table 2.16 Input Parameters Used and Cutoff Values When π l is High and ρ is
Somewhat Effective
Input Parameters
Calculated Cutoffs
n α
β
c
θ
s
π
πl
πh
ρ̇
ρ̈
5 40 294 738 50 100 0.40 0.38 0.50 0.25
0.37
Example 1: The treatment is somewhat effective (ρ̇ = 0.25 < ρ = 0.30 <
ρ̈ = 0.37). The optimal solution is presented in Figure 2.16. The OTDs are A40 S55 ,
where S = 1. When all trees are infested, the landowner would only treat one tree.
The reason for this decision is largely due to the reimbursement schedule, which is
presented in the left table of Figure 2.16. In order to induce the landowner to treat all
trees when not all of them are infested in the first period, the local government sets
the reimbursement to a lower value ($58) for treating any number of trees between 1
and 4 while offering a much higher compensation ($102) for treating 5 trees. Given
that the treatment is only somewhat effective, the landowner would not want to treat
all. Therefore, he would choose to treat the minimum number of trees (q ∗ (5) = 1) to
get the lower reimbursement.
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q
0
1
2
3
4
5

r∗ (q)
$0
$58
$58
$58
$58
$102

Figure 2.16 The optimal solution when π l is high (π l = 0.38 > π̈ l = 0.35) and ρ
is somewhat effective. Table (left): The optimal reimbursement schedule. Plot
(right): The OTDs (top) and the corresponding reimbursement (bottom).
Example 2: The treatment is very effective (ρ̈ = 0.37 < ρ = 0.38). As
shown in Figure 2.17, the OTDs are A50 . Because the treatment is very effective,
treating all trees even when all of them are already infested in the first period is
beneficial to the landowner. Further, the local government does not need to provide
any reimbursement.

q
0
1
2
3
4
5

r∗ (q)
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0

Figure 2.17 The optimal solution when π l is high (π l = 0.38 ≥ π̈ l = 0.38) and ρ
is very effective. Table (left): The optimal reimbursement schedule. Plot (right):
The OTDs (top) and the corresponding reimbursement (bottom).
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2.4.2.3

Scenario 3: The low second-period attack rate is medium. As

discussed in Section 2.4.1.1, when π l is medium (π̇ l ≤ π l < π̈ l ), there are two key
factors that determine the optimal treatment decisions. First, when the treatment is
less effective, the value of the high second-period attack rate (π h ) determines which set
n
n
of treatment decisions among Aj0 , N00 Aj1 Nj+1
, and N00 I1j An−1
j+1 Nn is optimal. Second,

when the treatment is somewhat effective, the relationship between π l and ρ decides
what would the set of optimal treatment decisions look like. An example of each
aforementioned scenario is presented next.

2.4.2.3.1

The effect of π h on the OTDs when the treatment is less

effective. We present three examples to illustrate the impact of π h on the optimal
solution by varying its value among 0.35, 0.50 and 0.75. Table 2.17 lists the other
parameters and calculated cutoffs used in all three examples.
Table 2.17 Parameters Used When π l is Medium and ρ is Less Effective
Input Parameters
Calculated Cutoffs
n α
β
c
θ
s
ρ
π
πl
ρ̇
ρ̈
π̇ l
π̈ l
π̂ h
5 40 294 738 50 100 0.20 0.30 0.25 0.25 0.38 0.24 0.32 0.57
Example 1: Figure 2.18 shows the optimal solution when π h is 0.35, which
is considered low since π h < π̂ h . The OTDs are A30 N45 . Because π l is medium, the
landowner would prefer to avoid the chance of healthy trees getting infested in the
second period. Therefore, he would choose to treat all trees if the infestation level
in the first period is at or below 3. However, when the infestation level is above 3,
he would not treat any trees because the treatment is less effective. To encourage
the landowner to treat all trees, the local government sets a generous reimbursement
of $534 for treating all trees. The reimbursement for any other treatment decision,
however, is only a token amount of $18.
Example 2: As shown in Figure 2.19, the set of optimal treatment decisions,
N00 A31 N45 , when π h = 0.50 varies slightly from that when π h = 0.35. The landowner
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q
0
1
2
3
4
5

r∗ (q)
$18
$18
$18
$18
$18
$534

Figure 2.18 The optimal solution when π l is medium, ρ is less effective, and
π h = 0.35. The set of optimal treatment decisions is A30 N45 .Table (left): The optimal
reimbursement schedule. Plot (right): The OTDs (top) and the corresponding
reimbursement (bottom).
would not treat any trees when no trees have been infested in the first period. This
is because the local government provides a much lower financial award ($252) for
treating all trees. His other treatment decisions when there is at least one infested
tree, however, are the same as those when π h = 0.35 since not treating all trees would
lead to a much higher attack rate in the second period.

q
0
1
2
3
4
5

r∗ (q)
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$252

Figure 2.19 The optimal solution when π l is medium, ρ is less effective, and
π h = 0.50. The set of optimal treatment decisions is N00 A31 N45 . Table (left): The
optimal reimbursement schedule. Plot (right): The OTDs (top) and the
corresponding reimbursement (bottom).
Example 3: When π h is 0.75, it is considered high because π h ≥ π̂ h . As per
Figure 2.20, Even though the reimbursement scheme is quite similar to that when
π h = 0.50, the OTDs are I01 A42 N55 instead. Because the reimbursement for treating all
trees is only $189, the landowner would not treat all trees when the infestation level is
0 or 1. Instead, he would treat only infested trees and take the risk of newly infested
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trees with a medium attack rate (π l = 0.25). However, when the infestation level is
between 2 and 4, treating all trees can prevent healthy trees from becoming infested
in the second period. When all trees are infested, treating them is not optimal since
the treatment is less effective.

q
0
1
2
3
4
5

r∗ (q)
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$189

Figure 2.20 The optimal solution when π l is medium, ρ is less effective, and
π h = 0.75. Table (left): The optimal reimbursement schedule. Plot (right): The
OTDs (top) and the corresponding reimbursement (bottom).

2.4.2.3.2

The effect of the relationship between π l and ρ on the OTDs

when the treatment is somewhat effective. Recall that π l is considered
medium-low if it is less than π̂ l (ρ) and medium-high otherwise (see Definition 4).
We present a numerical example for each case. The other parameters and calculated
cutoffs are shown in Table 2.18.
Table 2.18 Input Parameters Used and Calculated Cutoffs When π l is Medium and ρ
is Somewhat Effective

n
5

α
40

β
200

Input Parameters
c
θ
s
ρ
900 50 100 0.20

π
0.30

h

π
0.60

Calculated Cutoffs
ρ̇
ρ̈
π̇ l
π̈ l
π̂ l (ρ)
0.16 0.21 0.17 0.21 0.20

Example 1: The OTDs when π l is 0.17, as shown in Figure 2.21, are N00 I12 A53 .
The local government does not provide any financial award unless all trees are treated.
This result is intuitive since π l is medium-low, and the chance of healthy trees
becoming newly infested in the second period is fairly low. Therefore, only infested
trees need to be treated in the first period so long as the infestation level is sufficiently
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low (below 3). However, if the infestation level is already high (at or above 3), the
landowner is better off treating all of them as the treatment is somewhat effective,
and this is the only option for the landowner to receive partial reimbursement.

q
0
1
2
3
4
5

r∗ (q)
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$74

Figure 2.21 The optimal solution when π l is medium-low, and ρ is somewhat
effective. Table (left): The optimal reimbursement schedule. Plot (right): The
OTDs (top) and the corresponding reimbursement (bottom).
Example 2: Figure 2.22 shows that when π l is 0.20, the OTDs are A40 N55 .
The local government only sets a positive reimbursement when all trees are treated.
As a result, the landowner treats all trees so long as not all of them are already
infested in the first period. This allows the healthy trees to be EAB resistant in the
second period. However, if all trees are already infested, given that the treatment is
somewhat effective, the landowner would not treat any trees.

q
0
1
2
3
4
5

r∗ (q)
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$40

Figure 2.22 The optimal solution when π l is medium-high and ρ is somewhat
effective. Table (left): The optimal reimbursement schedule. Plot (right): The
OTDs (top) and the corresponding reimbursement (bottom).
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2.5

Model Comparisons and Managerial Insights

In this section, we first compare the efficacy of the two cost-sharing models (IBR
in Section 2.3 and TBR in Section 2.4) in several metrics. We then summarize the
managerial insights provided from the analytical solutions and the numerical results
of the two models, as well as from the model comparisons.

2.5.1

Model Comparisons

In addition to the IBR and TBR models, we also consider a third model in which the
local government does not offer a cost-sharing (or NCS) program. We analyze four
scenarios created by varying the treatment effectiveness between very effective and
not very effective and the low second-period attack rate between low, medium and
high.

2.5.1.1

Scenario 1: The low second-period attack rate is low or medium,

and the treatment is not very effective. Table 2.19 presents the expected
number of surviving trees (Etrees ), the expected reimbursement (Er ), the expected
objective function value (Eobj ) of the local government, and the OTDs of the three
models. Under NCS, the local government does not offer any financial award and
therefore, Er is zero. The measure Etrees is computed as the expected number of
surviving trees, assuming that the landowner would not take any actions in mitigating
the negative impact of EAB. That is, the landowner’s OTDs are N05 . The Eobj is
computed as the expected value of Ψ(q(i), r(i)|n, i), the objective function value in
Equation (2.5) where both q(i) and r(i) are set to zero, over i. Similarly, Er in IBR is
the expected value of r∗ (i) over i while Eobj is the expected value of Ψ(q ∗ (i), r∗ (i)|n, i)
over i. In TBR, Er is the expected value of r∗ (q(i)) over i and Eobj is Ψ(q∗ , r∗ |n), the
objective function value of Equation (2.11).
In this scenario, π l is medium-low (π̇ l = 0.24 = π̂ l (ρ) = 0.24 < π l = 0.25 < π̈ l =
0.32), ρ is less effective (ρ = 0.20 < ρ̇ = 0.25), and π h varies from low (π h = 0.35 or
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Table 2.19 Comparisons under Scenario 1 (π l < π̈ l and ρ < ρ̈)
IBR
TBR
NCS

Etrees
2.97
3.77
2.36

πh
Er
270
518
0

= 0.35
Eobj
-622
-504
-411

OTD
N00 I12 N35
A30 N45
N05

Etrees
3.07
3.60
1.96

πh
Er
108
202
0

= 0.50
Eobj
-420
-329
-537

OTD
N00 I13 N45
N00 A31 N45
N05

Etrees
3.07
3.34
1.43

Er
71
90
0

π h = 0.70
Eobj OTD
-386 N00 I13 N45
-244 N00 I11 A42 N55
-705 N05

Note: Other parameters used: n = 5, α = 40, β = 294, c = 738, θ = 50, s = 100,
ρ = 0.20, π = 0.30, π l = 0.25. Calculated cutoffs: ρ̇ = 0.25, ρ̈ = 0.38, π̇ l = 0.24,
π̈ l = 0.32, π̂ l (ρ) = 0.24, π̂ h = 0.57.
n
under
0.50 < π̂ h = 0.57) to high (π h = 0.70 > π̂ h = 0.57). The OTDs are N00 I1j Nj+1

IBR. As π h increases, the index j increases. This suggests that the infested trees will
be treated up to a higher infestation level. While the landowner’s OTD vary based
on the value of π h , a commonality among them is that the landowner will treat all
(healthy and infested) trees for some infestation levels. As a result, the expected
number of surviving trees at the end of the planning horizon is the highest under
TBR. Further, despite the higher reimbursement required under TBR, its expected
objective function value is higher than that of IBR.
Interestingly, not offering a cost-sharing program may be desirable to the local
government even though it always leads to the lowest number of surviving trees. Case
in point: When π h is 0.35, the expected objective function value is the highest under
NCS.

2.5.1.2

Scenario 2: The low second-period attack rate is high, and the

treatment is not very effective. We present the numerical results in Table 2.20
when π l is high (π l = 0.40 > π̈ l = 0.32), ρ is somewhat effective (ρ̇ = 0.25 < ρ =
0.30 < ρ̈ = 0.37), and π h is low (π h = 0.42 or 0.55 or 0.70 < π̂ h = 0.78).
Under IBR, the landowner will treat all trees when the infestation level is below a
n
certain cutoff (j) and not treat any trees beyond the cutoff (Aj0 Nj+1
). As π h increases,

the landowner would treat all trees up to a higher infestation level to prevent the high
risk of getting newly infested trees in the next period–consequently, j increases.
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Table 2.20 Comparisons under Scenario 2 (π l ≥ π̈ l and ρ < ρ̈)

IBR
TBR

Etrees
3.13
3.59

π h = 0.42
Er Eobj
189 -447
215 -269

NCS

1.76

0

-607

OTD
A20 N35
A40 S55
(S=3)
N05

Etrees
3.47
3.59
1.42

π h = 0.55
Er Eobj OTD
55 -164 A30 N45
59 -116 A40 S55
(S=1)
0
-701 N05

Etrees
3.58
3.58

π h = 0.70
Er Eobj OTD
29 -86
A40 N55
0
-58
A40 N55

1.02

0

-809

N05

Note: Other parameters used: n = 5, α = 40, β = 294, c = 738, θ = 50, s = 100,
ρ = 0.30, π = 0.40, π l = 0.38. Calculated cutoffs: ρ̇ = 0.25, ρ̈ = 0.37, π̇ l = 0.26,
π̈ l = 0.35, π̂ l (ρ) = 0.28, π̂ h = 0.78.

The landowner takes a more aggressive approach in TBR. He treats all trees
except when all of them are already infested in the first period. As the reimbursement
from the local government decreases in π h , he treats fewer trees when i = 5. Both
the expected number of surviving trees and the expected objective function value are
highest under TBR. This shows that offering reimbursement based on the number of
treated trees is superior under this scenario.

2.5.1.3

Scenario 3: The low second-period attack rate is low or medium,

and the treatment is very effective. Table 2.21 summarizes the numerical
results when π l is medium (π l = 0.29 ≤ π̇ l = 0.29), the treatment is very effective
(ρ = 0.38 > ρ̈ = 0.37), and π h is high (π h = 0.73 or 0.53 or 0.33 > π̂ h = 0).
Table 2.21 Comparisons under Scenario 3 (π l < π̈ l and ρ ≥ ρ̈)

IBR
TBR
NCS

Etrees
3.44
4.07
2.38

πh
Er
102
337
0

= 0.33
Eobj
-330
-204
-329

OTD
N00 I14 A55
A50
N05

Etrees
3.44
3.44
1.85

πh
Er
33
0
0

= 0.53
Eobj
-147
-114
-459

OTD
N00 I14 A55
N00 I14 A55
N05

Etrees
3.44
3.44
1.31

πh
Er
33
0
0

= 0.73
Eobj
-147
-114
-589

OTD
N00 I14 A55
N00 I14 A55
N05

Note: Other parameters used: n = 5, α = 40, β = 294, c = 738, θ = 50, s = 100,
ρ = 0.38, π = 0.30, π l = 0.29. Calculated cutoffs: ρ̇ = 0.25, ρ̈ = 0.37, π̇ l = 0.29,
π̈ l = 0.38, π̂ l (ρ) = 0.38, π̂ h = 0.

When π h is 0.33, the OTDs are N00 I14 A55 under IBR and A50 under TBR. Even
though the local government offers a higher expected reimbursement under TBR, the
expected objective function value is higher under TBR as a result of treating all trees
and having a high success rate. As π h gets higher (0.53 or 0.73), the landowner only
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treats the infested trees (N00 I14 A55 ) under both IBR and TBR. Because the expected
reimbursement required under TBR is zero, the objective function value is higher.
2.5.1.4

Scenario 4: The low second-period attack rate is high, and the

treatment is very effective. We present the numerical results in Table 2.22 when
π l is high (π l = 0.25 > π̈ l = 0.23), the treatment is very effective (ρ = 0.30 > ρ̈ =
0.21), and π h is high (π h = 0.70 or 0.50 or 0.33 > π̂ h = 0).
Table 2.22 Comparisons under Scenario 4 (π l ≥ π̈ l and ρ ≥ ρ̈)

IBR
TBR
NCS

Etrees
3.95
3.95
2.41

π h = 0.33
Er Eobj
56 129
39 146
0
-178

OTD
A50
A50
N05

Etrees
3.95
3.95
1.96

π h = 0.50
Er Eobj
53 132
0
185
0
-273

OTD
A50
A50
N05

Etrees
3.95
3.95
1.43

π h = 0.70
Er Eobj
53 132
0
185
0
-385

OTD
A50
A50
N05

Note: Other parameters used: n = 5, α = 40, β = 200, c = 900, θ = 50, s = 100,
ρ = 0.30, π = 0.30, π l = 0.25. Calculated cutoffs: ρ̇ = 0.16, ρ̈ = 0.21, π̇ l = 0.19,
π̈ l = 0.23, π̂ l (ρ) = 0.33, π̂ h = 0.

The OTD under both IBR and TBR are A50 regardless of the value of π h . Similar
to the results in the previous scenario, the expected number of trees and the expected
objective function value are highest under TBR, which attests to the superiority of
providing reimbursement based on the number of treated trees over the infestation
level.

2.5.2

Managerial Insights

For the treatment-based reimbursement model, we find three optimal decisions based
on the treatment effectiveness and the second-period attack rates: treat none of the
trees, treat all (healthy and infested) trees, or treat only the infested trees. We provide
a complete characterization of the optimal treatment decision and the reimbursement
analytically for each infestation level.
First, not treating any of the trees is optimal if one of the following conditions
holds: (1) none of the trees have been infested in the first period, and the low secondperiod attack rate is either low or medium, i.e., the attack rate in the second period
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would be low or medium if treatment was applied in the first period; (2) all trees
have been infested in the first period, and the treatment is not very effective; or (3)
some of the trees are infested and the high second-period attack rate is low, i.e., the
attack rate in the second period would be low even if no treatments were applied
in the first period. Treating only the infested trees is advantageous only when some
(but not all) trees are infested, and either of the following is true: (i) the treatment
is very effective, and the low second-period attack rate is low or medium, (ii) the
treatment is not very effective, the low second-period attack rate is low, and the high
second-period attack rate is medium or high. In all other cases, treating all trees is
optimal.
Next, the reimbursement is only higher than the inspection cost when some
trees are infested in the first period, the treatment is not very effective, and the high
second-period attack rate is low. In all other scenarios, the reimbursement is no
greater than the inspection cost. When some (but not all) trees are infested in the
first period and the high second-period attack rate is high, the local government does
not need to provide any reimbursement. The landowner will treat all of the infested
trees and may even treat all of the healthy trees. Last, neither the treatment decision
nor the reimbursement is monotonic at the infestation level.
For the treatment-based reimbursement model, the optimal treatment decisions
vary with key parameters, such as the treatment effectiveness and the second-period
attack rates, and a few takeaways are worth mentioning. First, when the infestation
level is low (excluding the case where none of the trees are infested), the local
government always encourages the landowner to treat, at a minimum, all of the
infested trees. Further, the higher the low second-period attack rate is, the more
likely he will be incentivized to treat all (healthy and infested) trees. Two, when
the treatment is very effective, treating all trees can be optimal regardless of the
infestation level. In this case, the reimbursement required to induce the landowner
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to treat all trees is very small, if not zero. Third, when the treatment is not very
effective, and the infestation level in the first period is already high, not treating any
trees may be optimal.
When compared to the infestation-based reimbursement model, the treatmentbased reimbursement model induces the landowner to treat more trees. Even though
the expected reimbursement is higher, the local government achieves a greater
objective function value because more ash trees would survive at the end of the
planning horizon. Under the scenario where the low second-period attack rate is very
low, and the treatment is not very effective, the local government may consider not
offering any cost-sharing program because the high expected reimbursement required
in the treatment-based reimbursement model leads to a lower objective function value.

2.6

Conclusions

In this work, we develop two cost-sharing models for a local government to induce
the participation of a private landowner in mitigating the negative impact of emerald
ash borer on ash trees. Both types of information asymmetry are considered. In
the infestation-based reimbursement model, the local government encounters a moral
hazard problem because the reimbursement, distributed to the landowner prior to
treatment, must incentivize the landowner to treat the desired number of trees based
on the infestation level post-reimbursement. The local government, on the other
hand, deals with an adverse selection problem in the treatment-based reimbursement
model. She designs the reimbursement schedule so that the landowner would not treat
more than the optimal number of trees in order to claim a higher reimbursement.
For both models, we identify possible optimal treatment decision(s) and the
conditions under which each treatment decision can be optimal. We analytically
characterize the optimal treatment decision, and the reimbursement in the infestationbased reimbursement model. In the treatment-based reimbursement model, however,
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numerical results are used to analyze the reimbursement schedule. Additionally,
we investigate the efficacy of the cost-sharing programs by comparing the two
cost-sharing models to the one where the local government does not offer any
cost-sharing program. We conclude that in all scenarios but one, the treatment-based
reimbursement model achieves the highest number of surviving trees and the highest
objective function value of the local government, even though the reimbursement
required to run the program is the highest. The only exception is when the treatment
is not effective and both of the second-period attack rates are low.
Our future work would focus on two tasks. First, develop a heuristic to find the
optimal solution for the treatment-based reimbursement model. Currently, finding
the optimal treatment decisions and the reimbursement schedule requires a complete
search with all possible combinations of treatment decisions. Because we have been
able to narrow down the structures of the optimal treatment decisions, they can be
used to reduce the search time. Second, integrate the game-theoretic models with
an optimization model to maximize the number of surviving ash trees in both public
and private lands under a limited budget through a public-private partnership. This
integrated framework will provide optimal budget allocations for managing public
trees and running the cost-sharing programs with landowners that are heterogeneous
in the number of ash trees and attack rates.
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CHAPTER 3
DATA-DRIVEN INTEGRATED GAME THEORY-OPTIMIZATION
FRAMEWORK TO PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR EAB
MANAGEMENT

3.1

Introduction

Invasive species are plants, animals, or pathogens which are non-native to the
ecosystem under consideration, the introduction of which causes or is likely to cause
a large economic or environmental harm. For example, Xu et al. [129] show the total
economic losses caused by invasive alien species to China were $14.45 billion. Invading
alien species in the United States causes major environmental damages and losses,
adding up to almost $120 billion per year [110]. Kettunen et al. [76] present that
the total cost of invasive species in Europe, based on documented costs, is estimated
to be at least $13.1 billion per year and probably over $21 billion. Emerald ash
borer (EAB) is one of the harmful invasive species, first discovered in southeastern
Michigan in 2002, is a wood-boring insect native to Asia. EAB larvae feed on the
inner bark of ash trees and thus disrupt the tree’s ability to transport water and
nutrients. Emerald Ash Borer was discovered in New Jersey in May 2014 in Somerset
County. As October of 2018, infestations of EAB are found throughout 35 states in
the United States and the Canadian provinces of Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick,
Nova Scotia, and Manitoba [52], which has killed tens of millions of ash trees since
2002 in North America and caused hundreds of millions of dollars economic losses.
Due to the pressing need to control the spread of EAB, researchers have
developed optimization models to search, treat and remove ash trees [134, 135,
79, 22, 21] or explore the collaboration between the Forest Service and the private
landowners as shown in Chapter 2. Unlike former work, this chapter explores the
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government’s budget allocation strategies to optimize surveillance, treatment, and
removal decisions on both public and private sites at each period of a multi-period
horizon EAB management planning problem.
Most studies on public-private partnerships that use game theory combined
with optimization focus on energy sectors. To our knowledge, this chapter is among
the first to present an integrated game-optimization framework in public-private
partnerships with an application to tackle general natural resources conservation
problems, such as managing the harmful impacts of a forest insect infestation on tree
genera. Specifically, we present a data-driven integrated game-theory-optimization
model to allocate the limited government budget to survey, treat and remove ash trees
among public trees and optimally reimburse private landowners for EAB management.
We build a multiple regression model to predict the next period attack rate based
on the real EAB infestation data collected by [57, 83] to consider the uncertainty
of the attack rate. We apply our integrated mathematical model to the case of
New Jersey EAB infestation with various public-private tree distribution scenarios
on a landscape including 5×5 sites, where each site has a size of 0.1 acres. Our
findings provide practical insights into budget allocation among different management
options between public and private locations under different budgets and treatment
effectiveness rates.

3.2

Literature Review and Key Contributions

This section presents a review of the articles that study game-theoretical models
in public service and public-private partnerships, integrated game theory and
optimization approaches, and optimization methods for EAB management, and then
gives this chaper’s key contributions and managerial insights.
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3.2.1

Principal-Agent Models in Public Services

The principal-agent (PA) framework has been applied to many fields in public
services, such as real options, carbon emission reduction, health-care delivery, and
infrastructure design and operation [115, 58, 36, 10, 108]. Chapter 2 builds a PA
framework to study the collaboration between the government and private landowners
to control the impact of an invasive insect (Emerald Ash borer).
Silaghi and Sarkar [115] present a principal-agent model for public-private partnership
investment. They study concession contracts between a private firm and a government
in the presence of moral hazard within a real-options framework.

The authors

address the limitation in inducing the firm to exert the effort of previous work
and illustrate the importance of considering the cost of a bailout option.

The

PA framework also plays a significant role in reducing carbon emissions, as shown
in the study of [36].

In their paper, Cai and Singham [36] design the optimal

carbon capture and storage system contracts to induce the emitters whose demand
is heterogeneous to participate in the carbon capture and storage system. Fuloria
and Zenios [58] study a principal-agent framework to address the health-care delivery
system with two non-cooperative parties, including a purchaser of medical services
and a specialized provider. The authors propose a dynamic principal-agent model
to consider the best payment system for the purchaser among the fee-for-service
system, the capitation system, and outcomes-adjusted payment system.

They

find that the outcomes-adjusted payment system can significantly improve patient
life expectancy. Auriol and Picard [10] focus on the trade-off between allocative
efficiency and the cost of public funds in build-operate-and-transfer concession. When
concession candidates do not have any better information, the government always
avoids build-operate-and-transfer concessions. However, when information becomes
asymmetric, the results depend on the shadow costs of public funds. Paez-Perez and
Sanchez-Silva [108] propose a dynamic principal-agent framework for the cooperation

70

between the public entity and the private entity in infrastructure. The authors
consider the impact of the infrastructure’s natural deterioration on the actions of
entities.

3.2.2

Game Theory and Optimization Models

Game theory and optimization methods have been combined to tackle various
industry and energy-related problems. Dai and Qiao [50] propose a model to maximize
the total profits of wind and conventional power producers from both the energy
market and a new bilateral reserve market by using stochastic programming and game
theory to generate the optimal bidding strategies. A Nash Equilibrium is obtained
by [50] to settle the reserve price between wind and conventional power producers.
Das and Tripathi [51] introduce an adaptive and intelligent energy-efficient
routing technique based on the fusion of non-cooperative two-person zero-sum game
theory and linear programming. Here, the linear programming technique is used to
solve the mixed strategy games of a larger dimension payoff matrix. The comparison
between this combined method and the previous methods shows that this new method
not only reduces energy consumption but also prolongs the lifetime of the network.
To deal with the transboundary water conflicts between two cities, Zeng et al.
[139] integrate cooperative game theory and mathematical programming. The results
from Rubinstein bargaining are chosen to allocate the initial water and pollutant
discharge rights for all players. Based on the solutions of Rubinstein bargaining,
the cooperative game theory model can reallocate the water and pollutant discharge
rights between two cities. Further, the numerical solutions show that the reallocation
can bring the maximum net benefit.
A consumption scheduling mechanism is proposed by [143] for home and neighborhood area load demand management in the smart grid, based on mixed-integer
linear programming and the coordination game. There are two scenarios shown in this
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mechanism, and the effectiveness of both scenarios are verified by using a simulation.
In those two scenarios, the distributed one is solved by using the results of the game
theory problem.
Zamarripa et al. [138] present a multi-objective mixed-integer linear programming
problem assisted with a game theory (the nonzero-sum game) optimization framework
to improve supply chain planning decision-making. The multi-objective problem is
solved by the ϵ−constraint method and the game theory framework is used to support
the decision-making to handle the uncertainty of the cooperative and competitive
scenarios.

3.2.3

Resource Allocation Optimization and EAB Management

Resource allocation is a core problem in many combinatorial optimization problems
[126, 109, 18]. The applications of the budget-constrained resource allocation vary
from agriculture and energy [46, 45, 73, 47], capital asset management and production
planning [30, 34, 90, 61, 32, 33, 23], and healthcare [78, 49, 24, 137, 136]. In invasive
species management, spatio-temporal resource allocation problems have often been
considered due to the dynamic nature of the problem that occurs over a geographical
location [67, 66, 28, 27]. We refer the reader to the review of [29], which discusses the
complexities of the spatio-temporal optimization and resource allocation challenges
as well as mathematical programming approaches in invasive species management.
Various resource optimization methods have been proposed for EAB management.
For example, Yemshanov et al. [134] explore the optimal survey resource allocation to
maximize the expected number of transmission pathways covered by survey locations
and the expected number of survey locations that have at least one pest introduction.
Yemshanov et al. [135] study a multi-day surveillance approach to minimize the
expected number of sites with undetected infested trees or minimize the expected
number of undetected infested trees. The authors find that the managers prioritize
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surveying the sites with high host densities and the high risk of infestation to minimize
the expected number of undetected infested trees. However, the managers tend to
survey a larger area at lower sampling densities to minimize the expected number of
sites with undetected infested trees. Kıbış et al. [79] propose a multi-stage stochastic
mixed-integer programming model to explore the optimal surveillance, treatment,
and removal decisions to control the spread of EAB in Bonneville, Minnesota, USA.
The authors show that delaying surveillance is never optimal in almost all infestation
and budget scenarios. The presented model in [79] is extended by [22] by considering
the uncertainty of infestation levels and the impact of distance on the infestation to
study the EAB management in Winnipeg, MB, Canada. Bushaj et al. [21] consider
managers’ risk aversion, and they find that the managers prefer to remove ash trees at
a higher cost instead of treating them as they become more risk-averse. Those papers
mentioned above explore the optimal operations and management planning for EAB
infestation in public areas. Those papers we mentioned above explore the optimal
operations planning of EAB infestation in the public area. Chapter 2 presents a
principal-agent framework to design cost-sharing programs for the government to
induce a private landowner to act on private lands. There are two cost-sharing
programs where the reimbursement is either based on the infestation level or the
number of treated trees shown in their paper, and the optimal treatment decisions
are among treating none of the trees, treating all trees, and treating only infested
trees according to the treatment effectiveness and the second-period attack rate.

3.2.4

Key Contributions and Insights

Despite the recent progress in integrating game theory and mathematical programming
with mainly energy applications, studies that use game theory in combination with
optimization are limited, especially in public services. Furthermore, we are not aware
of any other integrated game-optimization framework in public-private partnerships
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with an application in general natural resources conservation problems, such as
tackling a forest insect infestation.
(a) To our knowledge, this study is among the first to integrate a principal-agent
framework with a mixed-integer programming (MIP) model to motivate publicprivate partnerships and guide the government in its budget allocation for social
good.
(b) Game theory and mathematical programming are typically two distinct fields.
Unprecedentedly, we have synchronized both MIP and game-theoretical models’
assumptions and blended them to tackle the resource allocation problem
surrounding the EAB management in public and private sites.
(c) We integrate the solution of the principal-agent model based on Chapter 2
into an MIP to optimize the resource allocation among the public and private
sites to survey, treat, and remove ash trees with a limited government budget.
The model optimizes the treatment budget for public sites, while deciding on
the reimbursement level for tree treatments in private sites. As opposed to
Chapter 2’s constant attack rate, the attack rate is dynamically updated in our
integrated game theory-MIP framework. While the MIP model on the EAB
management in public sites is based on those presented in [79] and [22], different
than those studies, we formulate non-linearities as a function of the attack rate
and former treatment decisions. We linearize all non-linearities that arise due
to the changing attack rates with respect to the treatment level by replacing
them with equivalent constraints and additional binary variables, resulting in a
linear optimization formulation. The treatment and removal cannot exceed the
number of infested trees in the mathematical models of [79] and [22]. However,
we consider a more general model so that treatment can be applied to healthy
trees to make the susceptible trees become EAB resistant.
(d) We consider three types of ash trees in our model: healthy, infested and
dead ash trees, compared to four infestation levels of ash trees in [22] to
synchronize both game theory and MIP models and incorporate the game
theory model’s solutions into the optimization formulation. We assume that
the surveillance occurs in each period in the public sites, and the infestation
realization is computed by infestation dynamics equations in the model. The
infestation dynamics equations in our MIP model compute the infestation rate
as a function of treatment instead of using high or low survey outcomes with
different probabilities. Furthermore, we introduce the success rate of treatment
to account for the effectiveness of treatment and surveillance jointly.
(e) Bushaj et al. [22] apply a distance-dependent approach to estimate the constant
spread probabilities at four 1-km distances from the central site, and Chapter
2 uses a constant attack rate in the next period to compute the newly infested
trees. However, different than both studies, we incorporate the uncertainty in
the next period’s attack rate in each site in each period by building a multiple
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regression model. This regression model is integrated into the MIP model to
dynamically predict the next period’s attack rate depending on the current
attack rate and the surrounding infestation based on a real EAB infestation
data set. We also use this regression model to predict the high attack rate in
the next period in the game theory model instead of using the constant next
period’s attack rate to get optimal treatment, removal, and reimbursement
decisions in private sites. Those decisions are treated as the input in the
modified optimization model to compute the optimal decisions for surveying,
treating, and removing ash trees from the public sites, and the reimbursement
amount for the private sites.

3.3

Integrated Game Theory-Optimization Mathematical Formulation

This section presents notation used throughout the chapter (Section 3.3.1), essential
features and assumptions made regarding the mathematical models (Section 3.3.2),
data analysis to calibrate the attack rates (Section 3.3.3), and the integration of the
game-theoretic and optimization models (Section 3.3.4). Then Section 3.3.5 presents
the mathematical formulation for the integrated game theory and optimization model
that synergizes all elements described in this section.

3.3.1

Model Notation

This section summarizes all notations used in our mathematical model (Table 3.1).
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Table 3.1 Notation
Sets and Indices:
Γu
Set of all public sites.
Γr
Set of all private sites.
Γ
Set of all sites; Γ = Γu ∪ Γr .
Θi
Set of all neighboring sites of site i.
T
Set of time periods, T = {1, 2, 3}.
i
Index for all sites, i ∈ Γ.
j
Index for all neighboring sites of the site i, j ∈ Θi
t
Index for time periods, t ∈ T .
Input Parameters:
πi0
Initial attack rate, the probability of an ash tree is infested with the EAB at
the beginning in site i ∈ Γ.
Ni0 Initial ash trees population in site i ∈ Γ.
Ii0
Initial number of infested ash trees in site i ∈ Γ.
0
Di
Initial number of dead ash trees in site i ∈ Γ.
1
δt
Discount factor at time t which is equal to (1+τ
, where τ is a
)t
discount rate.
θD
Penalty value of each dead tree.
α
Marginal value of a healthy tree.
η
Rate of reduction of the attack rate in the previous period, η ∈ [0, 1).
c1
Cost of surveying a tree.
c2
Cost of treating a tree.
c3
Cost of removing a tree.
ψ
Total budget available throughout the planning horizon.
ri
Reimbursement assigned to the private site i ∈ Γr .
ρ
Success rate of treating an EAB infested trees, ρ̄ = 1 − ρ.
qS,i Treated healthy trees in private site i ∈ Γr .
qI,i Treated infested trees in private site i ∈ Γr .
ω0
Regression weight for the previous
attack rate on the current high attack rate.
ωI
Regression weight for the ratio of neighbors’ infested trees to all trees
in previous period on the current high attack rate.
ni
Number of neighboring sites of site i.
Decision variables:
Nit
Total number of ash trees at site i ∈ Γ, at period t.
t
Si
Number of susceptible ash trees at site i ∈ Γ, at period t.
t
Ii
Number of infested trees at site i ∈ Γ, at period t.
Ḋit
Number of cumulative dead trees at site i ∈ Γ, at period t.
t
Di
Number of newly dead trees at site i ∈ Γ, at period t.
t
H̃i
Number of treated healthy trees at period t in site i ∈ Γ.
t
˜
Ii
Number of treated infested trees at period t in site i ∈ Γ.
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Iˆit
Number of removed infested trees at period t in site i ∈ Γ.
t
Number of removed dead trees at period t in site i ∈ Γ.
D̂i
t
Vi
Number of surveyed trees at site i ∈ Γ, at period t.
t
Wi
Number of awarded ash trees at site i ∈ Γ, at period t. Wit = Hit + ρ · I˜it .
Binary Decision variables:
µti
An indicator parameter such that µti = 1 when the number of treated
and removed infested trees is less than the number of infested trees
in site i ∈ Γ and period t; otherwise, µti = 0 in site i ∈ Γ and period t.
µ̄ti = 1 − µti .
Linearization-related variables:
P

xti1
xti2
At+1
i
Bit+1
t+1
yi,1
t+1
yi,2
t+1
yi,1,k
t+1
yi,2,k
λt+1
ink
t+1
ωi,n,k

3.3.2

t+1
πh,i

t
πh,i

xti1

πit

j∈Θi

(Ijt −I˜jt −Iˆjt )

= ω0 · + ωI ·
= 0 and
Binary variable,
= 1 if
ni
otherwise.
Binary variable, all susceptible trees in period t are infested in the
period t + 1 if xti2 = 1 and not all susceptible trees in period
t are infested in the period t + 1 otherwise.
t+1
Substitute variable of µti · πh,i
t+1
Substitute variable of µ̄ti · πl,i
Substitute variable of 12 (πit+1 + Sit )
Substitute variable of 12 (πit+1 − Sit )
t+1 2
Breakpoints of (yi,1
) ; k = 0, 1, 2, ..., m.
t+1 2
Breakpoints of (yi,2 ) ; k = 0, 1, 2, ..., m.
t+1
Weight of the kth breakpoint (yink
) in the linearization function;
n = 1, 2 and k = 0, 1, 2, ..., m.
Binary variable to make at most two adjacent λ’s are greater than zero.

Model Features and Assumptions

The transmission of EAB is affected by many factors, such as the uncertain attack
rates and the behavior and decisions of the government and private landowners to
treat and remove ash trees on their specific lands. Therefore, we incorporate some
important features and make assumptions about the possible behavior of the decisionmakers in the integrated model formulation.
(a) If the total number of treated and removed infested trees is less than the number
of the infested trees in site i in period t, the chance of an untreated healthy
t+1
tree getting infested in the next period t + 1 increases from πit to πh,i
and
t+1
decreases to πl,i otherwise. So the attack rate site i in the period t + 1,
t+1
t+1
πi t+1 := µti πh,i
+ µ̄ti πl,i
, where µti is an indicator variable such that µti = 1
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when the total number of treated and removed infested trees is less than the
infested trees; otherwise, µti = 0 in site i in the period t. µ̄ti = 1 − µti .
t+1
(b) High attack rate πh,i
in period t + 1 is estimated by using real EAB infestation
data, as described in Section 3.3.3. The data was collected by [83] and [57] in
Toledo, Ohio, from 2005 to 2011, from 10 different sites, and each site includes
t+1
3 to 6 plots, a 400 m2 circular landscape. We assume the attack rate πl,i
in
the period t + 1 is represented by a percent of the attack rate in the previous
t+1
period t, i.e., πl,i
= ηπi t and η ∈ [0, 1).

(c) The untreated or unsuccessfully-treated infested trees will be dead in the next
period for the infested trees, and the treated infested trees will not spread
infestation even though the infested trees may not be treated successfully. On
the other hand, the successfully-treated infested trees and treated healthy trees
will become EAB resistant in the next period.
(d) The government is willing to treat healthy and infested trees to control the
spread of EAB in public sites, and surveillance is applied in public sites in each
period. The private landowner also treats healthy and infested trees in their
private sites to save more ash trees and reduce associated costs with treating
infested and removing dead trees.
(e) The government budget is only used to survey ash trees and treat and remove
infested ash trees in public sites, and reimburse the landowner for their
surveillance, treatment, and removal in private sites. The total budget is not
used for removing the dead trees in public sites because the city has a separate
budget for removing dead public trees. However, the private landowner only
removes dead trees and does not remove infested trees.
(f) In public sites, the treatment can apply to healthy and infested trees, and
removal can only apply to infested trees, as discussed above. We assume that
the private landowners can treat healthy and infested trees on their own sites.
Furthermore, landowners must remove all dead trees in their own sites.

3.3.3

Data Analysis to Estimate Attack Rates

The attack rate is estimated by using the real EAB infestation data, which was
collected from 10 different sites in Maumee Bay State Park in Toledo, Ohio, from
2005 to 2011 [57, 83]. Each site is a forested area with homogeneous tree species and
includes three plots where each plot represents a 0.1 acres circular landscape. Data
consists of the number of individual ash trees that were tracked in these sites and
were not treated or removed. Based on their ash canopy conditions, the ash trees
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are clustered into three classes (healthy, infested, and dead trees). The latitude and
longitude of each plot of each site are also shown in this data [57, 83].
The attack rate is defined as the ratio of the newly infested trees in the current
period to the number of susceptible trees of the previous period. To improve the
accuracy of the EAB infestation data, we remove the observations that involve a
decreasing attack rate because no treatment and removal are applied to those sites.
As a result of the data cleansing exercise, a total of 120 observations were extracted
and used out of a total of 294 observations. After several computational experiments
using different factors, we find the previous average attack rate in each site and the
average number of infested trees from the neighboring sites play a significant role in
the current period’s attack rate. As shown in Table 3.2, the correlation coefficient
between attack rate and previous attack rate is 0.8, and the correlation coefficient
between attack rate and the average neighboring sites infested trees is 0.6. These
results imply a strong linear relationship between attack rate and previous attack rate,
and a strong linear relationship between the attack rate and the average neighboring
infested trees. What is more, the correlation coefficient between the previous attack
rate and the average neighboring infested trees is 0.5, which means the relationship
between those two factors is not strong enough, so we ignore the interaction impact
between the previous attack rate and the average neighboring infested trees on the
attack rate. Here, the neighboring sites refer to areas whose distance from the current
site is less than 1 mile.
Table 3.2 Correlation Coefficients between Any Two Factors
Attack rate Previous attack rate Average neighboring
infested trees
Attack rate
1.0
0.8
0.6
Previous attack rate
0.8
1.0
0.5
Average neighboring
0.6
0.5
1.0
infested trees
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A multiple regression model is developed to analyze the relationship between the
next period’s attack rate and two factors which are mentioned above. Our regression
analysis that is run under the 95% confidence level with no constant in Excel has
resulted in the following equation:
P
πit+1 = ω0 · πit + ωI ·

j∈Θi

ni

Ijt
,

(3.1)

where ni is the number of neighboring sites of site i. The coefficients of the previous
attack rate and the average number of infested trees in the neighboring sites are shown
in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3 Coefficient and p-value of Each Variable Used in the Regression
Analysis
Regression Input
Coefficients p-value
t
Previous attack rate (πi )
ω0 = 1.28
0.00
P
Average neighboring infested trees (

j∈Θi

ni

Ijt

)

ωI = 0.06

0.00

Figure 3.1 Comparison between the real attack rate and the predicted attack
rate for 120 observations.
Table 3.3 shows a statistical analysis to compare the predicted and real
observations. Here, the p-value of all variables is less than 0.05, and the statistical
measure R2 is 0.854, implying that the performance of the regression model is good.
Figure 3.1 displays the value of the real attack rate and the predicated attack rate
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from the regression model (3.1). As shown in Figure 3.1, the predicted attack rate
also visually fits well with the real attack rate in all observations.

3.3.4

Game Theory-Optimization-Data Analysis Integration Schema

Figure 3.2 Game Theory, Optimization, and Data Analysis Integration Schema.

The optimization model shown on the left side of Figure 3.2 displays a multistage stochastic mixed-integer programming optimization model [22] that allocates
resources to apply surveillance, treatment, and removal of ash trees over time in
public sites. However, the game-theory model (Section A.2.1), shown on the right
side of Figure 3.2, presents a principal-agent framework to calculate the optimal
reimbursement assigned by the government to induce private landowners to treat and
remove ash trees on their lands to prevent the spread of EAB. Our model integrates
two models, i.e., the optimization model and the game-theory model, to allocate the
resources to both public and private sites.
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Bushaj et al. [22] have explored a five-period time horizon, and three classes
of infestation asymptomatic, symptomatic, and dead trees.

Surveillance can be

implemented in each period. However, in our model, all ash trees are divided into
three classes, i.e., healthy trees, infested trees, and dead trees, and surveillance
is applied in each period over the three-period time horizon.

Furthermore, the

optimization model calculates the newly expected infested trees by using the impact
rate of each infested tree, which is defined as the number of new infestations per
infested tree. But the game-theory model defines and uses the attack rate as a
given probability of a healthy tree being infested to compute the newly infested
trees. To integrate those two models, we need a unified method to count the newly
infested trees. After performing data analysis using the actual EAB infestation
data mentioned in Section 3.3.3, we estimate the high attack rate by a multiple
regression model and the low attack rate by timing the previous attack rate with a
rate of reduction η, as shown under the ”Data Analysis of Attack Rate” in Figure
3.2. Further, the integration model gets the inputs of the treatment, removal, and
reimbursement from the game-theory model with the attack rate calculated by the
regression model or timing a rate η.
Based on the results of the game theory model, when there are no infested
trees on the private land, both treatment and reimbursement depend on the low
t+1
t+1
). If πl,i
is not large, the landowner has the
attack rate of the next period (πl,i

incentive not to treat any trees (qS,i = qI,i = 0). The reimbursement (ri ) decreases
the treatment effectiveness (ρ). Further, the reimbursement is no greater than the
surveillance cost (c1 Ni0 ) if the treatment is very effective; otherwise, it is greater than
t+1
the surveillance cost. If πl,i
is large, the private landowner is induced to treat all trees
t+1
(qS,i = Ni0 − Ii0 , qI,i = Ii0 ). The reimbursement (ri ) decreases in πl,i
. Furthermore, it

is less than the surveillance cost when π l is very high and greater than the surveillance
cost otherwise.
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When all trees are already infested in the private land, the treatment effectiveness plays a significant role in both treatment and reimbursement. If the treatment
is not very effective, the private landowner is just assigned the surveillance cost as
the reimbursement, and the landowner does not treat any trees (qS,i = qI,i = 0). On
the contrary, if the treatment is very effective, the private landowner is induced to
treat all trees (qS,i = Ni0 − Ii0 , qI,i = Ii0 ) even if the reimbursement is less than the
surveillance cost.
When there are some trees (not all) infested in the private land and the
treatment is very effective, the government encourages the private landowner to only
treat infested trees (qS,i = 0, qI,i = Ii0 ) if the next period’s low attack rate is not very
high and the private landowner is induced to treat all trees (qS,i = Ni0 − Ii0 , qI,i =
Ii0 )otherwise. Further, the private landowner can get the reimbursement when the
next period’s high attack rate is not very high, and no reimbursement otherwise.
When there are some trees (not all) infested in the private land and the
treatment is not very effective, the private landowner does not have enough incentive
to treat any trees even with a reimbursement which is higher than the surveillance cost
when the next period’s high attack rate is low. When the next period’s high attack
rate is not low, the landowner is induced to treat all infested trees (qS,i = 0, qI,i = Ii0 )
if the next period’s low attack rate is not very high; otherwise, the landowner prefers
to treat all trees (qS,i = Ni0 − Ii0 , qI,i = Ii0 ). The results from the game theory model
will be inputted into the integrated model to mimic the surveillance, treatment, and
removal decisions on the private land and guide the allocation of the total budget
among public and private sites.
Since we use the attack rate to compute newly infested trees, we have two
different types of non-linear terms in constraints, one is a product of a binary variable
and a continuous variable, and another is a product of two continuous variables. As
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a result, we provide the corresponding linearization equivalent equations to replace
those non-linear terms in our constraints.

3.3.5

Mathematical Formulation

The mathematical formulation for our integrated game theory and optimization model
(3.2)-(3.32) is given below.

max

3
P
t=1

δt

P


α · Wit − θD · (Iit − ρI˜it − Iˆit )

(3.2)

i∈Γ

Subject to:

(a) Constraints that apply to both private and public sites
• Initiation on Population, infestation, and dead trees:
Ni1 = Ni0
Ii1 = Ii0
Ḋi1 = Ḋi0

∀i ∈ Γ

(3.3)

∀i ∈ Γ

(3.4)

∀i ∈ Γ

(3.5)

• Population constraints:
Nit+1 = Nit − Iˆit − D̂it ∀i ∈ Γ and t = 1, 2

(3.6)

• Healthy trees:
Hit = Nit − Ḋit − Iit ∀i ∈ Γ,

and t ∈ T

(3.7)

• Awarding trees:
Wit = Hit + ρ · I˜it ∀i ∈ Γ,

and t ∈ T

(3.8)

• Susceptible tree population can be infested in the next period after
treatment and removal:
Sit = Hit − H̃it ∀i ∈ Γ,
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and t ∈ T

(3.9)

• Believed attack rate:
P
t+1
πh,i

= min{1, ω0 ·

πit

+ ωI ·

t+1
πl,i
= ηπit

j∈Θi

(Ijt −I˜jt −Iˆjt )

} ∀i ∈ Γ and t = 1, 2
(3.10)
∀i ∈ Γ and t = 1, 2
(3.11)
ni

πi 1 = πi0 ∀i ∈ Γ
t+1
t+1
πi t+1 = µti · πh,i
+ µ̄ti · πl,i
∀i ∈ Γ and t = 1, 2

(3.12)
(3.13)

• Believed number of newly infestations before treatment and removal:
Iit+1 = πit+1 Sit ∀i ∈ Γ and t = 1, 2

(3.14)

• Believed number of newly dead trees before treatment and removal:
Dit+1 = Iit − ρ · I˜it − Iˆit ∀i ∈ Γ and t = 1, 2

(3.15)

• Believed number of cumulative dead trees before treatment and removal:
Ḋit+1 = Ḋit − D̂it + Dit+1 ∀i ∈ Γ and t = 1, 2

(3.16)

(b) Treatment and removal decisions in public sites (i ∈ Γu )
H̃it ≤ Nit − (Iit + Dit ) ∀i ∈ Γu

and t ∈ T

(3.17)

I˜it + Iˆit ≤ Iit ∀i ∈ Γu , t ∈ T

(3.18)

I˜it + Iˆit ≥ µ̄ti · Iit ∀i ∈ Γu , t ∈ T

(3.19)

D̂it = 0 ∀i ∈ Γu , t ∈ T

(3.20)

(c) Treatment and removal decisions only in private sites (i ∈ Γr )
H̃i1 = qS,i ∀i ∈ Γr

(3.21)

I˜i1 = qI,i ∀i ∈ Γr

(3.22)

H̃it = 0 ∀i ∈ Γr

and t = 2, 3

(3.23)

I˜i2 = Ii2 ∀i ∈ Γr

(3.24)

I˜i3 = 0 ∀i ∈ Γr

(3.25)

Iˆit = 0 ∀i ∈ Γr , t ∈ T

(3.26)

D̂i1 = Di0 ∀i ∈ Γr , t ∈ T

(3.27)

D̂it+1 = Iit − ρ · I˜it ∀i ∈ Γr
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and t = 1, 2

(3.28)

(d) Surveillance decisions:
Vi1 = Ni1 ∀i ∈ Γu
Vit+1 = I˜it + Sit ∀i ∈ Γu

(3.29)

and t = 1, 2

(3.30)

(e) Budget (private reimbursement and public treatment, removal, and surveillance
costs):
P
i∈Γr

ri + c1 ·

3
P P

Vit + c2 ·

i∈Γu t=1

3
P P

3
P P
(Iˆit + D̂it ) ≤ ψ
(H̃it + I˜it ) + c3 ·

i∈Γu t=1

i∈Γu t=1

(3.31)
(f) Non-negativity and binary restrictions:
H̃it , I˜it , Iˆit , D̂it , Nit , Iit , Dit , Sit , Hit , Vit ≥ 0 µti ∈ {0, 1} ∀ t ∈ T, i ∈ Γ

(3.32)

The objective function (3.2) represents the utility of the government over the
planning horizon, which is defined by the discounted value of surviving trees minus
the penalty on the infested, and dead trees. Equations (3.3), (3.4), and (3.5) present
the initial values for the number of healthy, infested, and dead ash trees, respectively,
in each site i at the beginning of the planning horizon. Equation (3.6) computes
the remaining population of the ash trees after some of the infested and dead trees
are removed from the ash tree population. Equation (3.7) represents the number of
healthy trees at each period in each site, and Equation (3.8) shows the number of
awarding trees at each period in each site. Equation (3.9) estimates the number of
healthy trees susceptible to an infestation in the next period. We assume that the
successfully treated infested trees will become healthy and EAB resistant in the next
period, and treated healthy trees also will be EAB resistant in the next period. As
a result, as shown in Equation (3.9), the number of susceptible trees, which may be
infested in the next period, equals the number of healthy trees minus the number of
treated healthy trees in period t.
Our multiple regression model described in Section 3.3.3 utilizes the real data
on the EAB infestation to predict the high attack rate in the next period considering
the current attack rate and the average infestation from the surrounding sites. We
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also must guarantee that the high attack rate should not exceed 1. Consequently, the
high attack rate is calculated using the following equation (Equation (3.10)):
P
t+1
πh,i

= min{1, ω0 ·

πit

+ ωI ·

j∈Θi

(Ijt −I˜jt −Iˆjt )

} (∀i ∈ Γ;

ni

t = 1, 2)

Equation (3.10) defines the high attack rate at period t+1 in site i (i ∈ Γ) when
the total number of treated and removed infested trees is less than the number of the
infested trees at period t in site i (i ∈ Γ). Equation (3.10), which is non-linear, is
replaced with the following constraints to obtain its equivalent linearization for each
i ∈ Γ and t = 1, 2:
t+1
πh,i
≤1

(3.10.1)

P
t+1
πh,i
≤ ω0 · πit + ωI ·

(Ijt − I˜j − Iˆjt )

j∈Θi

ni

t+1
1 − πh,i
≤ xti1 · M

P
ω0 · πit + ωI ·

(3.10.2)

(3.10.3)

(Ijt − I˜j − Iˆjt )

j∈Θi

t+1
− πh,i
≤ (1 − xti1 ) · M

ni

(3.10.4)

where M is a bigPnumber and xti1 is a binary variable, which takes a value of zero
if ω0 · πit + ωI ·

j∈Θi

(Ijt −I˜j −Iˆjt )

P t ˜ nˆi t
(Ij −Ij −Ij )

ω0 · πit + ωI ·

j∈Θi

ni

t+1
t+1
= 1, and one, i.e., πh,i
=
> 1, implying that πh,i

, otherwise.

Equation (3.11) defines the low attack rate when the government or the private
landowner applies treatment or removal to all infested trees at period t in site i (i ∈ Γ),
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which means I˜it + Iˆit ≥ Iit . If all infested trees are treated or removed, the attack rate
t+1
will become πl,i
, which must be lower than the previous attack rate, and we use a

rate η as a multiplier of the current attack rate to compute the low attack rate. The
attack rate is initialed at the beginning (period 1) for each site by Equation (3.12).
Equation (3.13) computes the attack rate at period t + 1 in each site after treatment
and removal are applied in period t as a function of the high, and low attack rates
and treatment and removal level applied. Specifically, the next period’s attack rate
increases or decreases depending on the number of treated and removed infested trees
at the current period in site i (i ∈ Γ). Further, the attack rate will become the high
t+1
attack rate (πh,i
) if not all infested trees are treated or removed, i.e., µti = 1, (See
t+1
Equation (3.10)) and the low attack rate (πl,i
) otherwise, i.e., µti = 0 (See Equation

(3.11)).
Further, Equation (3.13) is a non-linear constraint and can be linearized by the
following constraints:
πit+1 = At+1
+ Bit+1
i

(3.13.1)

LB1 · µti ≤ At+1
≤ U B1 · µti
i

(3.13.2)

t+1
t+1
πh,i
− U B1 · µ̄ti ≤ At+1
≤ πh,i
− LB1 · µ̄ti
i

(3.13.3)

LB2 · µ̄ti ≤ Bit+1 ≤ U B2 · µ̄ti

(3.13.4)

t+1
t+1
πl,i
− U B2 · µti ≤ Bit+1 ≤ πl,i
− LB2 · µti

(3.13.5)

88

where LB1 = 0, U B1 = 1 and LB2 = 0, U B2 = η, are the lower and upper
t+1
t+1
t+1
bounds of πh,i
and πl,i
, respectively. At+1
is the substitute variable of µti · πh,i
i
t+1
and Bit+1 is the substitute variable of µ̄ti · πl,i
. Further, πit+1 can be represented by

(At+1
+ Bit+1 ), and At+1
as well as Bit+1 are restricted by the linear constraints from
i
i
Equation (3.13.2) to (3.13.5). When some of the infested trees are left untreated or
unremoved (µti = 1), Equation (3.13.2) to (3.13.5) become

LB1 ≤ At+1
≤ U B1
i

t+1
t+1
πh,i
≤ At+1
≤ πh,i
i

0 ≤ Bit+1 ≤ 0

t+1
t+1
πl,i
− U B2 ≤ Bit+1 ≤ πl,i
− LB2

t+1
t+1
As a result, At+1
= πh,i
and Bit+1 = 0, and thus πit+1 = πh,i
. When all infested trees
i

are treated or removed (µti = 0), Equation (3.13.2) to (3.13.5) become

0 ≤ At+1
≤0
i

t+1
t+1
πh,i
− U B1 ≤ At+1
≤ πh,i
− LB1
i

LB2 ≤ Bit+1 ≤ U B2
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t+1
t+1
πl,i
≤ Bit+1 ≤ πl,i

t+1
t+1
As a result, At+1
= 0 and Bit+1 = πl,i
, and thus πit+1 = πl,i
.
i

As shown in Equation (3.14), a susceptible tree in period t has a πit+1 chance of
being infested in the next period, so the number of newly infested trees is that the
susceptible trees in period t multiplied by the period t+1 attack rate. Equation (3.14)
is the product of two continuous variables which should be linearized. To perform
linearization, first, the product of two continuous variables should be converted into
t+1
t+1
a separable function. We introduce two new variables, yi,1
and yi,2
, which are,

respectively, defined as:
t+1
yi,1
= 12 (πit+1 + Sit )
t+1
yi,2
= 12 (πit+1 − Sit )

t+1
where 0 ≤ yi,1
≤

1+Ni0
2

and −

Ni0
2

t+1
≤ yi,2
≤ 12 . Now, πit+1 Sit can be replaced by the

separable function:
t+1 2
t+1 2
(yi,1
) − (yi,2
)

Then, we use the piecewise linearization technique of [14] to present the equivalent
t+1 2
t+1 2
linearization of (yi,1
) − (yi,2
) . Let f (x) = x2 . f (x) have x0 , x1 , x2 ,..., xm

breakpoints, and f (x1 ), f (x2 ), f (x3 ), f (x4 ) be related corresponding function values.
If LB ≤ x ≤ U B, we may choose the m + 1 breakpoints: xk = LB +

k·(U B−LB)
m

(k = 0, 1, ..., m), respectively. Given that λk represents the kth non-negative weights,
f (x) can be replaced with its approximate function, f˜(x), which can be represented
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by linear equations as given below:
m
P
f˜(x) =
λk f (xk )

x=
m
P

k=0
m
P

λk xk

k=0

λk = 1

k=0

with added restrictions that at most two adjacent λ’s are greater than zero, i.e.,
m
P
λk ≤ βk + βk+1 and k = 0, 1, ..., (m − 1), λm ≤ βm , and
βk = 1 (βk is a
k=0
t+1 t+1
˜ i,1
binary variable). Using the linearization method shown above and letting g̃(y
, yi,2 )
t+1 2
t+1 2
t+1 t+1
˜ i,1
denote the approximated function value of (yi,1
) − (yi,2
) , and g̃(y
, yi,2 ) can be

represented by the following linear constraints:

t+1 t+1
˜ i,1
g̃(y
, yi,2 ) =

m
X

t+1
λt+1
i,1,k f (yi,1,k ) −

k=0

m
X

t+1
λt+1
i,2,k f (yi,2,k )

(3.14.1)

k=0

t+1
=
yi,1

m
X

t+1
λt+1
i,1,k yi,1,k

(3.14.2a)

t+1
λt+1
i,2,k yi,2,k

(3.14.2b)

k=0

t+1
yi,2
=

m
X
k=0

m
X

λt+1
i,1,k = 1

(3.14.3a)

λt+1
i,2,k = 1

(3.14.3b)

k=0

m
X
k=0
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t+1
t+1
t+1
t+1
λt+1
i,1,k ≤ βi,1,k + βi,1,k+1 , λi,1,m ≤ βi,1,m

k = 0, 1, ..., (m − 1)

(3.14.4a)

t+1
t+1
t+1
t+1
λt+1
i,2,k ≤ βi,2,k + βi,2,k+1 , λi,2,m ≤ βi,2,m

k = 0, 1, ..., (m − 1)

(3.14.4b)

m
X

t+1
βi,1,k
=1

(3.14.5a)

t+1
βi,2,k
=1

(3.14.5b)

k=0

m
X
k=0

t+1
βi,1,k
∈ {0, 1}

k = 0, 1, ..., m

(3.14.6)

t+1 t+1
˜ i,1
Because g̃(y
, yi,2 ) denotes the approximated function value of πit+1 Sit , its

value may exceed the value of Sit . To ensure that the number of newly infested trees,
Iit+1 , is not more than Sit , we incorporate the following function setting Iit+1 to the
t+1 t+1
˜ i,1
minimum of g̃(y
, yi,2 ) and Sit , i.e.,

t+1 t+1
˜ i,1
Iit+1 = min(g̃(y
, yi,2 ), Sit ).

(3.14.7)

Here we have a new non-linear constraint which can be lineareized by the following
constraints:
t+1 t+1
˜ i,1
Iit+1 <= g̃(y
, yi,2 )

(3.14.7a)

Iit+1 <= Sit

(3.14.7b)
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t+1 t+1
˜ i,1
g̃(y
, yi,2 ) − Iit+1 <= xti2 · M

(3.14.7c)

Sit − Iit+1 <= (1 − xti2 ) · M

(3.14.7d)

where xti2 is a binary variable and M is a big number. the approximated expression’s
t+1 t+1
˜ i,1
, yi,2 ) and xti2 takes value zero, otherwise,
value is not more than Sit , Iit+1 = g̃(y

Iit+1 = Sit and xti2 takes value one.
We assume that the infested trees will be dead in the next period if those trees
are not treated, or treatment is unsuccessful. Based on this assumption, Equation
(3.15) and Equation (3.16) give the number of newly dead trees and the number of
total dead trees at period t+1 in site i (i ∈ Γ) after treatment and removal are applied
at period t in that site respectively. Equation (3.17) shows that the treatment can be
applied to healthy trees in public sites, and those treated healthy trees will become
EAB resistant in the next period. Both treatment and removal can be applied to the
infested trees in public sites in each period, as shown in Equation (3.18).
As shown in Equation (3.19), all infested trees are treated or removed in period
t in site i (i ∈ Γ) if µti = 0, and not all infested trees are treated or removed if µti = 1.
The right-hand side of constraint (3.19) is a non-convex term which is a product of
a binary variable µ̄ti and a continuous variable Iit for which 0 ≤ Iit ≤ Ni0 holds. We
introduce a continuous variable zit to represent the term µ̄ti · Iit , and the equivalent
linearization constraints to replace Equation (3.19) are presented below:

0 ≤ zit ≤ Ni0 · µ̄ti ∀i ∈ Γu , t ∈ T

(3.19.1)

Iit − Ni0 · µti ≤ zit ≤ Iit ∀i ∈ Γu , t ∈ T

(3.19.2)
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I˜it + Iˆit ≥ zit ∀i ∈ Γu , t ∈ T

(3.19.3)

When µti = 0, the above constraints become:

0 ≤ zit ≤ Ni0 ∀i ∈ Γu , t ∈ T

Iit ≤ zit ≤ Iit ∀i ∈ Γu , t ∈ T

I˜it + Iˆit ≥ zit ∀i ∈ Γu , t ∈ T

The above three constraints imply that zit = Iit and I˜it + Iˆit ≥ Iit , i.e., the treated and
removed infested trees are not less than the infested trees in public site i in period t.
On the contrary, when µti = 1, Equations (3.19.1) to (3.19.3) become:

0 ≤ zit ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ Γu , t ∈ T

Iit − Ni0 ≤ zit ≤ Iit ∀i ∈ Γu , t ∈ T

I˜it + Iˆit ≥ zit ∀i ∈ Γu , t ∈ T

The above three constraints indicate that zit = 0 and I˜it + Iˆit ≥ 0, the total number of
treated and removed infested trees are non-negative in public site i in period t.
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Equation (3.20) implies that dead trees in public sites will not be removed, nor
will any budget be allocated because another specified city budget is used to remove
dead public trees. Equations (3.21) and (3.22) represent the treatment decisions for
the private land taken from the game-theory model as shown in Appendix A.2.1 and
used as an input into the optimization model. Further, the treatment decisions on
healthy trees and infested trees in private sites in period one are shown in Equations
(3.21) and (3.22), respectively. The private landowner will treat only infested trees
without considering the treatment of healthy trees in the second period; however, no
trees will be treated in the third period, which is implied by Equations (3.23), (3.24),
and (3.25), respectively. Furthermore, Equations (3.26), (3.27), and (3.28) imply that
the private landowner will only remove all dead trees in each period.
Equation (3.29) illustrates that all ash trees will be surveyed at the beginning
period in all public sites. According to assumptions that untreated infested trees will
be dead in the next period, treated healthy trees will become EAB resistant. As a
result, it is only necessary survey treated infested trees and susceptible trees in the
previous period. As shown in Equation (3.30), the number of surveyed trees at period
t + 1 is equal to the number of treated infested trees plus the number of susceptible
trees at period t in each public sites.
The total budget imposed on the reimbursement allocated to the private sites
and the total cost of surveillance, treatment, and removal over the planning horizon
allocated to the public sites is implied by Equation (3.31). According to the budget
constraint (3.31), the expenses related to the government’s reimbursement given to
the private landowners plus the cost of surveillance, treatment, and removal of ash
trees in the public sites over all periods must be less than or equal to the total budget
available throughout the planning horizon. The reimbursement is an input obtained
from the solution of the game-theory model. Equation (3.32) assures that all original
decision variables are non-negative, and the indicator variable µti is binary.
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3.4

Numerical Solutions

In this section, we present numerical solutions under different cases by considering
different budget levels, different ash tree distribution levels in public sites, and
different success rate of treatment levels which all play a significant role on optimal
decisions in both public and private sites. We applied our integrated principal-agent
framework with mixed-integer optimization model to find the optimal treatment and
removal decisions in studied 5×5 sites at each period to maximize the utility of
government over the planning horizon.

3.4.1

Model Application and Data

Based on the real EAB infestation data collected from 14 different surveyed areas in
Maumee Bay State Park in Toledo, Ohio, from 2005 to 2011 [57, 83], and each area
includes three sites. Each site is a 0.1-acre circular landscape. As a result, the study
area was divided into 0.1-acre survey units (we call sites in this chapter). We study a
5×5 girdded area, because most adults fly less than 328 feet when ash trees are near
shown in [84]. We calculate the population of ash trees in all sites in each area. As
shown in Figure 3.3, we found the minimum population among those sites is 1 and
the maximum number of ash trees among those sites is 42, and the medium number
of ash trees among all sites is 11. We treat the sites as sites with a low density of ash
trees where the number of ash trees is less than or equal to 11; otherwise, we treat
the sites as sites with a high density of ash trees.
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Figure 3.3 Population of ash trees in all plots.

The average number of ash trees among the low-density sites is around seven,
and the average number of ash trees among the high-density sites is around 24. So
we use seven as the low distribution level of ash trees and 24 as the high distribution
level of ash trees in public sites. Furthermore, The mean number of ash trees in
single-family house land is around one [122]. So we use three as the population of
ash trees in each private site to cover the maximum population of ash trees in private
lands.
The ash trees are present in specific public areas, such as streets and parks. We
consider two scenarios on different levels (low and high) of ash tree distribution in
public sites to show the numerical solutions. We consider the street public sites to
have a low distribution level of ash trees because a certain space between two trees is
required, and the public park public sites have a high distribution level of ash trees.
Figure 3.4 presents the four different cases on the different ash trees distributions levels
and the different number of public sites. The number of ash trees in each private site
is 3, and the number of ash trees in each public site is 7 for street scenarios, and each
private site has three ash trees, and each public site has 24 ash trees in both two park
scenarios.
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Figure 3.4 Different distribution level of ash trees in the public sites. The
number of ash trees in each private site, each public street site, public park site are
3, 7, 24, respectively.

As shown in Figure 3.4, Street 1 shows the street scenario that there are 21
private sites and there are four public sites; Street 2 represents the scenario that has
16 private and nine public sites; Street 3 presents the street scenario which has 12
public sites and 13 private sites. Park 1 shows the park scenario where there are 21
private sites and four public sites, and Park 2 presents the park scenario, which has
16 private sites and nine public sites.
We assume we survey a tree by branch sampling method in the public sites,
and the surveillance cost per tree is estimated $124, and the cost of treating an
infested tree is estimated at $180 from [132]. The monetary value of an alive ash tree
was estimated at $72 from [79]. Morris County took down ash trees along county
rights-of-ways in Morris Township and Long Hill in the first round of cutting in
2019. The Board of Freeholders approved a resolution to award a $498,465 contract
to Landing-based Tree King for the first round of tree removal (The contractor is
responsible for removing and properly recycling the downed trees), and this initial
project includes the removal of 880 trees in total in Long Hill and Morris Township
[105]. So we estimate that the cost of removing an ash tree is $300.
As shown in the cost-sharing model, the optimal treatment decision in private
sites is mainly driven by the success rate of treatment (ρ) and the low second-period
2
attack rate (πl,i
). To distinguish the success rate of treatment and the low second-

period attack rate in different levels, we define the following parameters. First, let
ρ̇ :=

β
s+β+θ+c

and ρ̈ :=

β
,
θ+c

then 0 < ρ̇ < ρ̈. Because the cost of treatment is generally
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much lower than the sum of the valuation of a live ash tree and the removal cost, ρ̈ is
likely to be small. Then we can categorize the treatment effectiveness (ρ) into three
levels.
Definition 6. As summarized in Table 3.4, the treatment is considered to be less
effective if ρ ∈ [0, ρ̇), somewhat effective if ρ ∈ [ρ̇, ρ̈), and very effective if ρ ∈ [ρ̈, 1].
2
) in site i
Definition 7. As shown in Table 3.5, the low second-period attack rate (πl,i
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
, 1].
∈ [π̈l,i
), and high if πl,i
, π̈l,i
∈ [π̇l,i
), medium if πl,i
∈ [0, π̇l,i
is considered low if πl,i

Table 3.4 Categorization of Treatment
Effectiveness (ρ)
Condition
ρ
ρ ∈ [0, ρ̇)
less effective
ρ ∈ [ρ̇, ρ̈) somewhat effective
ρ ∈ [ρ̈, 1]
very effective

Table 3.5 Classification of the Low
2
Second-period Attack Rate (πl,i
)
Condition
2
2
πl,i
∈ [0, π̇l,i
)
2
2
2
)
πl,i ∈ [π̇l,i , π̈l,i
2
2
πl,i ∈ [π̈l,i , 1]

2
πl,i
low
medium
high

In the following sections, we will explore the impact of different factors on the
optimal treatment and removal decisions among public and private sites and run 30
scenarios by different initial infestation in private sites where the infestation follows
binomial distribution (Ii0 ∼ B(Ni0 , πi0 ) and i ∈ Γ). In Section 3.4.2, we focus on
the budget and the success rate of treatment’s effect on the optimal treatment and
removal decisions, respectively. In Section 3.4.3, we study the optimal action decisions
for the different numbers of private sites with and without the cost-sharing program.
In Section 3.4.4, we explore the impact of the different distribution levels of ash trees
in the public sites on the budget allocations and management options on both private
and public sites.

3.4.2

Different Budget Levels and Success Rate of Treatment Levels

We present nine cases by considering three different budget levels ($15000, $25000,
$35000) and three success rate of treatment levels (ρ = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6). Here, we focus
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on street 2 type area where there are nine public sites and 16 private sites. The input
parameters and cutoff values used are listed in Table 3.6.
Table 3.6 Input Parameters Used and Calculated Cutoffs for All Budget Levels
Input Parameters
Calculated Cutoffs
2
2
2
c1
c2
c3
θ α πi0 πl,i
ρ
π̇l,i
π̈l,i
ρ̇
ρ̈
0.2 0.27 0.39
124 180 300 50 72 0.4 0.32 0.4 0.33 0.46 0.30 0.51
0.6 0.43 0.56

3.4.2.1

Different budget levels. We first explore the impact of the budget on

management decisions under different treatment effectiveness. Figures 3.5, 3.6 and
3.7 show the different budget allocations among reimbursement assigned to private
landowners, surveillance, treatment, and removal cost applied to public sites when
ρ = 0.20, 0.4, 0.6, respectively. As shown in those figures, we find that the government
allocates the same budget on the surveillance in public sites and the reimbursement
for private sites. More budget is assigned to the treatment in public sites when the
total budget increases and the removal cost increases firstly and then decreases.

Figure 3.5 Surveillance, treatment, removal cost and reimbursement for different
budget levels when ρ = 0.2.
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Figure 3.6 Surveillance, treatment, removal cost and reimbursement for different
budget levels when ρ = 0.4.

Figure 3.7 Surveillance, treatment, removal cost and reimbursement for different
budget levels when ρ = 0.6.

When the government only assigns $15000 budget to control the spread of EAB,
the budget is very limited regardless effectiveness of treatment, and not all infested
trees can be treated or removed.
When the total budget rises, the government will spend the rest budget on
treating susceptible trees after taking the cost of removing all infested ash trees in
the public sites in the first period. Since the success rate of treatment is very less
effective, there is a high probability that the treated infested trees will also die in
the next period. But the treated susceptible trees must become EAB resistant in the
next period, and when the budget is enough, the treatment of the susceptible trees
occurs earlier in the public sites.
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Figure 3.8 The total expected healthy trees in all public sites and private sites
respectively for different budget levels. Where c1 = $124 per tree, c2 = $180 per
tree, c3 = $300 per tree, ρ = 0.2, and the initial attack rate is 0.4.
The quantity of total healthy trees at the end of the horizon increases with the
increase of the total budget. The number of healthy trees in all public sites increases
largely when the government assigns more and more budget. However, the increase
of healthy trees in all private sites is few.

3.4.2.2

Different success rate of treatment levels. In this section, we explore

the impact of the success rate of treatment on the management decisions and the
budget allocations for the treatment, removal in public sites, and the reimbursement
in the private sites. We increase the success rate of treatment from 0.2 to 0.6.
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Figure 3.9 Surveillance, treatment, removal cost and reimbursement for different
success rates of treatment with the same budget. Where c1 = $124 per tree,
c2 = $180 per tree, c3 = $300 per tree, and the initial attack rate is 0.4.
As shown in Figure 3.9, the allocated budget for the surveillance does not
change regardless of the increase in treatment success rate.

However, the total

reimbursement assigned to the private sites decreases with the increase in the success
rate of treatment. Because private landowners have more incentives when the success
rate of treatment is higher, the required reimbursement from the government is less.
The right-hand side of Figure 3.9 shows that there is more budget that can be
assigned to the public sites when the success rate of treatment is increasing with the
same total budget, as the reimbursement assigned to private sites is less and less. As
a result, the allocated budget for the treatment and removal in the public sites is
more with a higher success rate of treatment.
The left-hand side of Figure 3.9 shows the different budget allocations for
the surveillance, treatment, removal, and reimbursement with the same budget on
the treatment and removal decisions in different success rates of treatment. The
proportion of the budget for the treatment in the public sites increases. Conversely,
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the proportion of the budget for the removal in public sites decreases with the increase
in the success rate of treatment.
Table 3.7 The Percentage of Healthy and Infested Trees Being Taken Actions
Treated healthy
trees percentage
Treated infested
trees percentage
Removed infested
trees percentage

budget =$15000
ρ = 0.2 ρ = 0.4 ρ = 0.6
0.3%
1.2%
5.2%

budget = $25000
ρ = 0.2 ρ = 0.4 ρ = 0.6
28.4%
38.3%
50.1%

budget = $35000
ρ = 0.2 ρ = 0.4 ρ = 0.6
62.3%
57.3%
57.1%

0.9%

24.3%

72.2%

0.0%

0.2%

1.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.1%

35.1%

33.5%

15.2%

100.0%

99.8%

99.0%

100.0%

100.0%

99.9%

Table 3.7 shows that the newly infested trees, treated susceptible trees, treated
infested trees, removed infested trees, and removed dead trees in each site for each
period with different levels of the success rate of treatment and the same budget
assigned to treatment and removal in all public sites. As shown in Table 3.7, the
budget assigned on the public sites is almost all allocated to remove infested trees
when the success rate of treatment is very low (ρ = 0.2), and the rest budget
is applied to treat susceptible trees in the public sites. When the success rate of
treatment increases to 0.4, there is more budget assigned to treatment in the public
sites. Furthermore, the increased budget assigned to the treatment is allocated to
treating infested trees in public sites. The proportion of treatment on the budget
assigned to the public sites is largely improved when the success rate of treatment
becomes 0.6. Further, a large proportion of the treatment cost is used for treating
infested trees in public sites.

3.4.3

Number of Privates Sites

In this section, we present the optimal solutions under there street scenarios (Street
1, Street 2, and Street 3) with or without cost-sharing programming when the total
budget is set as $15000.
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Figure 3.10 Total expected healthy ash trees in all public and private sites
respectively for different street scenarios. Where c1 = $124 per tree, c2 = $180 per
tree, c3 = $300 per tree, ρ = 0.2, and the initial attack rate is 0.4.
As shown in Figure 3.10, the number of healthy ash trees in public sites increases,
and the number of healthy trees in private sites decreases when there are more and
more private sites with cost-sharing or without cost-sharing programming. However,
there is more budget applied to treatment and removal in public sites without
cost-sharing programming compared to the case with cost-sharing programming. But
accordingly, there are fewer healthy ash trees in private sites without cost-sharing
programming compared to the case with cost-sharing programming. As a result,
the cost-sharing program may reduce the budget allocated for treatment or removal
in public sites, which further causes the reduced healthy trees.

However, the

reimbursement given by the government can induce private landowners to take action
to save more ash trees.

105

Figure 3.11 Total expected infested ash trees in all public and private sites
respectively for different street scenarios. Where c1 = $124 per tree, c2 = $180 per
tree, c3 = $300 per tree, ρ = 0.2, and the initial attack rate is 0.4.
Figure 3.11 presents the total infestation becomes worse and worse with the
reduction of the number of private sites. But the number of infested ash trees in
private sites is decreasing.

3.4.4

Street vs Park

Figure 3.12 Surveillance, treatment, removal cost and reimbursement for street
and park scenarios. Where c1 = $124 per tree, c2 = $180 per tree, c3 = $300 per
tree, ρ = 0.2, and the initial attack rate is 0.4.
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The government needs to allocate more budget to the surveillance of public ash trees
when public sites belong to a park compared with the case when public sites belong
to the streets. As a result, less budget can be allocated to treatment and removal in
public sites when public sites are park areas.
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CHAPTER 4
EVALUATING THE IMPLICATIONS OF EMISSIONS POLICIES ON
A CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE SYSTEM

4.1

Introduction

Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) is a technology that captures the produced CO2
at the pollution sources before it is released into the atmosphere at major point
sources. By compressing CO2 to a supercritical fluid, it can then be transported and
stored underground permanently. Although CCS is suitable in many heavy polluting
industries, such as electricity, steel, cement, etc., almost all CCS facilities are used
in the power electricity sector. There are 51 large-scale CCS facilities globally ([59]).
Nineteen of them are in operation with a total capacity of 40 million metric tonnes per
annum (Mtpa). However, to meet the Paris Agreement of keeping the global average
temperature increase well below 2o C, it is estimated that over 2000 CCS facilities
with an average capacity of 1.5 Mtpa are needed.
Currently, coal- and natural gas-fired power plants produce 28% and 35% of
the U.S. electricity sector, respectively. This sector contributes to 28% of greenhouse
gas emissions in the U.S., and 82% of it is CO2 . Even though the share of electricity
produced by coal is estimated to drop to 17% by 2050, natural gas is predicted to
increase to 39% [53]. With such heavy reliance on fossil fuels, CCS can play a key
role in mitigating emissions because it has the potential to capture 90% of generated
CO2 .
The critical hurdle to widespread CCS adoption is not the technology itself
but the lack of regulatory environments that assign a monetary cost to emitting
CO2 into the atmosphere. At present, several countries have created regulatory
environments that encourage CCS, while other countries are moving in that direction.
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The Furthering carbon capture, Utilization, Technology, Underground storage, and
Reduced Emissions (FUTURE) Act, a U.S. Senate bill introduced in July 2017,
proposes to award $35 per tonne of CO2 stored via EOR and $50 per tonne of CO2
used for dedicated storage, and allows a 12-year period for companies to claim the
tax credit.
For CCS technology to be deployed on a commercial scale, it requires a
transportation network connecting CO2 emission sources (emitters henceforth) to
underground storage sites. A third-party operator (CCS operator henceforth) may
offer the transportation and disposition of CO2 as a service. Because the storage
operator owns the pipeline as well as the storage site, emitters only need to invest
in the CO2 capturing technology. Similarly, a market-based incentive structure is
required to encourage users to reduce emissions by participating in CCS. Without
either regulatory environments or economic incentives, emitters are unwilling to bear
the additional expense associated with capturing, transporting, and storing CO2 .
Our research investigates the effectiveness of incentives on participation in CCS
and the collaboration between emitters and a CCS operator. We use the PrincipalAgent framework to capture the dynamics and the decision processes among the
players.
We advance the literature by making two new contributions. One, we investigate
the impact of allocating allowance to agents on the total quantities being captured
and stored as well as the overall information rent given to the agents to incentivize
them to participate. We provide analytical solutions to the special case where the
allocated allowance is zero. We investigate the impact of providing allowance based
on the agent’s demand distribution through numerical analysis. Two, we evaluate a
common cost model where the cost of emission depends on the total emission quantity
instead of the individual emission quantity.
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 reviews relevant
literature. In Section 4.3, we present a two-stage optimization model. In the 1st stage,
we find the optimal quantities given the demand distributions and allowances. In
the 2nd stage, we select the allowances that minimize the expected allowance while
maximizing the overall captured quantity.

We present analytical and numerical

solutions where there is only one type of agent, and each has two demand levels
in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 shows the analytical solutions for special cases where there
are two different types of agents with two demand levels. We illustrate the numerical
solutions in Section 4.6 and make a comparison between the non-cap-and-trade policy
and the cap-and-trade policy in Section 4.7. Section 4.8 summarizes the managerial
insights, and Section 4.9 concludes the paper.

4.2

Literature Review

There are three related bodies of literature: adopting the principal-agent framework,
economic incentives for reducing carbon, CCS system deployment, and cap-and-trade
mechanism.
In the traditional principal-agent framework, information asymmetry only
occurs at the beginning. Once an agent announces his decision, such as selecting a
contract, the agent’s characterization, such as his private value for a service, becomes
public. The principal is able to design a menu of contracts (multiple offers) for
the agent to self-select. The contracts are incentive-compatible such that the agent
reveals his characterization once he picks a contract. Maskin and Riley [94] show
that, so long as the single-crossing property holds, a nonlinear price-quantity schedule
can discriminate among a set of buyers with discrete valuations. In the optimal
schedule, only the highest type agent is offered the efficient amount, the amount that
would be offered if there is no information asymmetry between the principal and
the agent. All other types are offered amounts with downward distortions. Further,
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the information rent increases in the agent’s type. The lowest type receives zero
information rent. This framework has been adopted in supply chain contracting
[48, 107, 93, 130, 123, 11, 92, 131, 41, 111], as well as in the pricing of digital goods
[121, 16], in service contracting [80, 3], and in resource allocation [71, 6, 72].
Similar to prior work [36, 116], we relax the assumptions on the information
structure of the traditional principal-agent framework in two ways. One, the agent’s
characteristic is uncertain. Specifically, even though the agent knows his demand
distribution, his actual demand varies from one period to the next after he enters
into a binding contract. Two, the principal does not know the demand distribution
of the agent but can estimate a finite number of possible distributions. To deal with
the uncertainty post contracting, we introduce contracts with multiple options. The
agent can select any option from the contract after his demand is realized in each
period.
In recent years, efforts have been made to study carbon emissions-related issues
in the production planning and design of supply chains. Song and Leng [119] obtain
the optimal production quantities under three common carbon emissions policies:
a strict cap on emissions, carbon tax, and cap-and-trade. Cachon [35] derives and
compares the optimal retail supply chain designs under three different objectives:
minimizing operating costs, minimizing carbon emissions, and minimizing both.
Benjaafar et al. [15] also consider how firms’ operational decisions need to be adjusted
when accounting for carbon emissions under different carbon policies. Caro et al. [37]
assert that double counting of emissions is needed to induce firms to make the optimal
abatement efforts. Fleten et al. [56] derive optimal investment schedules for a CO2
value chain with EOR and CO2 permit options. An alternative real options model
for choosing the optimal time to invest in capture technology under uncertain CCS
costs is presented in [113].
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Due to the high cost of transporting CO2 via trucks [64], it is prudent to consider
a permanent pipeline network for any long-term sequestration effort. The problem
of designing a minimum-cost network is well studied [98]. However, many additional
considerations arise in the design of CO2 networks. For example, Keating et al.
[74] and Middleton et al. [100] demonstrate that the geologic reservoir uncertainty
has large cost implications for building a CCS infrastructure. Similarly, fluctuating
network loads are caused by seasonal and daily variations in power plant output or
failures in various network components, and thus the heterogeneous emissions profiles
at different plants greatly impact the performance of the CCS network [99].
Different types of business models have been proposed to deal with the capture,
transportation, and storage of CO2 , including ”self build and operate” and ”pay
at the gate” [55]. The ”self build and operate” model takes a vertically-integrated
approach, in which emitters handle the entire chain of capture, transportation, and
storage. This means that each emitter needs to obtain permits for reservoirs and build
the infrastructure to operate and maintain these facilities. Emitters are intimidated
not only by the high capital cost this approach requires, but also by their lack of
expertise in performing such operations. Nevertheless, existing literature [98, 101]
has provided the design of an optimal vertically-integrated CCS infrastructure that
minimizes the total cost of capturing, transporting, and storing CO2 . Kemp and
Kasim [75] and Klokk et al. [82] have incorporated Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) to
create a value chain of CO2 , that is, selling a portion of captured CO2 to companies
with EOR operations. The ”pay at the gate” business model allows a third-party
operator to offer the transportation and disposition of CO2 as a service. Because the
storage operator owns the pipeline as well as the storage site, emitters only need to
invest in the CO2 capturing technology.
Since the notion of the government assigning the allowance to the emitter to emit
pollution was proposed over thirty years ago, there have been many papers exploring
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the market-based environmental policies. Among those policies, the cap-and-trade
policy is one of the most widely discussed mechanisms. Some scholars focus on the
carbon allowance price. The oil shocks have a long-run asymmetric effect on the
carbon allowance price and do cause the price volatility of carbon allowance from
2013 to 2020, which is shown in [142]. The carbon allowance price and emission
reduction have a significant positive correlation, and industry coverage, the annual
decline factor, and the free allowance rate affect the carbon allowance price, as shown
in [89]. Adekoya [1] has explored a new method to predict the carbon allowance price.
Some scholars paid the effort to study carbon allowance allocation policies. Zhang
et al. [141] display the different allocation schemes that affect the electricity price
even in other industries. It is recommended by [127] that China set a high initial free
allowance and then gradually reduce it to achieve emission reduction targets while
reducing economic losses. Shojaei and Mokhtar [114] present a two-step optimization
mechanism to allocate the carbon allowance and found that the allocation method
is more logical if including the consideration of regional heterogeneity. There are
some researches exploring other topics about cap and trade. Li et al. [88] illustrate
the impact of consumers’ low-carbon preference level on the emission index of the
government’s decision. Chai et al. [38] study if cap and trade mechanism can be
a benefit for re-manufacturing, and they conclude that the cap-and-trade policy is
advantageous for re-manufacturing in the ordinary and green markets.
Zhang and Xu [140] propose a multi-item production planning with a cap and
trade mechanism and find that emitters will get more profit under the cap and trade
policy when the penalty cost is the same as the trading price. Chan and Morrow
[39] evaluates the impacts of the cap and trade program, which involves nine states
of the United States, in emission and damages from co-pollutants. The results show
that the cap and trade program not only reduces the emission of CO2 but also lowers
the emission and associated damages of SO2 . However, this paper also addresses
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two factors that diminish the overall benefit of the program. But Kroes et al. [86]
illustrates that carbon tradeability may not induce emitters to reduce the emission
of CO2 even with a free allowance.

4.3

Model Formulation

The principal is a CCS operator who transports and stores emission quantity q in
exchange for a total payment of t. She has a cost function of s(q) = βq, and thus her
profit is t − s(q). An agent is an emitter who must pay the penalty for emitting. We
assume that the per-unit penalty depends on the emission quantity, θ.
As a result, an agent who generates θdn emission but captures q (q < θdn ) emits
θdn − q. We refer to θdn − q as the net emission quantity. Let ad denote the emission
allowance allocated to a type-d agent. If the net emission θdn − q is over the cap, then
the emitter needs to pay α2 (θdn − ad )2 .
When the allocated allowance is greater than or equal to the net emission
quantity (ad ≥ θdn − q), it is free for the agent to emit θdn − q. Moreover, he can
collect a revenue of α2 (ad − θdn + q)2 by selling unused allowance. The agent, however,
does incur a cost of γq for capturing q emission.
On the other hand, when the allocated allowance is less than the generated
emission quantity (ad < θdn − q), the total cost of capturing q and purchasing the
needed allowance is γq + α2 (θdn − q − ad )2 .
A type-d agent’s value function when q ≤ θdn is therefore

v(q, θdn ) =








α
2

· q 2 + (α(ad − θdn ) − γ) · q

if θdn ≤ ad

α
· q 2 − (α(θdn − ad ) + γ) · q + α(θdn − ad )2 if θdn − q < ad < θdn
2




 − α · q 2 + (α(θdn − ad ) − γ) · q
if ad ≤ θdn − q
2
(4.1)

For simplify, we use τ̂ (qdn ) to represent v(qdn , θdn ) when θdn − qdn < ad < θdn
and τ̄ (qdn ) to represent v(qdn , θdn ) when ad < θdn − qdn .
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When the agent picks the option (q, t), that q is actually greater than θdn . The
agent captures all emissions emit zero, so she doesn’t need to pay the penalty but
pay the capturing cost γθdn . In addition, she can get the revenue of

α 2
a
2 d

by selling

unused allowance.
If the agent will not participate in the cost-sharing program, the agent needs to
pay the penalty α2 (θdn − ad )2 when the allowance ad is less than θdn . But if θdn ≤ ad ,
there is no penalty and the agent can get revenue of

α
(ad
2

− θdn )2 of selling unused

allowance.
A type-d agent’s value function when q > θdn is therefore:

v(q, θdn ) =





α
2

2
· θdn
+ (α(ad − θdn ) − γ) · θdn




α
2

2
· θdn
− (α(θdn − ad ) + γ) · θdn + α(θdn − ad )2 if ad < θdn

if θdn ≤ ad

(4.2)

The agent’s emission quantity is uncertain, which comes from two sources. First,
the electricity demand of a power plant may vary from one period to the next due to
seasonality. Second, the generated emission depends on the operational efficiency and
the capturing technology used at the power plant. As a result, the emission quantity
may follow a number (D) of distributions. We thus refer to each distribution as θdn ,
where d = 1, · · · , D. Though the principal does not know which distribution an agent
has, she forms
a prior probability distribution
over θdn as follows:
  




θ1
[θ11 , · · · θ1n , · · · θ1N ]
µ1 [π11 , · · · π1n , · · · π1N ]
  



 ..  



..
..
 .  



.
.
  



  








Θd = 
=
with
probabilities
 θ d   [θd1 , · · · θdn , · · · θdN ] 
 µd [πd1 , · · · πdn , · · · πdN ] 
  



..
..
 ..  



 .  
.


.

  



θN
[θD1 , · · · θDn , · · · θDN ]
µD [πD1 , · · · πDn , · · · πDN ]

Figure 4.1 illustrates when an agent makes a decision and its implications
subsequently. We refer to the agent whose demand follows θdn as a type-d agent
henceforth. In the contracting stage, the principal does not know the agent’s demand
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distribution. Therefore, she offers a menu of contracts {xd }d=1,···,D to the agent. Each
contract contains multiple options: xd = [(qd1 , td1 ), · · · , (qdN , tdN )]. The agent selects a
contract xd′ that maximizes his expected utility. Upon committing to the contract xd ,
the agent can only pick an option within xd during the subsequent implementation
stage. As an example, in the first period (t = 1), the agent observes his realized
demand θdn and selects an option, say (qd′ m , td′ m ), that maximizes his utility in that
period. In the second period (t = 2), a different demand (θdn′ ) may be realized. As
a result, another option, (qd′ m′ , td′ m′ ), is selected instead.
Principle offers
a menu of contracts
{xd = [(qdn , tdn )n=1,···,N ]}
d = 1, · · · , D

Principal
stores qd′ n′ and
collects payment td′ n′

Principal
stores qd′ m′ and
collects payment td′ m′

t=2
t=0
Contract
-ing

Agent
(type-d)
selects
contract xd′

t=1
Implemen
-tation

Agent
observes θdn ,
selects
an option
from xd′ ,
ex: (qd′ m , td′ m )

Agent
observes θdn′ ,
selects
an option
from xd′ ,
ex: (qd′ m′ , td′ m′ )

Figure 4.1 Sequence of Events.

According to the revelation principle, the principal should design a menu of
incentive-compatible contracts to induce truth-telling from the agent. Therefore,
contract xd should generate the highest expected utility for a type-d agent among all
contracts. Moreover, when the agent’s realized demand is θdn , the option (qdn , tdn )
should provide the agent the highest utility when compared to all the other options
in contract xd .
The purpose of the CCS operator is to maximize the profit by providing the
designed contracts to the emitters. However, the government wants the emitters to
capture the CO2 as much as they can with the optimal allocated allowance(ad ). To
satisfy those two objects, we treat these as a two-stage problem. We first explore
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the optimal profit of the CCS operator, and then we compare the expected capturing
CO2 quantity under different ad to find the maximized expected capturing quantity.
For inducing the emitters to receive the contract designed by the CCS operator,
the CCS operator should make sure that the emitter’s expected value (πdl v(qdl , θdl ) +
πdh v(qdh , θdh )) is not greater than the expected payment (πdl tdl + πdh tdh ) offered by
her/him.
We begin by illustrating the optimal solutions when a cap-and-trade market
is not available. These results are used to compare those under the two types of
cap-and-trade policies.
Let Φ denote the principal’s expected profit and ∆dn = v(qdn , θdn ) − tdn denote
the information rent given to a type-d agent when his generated emission is θdn . The
first stage is exploring the principal’s optimization problem, which is shown as follows:

max Φ =

P
d

s.t.

P

µd


P


πdn (tdn − βqdn )

n

πdn ∆dn ≥ 0

d = 1, · · · , D

(IRd )

n

P

πdn ∆dn ≥

n

and

P
n

πdn max
{v(qd′ n′ , θdn ) − td′ n′ } d, d′ = 1, · · · , D, d′ ̸= d
′
n

(ICdd′ )

∆dn ≥ v(qdn′ , θdn ) − tdn′

n, n′ = 1, · · · , N, n′ ̸= n

qdn ≥ 0

d, d′ = 1, · · · , D, n = 1, · · · , N (N Ndn )

(ICdnn′ )

(4.3)
The CCS operator wants to maximize her/his expected profit and design the
optimal contract ((qdl , tdl ), (qdh , tdh )). The objective function consists of weighted
profit terms for each level. IRd is an individual rationality constraint to incentive the
emitter to participate. ICdd′ constraints make the type d agent prefer to pick contract
xd instead of other contracts by ensuring the expected utility from choosing contract
xd is greater than or equal to the expected utility of other contracts. ICdhl and ICdlh
are incentive compatibility constraints that make the emitter prefer the option that
the CCS operator designs. U Bdn are the upper bond constraints to ensure capturing
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a quantity of each demand level is less than or equal to the actual demand quantity.
N Ndn constraints make contract quantity and payment non-negative.
In the second stage, let Q denote the expected capturing quantities of CO2 . We
P
want to find the optimal minimum expected allowance ( µd ad ), which can maximize
d

the expected capturing quantity. The government’s optimization problem becomes

max

Q=

ad

X

∗
∗
(ad ))
(ad ) + πdh qdh
µd (πdl qdl

(4.4)

d

4.4

Single Distribution: D = 1

When there is only one type of agent, we treat it as a single distribution. In this
section, we present the optimal solutions for different demand levels with and without
the allowance.

4.4.1

Demand Level is Known: N = 1

We first present the optimal solution for the special case where the agent’s demand
distribution θdn is known and there is no demand uncertainty. That is, when D = 1
and N = 1.
Proposition 5. When the agent’s demand is certain, and the government does not
assign any allowance to the agent i.e., θdn >

γ+β
α

and ad = 0, the optimal price and

quantity are (q dn , tdn ) (the proof is shown in Appendix A.3.1.1), where

q dn = θdn −

γ+β
,
α

tdn = τ̄ (q dn ) = (αθdn − γ)q dn − α2 q 2dn .

(4.5)

We refer to q dn as the efficient quantity and tdn as the full price. We use E to
represent the case that capturing quantity is equal to the efficient quantity.
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Proposition 6. When the government does assign the allowance, the optimal
√
allowance ad = (1 + 2) γ+β
, if the agent’s demand is known i.e., θdn > γ+β
, the
α
α
optimal price and quantities are (q̂dn , t̂dn ) (the proof is shown in Appendix A.3.1.2),
where

q̂dn = θdn ,

2
t̂dn = τ̂ (q̂dn ) = α2 θdn
− (α(θdn − ad ) + γ)θdn + α(θdn − ad )2

(4.6)

The quantity q̂dn is referred to as the full quantity, and F represents capturing
the full quantity. The price t̂dn is referred to as the sacrificial price. Further, since the
capturing cost of the agent is greater than the marginal cost of the principal γ > β,
as a result, t(q dn ) − t̂(q̂dn ) =

γ 2 −β 2
2α

+ α(θdn − ad )ad > 0, the full price is higher than

the sacrificial price i.e., t(q dn ) > t̂(q̂dn ).

4.4.2

Single Bi-level Distribution: N = 2

Let us next show the case that the demand is uncertain. However, there is only one
type of agent. And we will summarise the optimal quantity and price in two different
cases.

4.4.2.1

The government does not assign any allowance to the agent.

First, we present the optimal solution for the case that the government gives no
allowance.
Proposition 7. When the agent’s demand distribution is known, i.e., θdn = θd , the
optimal quantities and prices are (the proof is shown in Appendix A.3.1.3):

d

∗
(qdl
, t∗dl )
(q dl , τ̄ (q dl ) − ∆∗dl )
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∗
(qdh
, t∗dh )
(q dh , τ̄ (q dh ) − ∆∗dh )

where
∆∗dl = −πdh α(θdh − θdl )(θdl −
∆∗dh

= πdl α(θdh − θdl )(θdl −

γ+β
),
α

(4.7)

γ+β
).
α

The optimal quantity at both demand levels is the efficient quantity. However,
the price designed for the low demand level is higher than the full price, and the
agent with the high demand level will be charged a lower price than her/his full price.
Further, It’s important to note the net (or expected) information rent given to the
agent is
E∆∗d = πdl ∆∗dl + πdh ∆∗dh = 0.

4.4.2.2

(4.8)

The government does assign the agent an allowance to emit CO2 .

In this section, we first list the optimal solution at the low and high levels of ad , and
the optimal ad which maximizes the capturing CO2 is shown afterward.
Proposition 8. When the agent’s demand distribution is known and the allowance
√
is low (0 < ad < (1 + 2) γ+β
), the optimal quantities and prices are (the proof is
α
shown in Appendix A.3.1.4):

d

∗
(qdl
, t∗dl )
(q dl − ad , τ̄ (q dl − ad ) − ∆∗dl )

∗
(qdh
, t∗dh )
(q dh − ad , τ̄ (q dh − ad ) − ∆∗dh )

where
∗
∆∗dl = −πdh α(θdh − θdl )qdl
,

∆∗dh

= πdl α(θdh −
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∗
θdl )qdl
.

(4.9)

The optimal quantity of both demand levels is the efficient quantity (πdl θdl +
πdh θdh −

γ+β
)
α

subtracting the allowance ad , so the expected quantity of capturing

CO2 under the low allowance.
Proposition 9. When the agent’s demand distribution is known and the allowance
√
is low (ad ≥ (1 + 2) γ+β
), the optimal quantities and prices are (the proof is shown
α
in Appendix A.3.1.5):

d

∗
, t∗dl )
(qdl
(θdl , τ̂ (θdl ) − ∆∗dl )

∗
, t∗dh )
(qdh
(θdh , τ̂ (θdh ) − ∆∗dh )

where
∆∗dl = −πdh [ω · v(θdh , θdh ) + ω̄ · v(θdl , θdh ) − v(θdl , θdl )] ,
∆∗dh = πdl [ω · v(θdh , θdh ) + ω̄ · v(θdl , θdh ) − v(θdl , θdl )] .
and

(4.10)

ω ∈ [0, 1].

Capturing all quantities is the optimal choice for the agent with low and high
demand levels. Therefore, the expected quantity is πdl θdl + πdh θdh .
What is more, no matter what is the value of the allowance ad , the principal is
able to induce the agent to participate and capture the efficient, even full quantities
without giving any net information rent. S/he can achieve the desired behavior by
charging a premium price when the generated emission is low and a reduced price
when the generated emission is high.
We show the optimal solutions under the different values of ad for the single
bi-level distribution case above. Table 4.1 illustrates the expected capturing CO2
(Eq ), the agent’s expected information rent (E∆), and the principle’s utility (Φ).
2
2
+ πdh · α2 q̄dh
which is the principal’s optimal utility when there is
Let Φ0 = πdl · α2 q̄dl

no allowance assigned by the government. As shown in Table 4.1, the emitter will
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capture the most CO2 when the allowance is not less than (1 +

√

2) ·

γ+β
,
α

however,

the utility of the principal will reduce.
Table 4.1 Comparison of the Single Bi-level Distribution with Different Values of
ad
ad = 0
√
0 < ad < (1 + 2) · γ+β
α
√
(1 + 2) · γ+β
≤
a
d
α

Eq
πdl q̄dl + πdh q̄dh
πdl q̄dl + πdh q̄dh − ad
πdl θdl + πdh θdh

E∆
0
0
0

Φ
Φ0
Φ0 + α2 a2d − α(πdl q̄dl + πdh q̄dh )ad
2
Φ0 − α2 ( γ+β
α ) − α(πdl θdl + πdh θdh )ad

What is more, the government actually wants to set an allowance as small
as possible, and the emitter can still be induced to capture maximum CO2 .
√
Consequently, the optimal a∗d is (1 + 2) · γ+β
.
α

4.5
4.5.1

Dual Distributions: D = 2 and N = 2

The Allowance is Not Given by the Government to Any Agent

In this section, we explore the case when the distribution of the two types of agents
partially overlap, θ1l < θ2l < θ1h < θ2h and there is no allowance assigned by the
government. We will list two types of analytical solutions in the following.

4.5.1.1

All efficient quantities contracts. We first explore the all-efficient-

quantities case. If all demand levels are offered efficient quantities, and the net
information rent for each type is zero. We refer to this as all efficient quantities
contracts, and the solutions are shown in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2 Efficient Contracts

d=1
d=2

∗
(qdl
,
(q 1l ,
(q 2l ,

t∗dl )
τ 1l (q 1l ) − ∆∗1l )
τ 2l (q 2l ) − ∆∗2l )
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∗
(qdh
,
(q 1h ,
(q 2h ,

t∗dh )
τ 1h (q 1h ) − ∆∗1h )
τ 2h (q 2h ) − ∆∗2h )

the information rents are:
∗
∆∗1l = −π1h · α(θ1h − θ1l )q1l
,
∗
;
∆∗1h = π1l · α(θ1h − θ1l )q1l
∗
∆∗2l = −π2h · α(θ2h − θ2l )q2l
,
∗
∆∗2h = π2l · α(θ2h − θ2l )q2l
.

In this particular solution, the constraints IR1 , IR2 , IC12 and IC1lh are binding. All
demand levels can be offered their related efficient quantities. However, the net
information rent is zero regardless of the demand level. The principal can maximize
her/his profit by charging a higher price for a low demand level and decreasing the
price for a high demand level compared to his/her full price.

4.5.1.2

A single contract. When the principal only serves one type of agents,

we call this solution a single contract. The constraints IR1 , IR2 , IC21 , IC1hl , IC1lh ,
IC2hl are binding. The optimal solutions are shown in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3 A Single Contract

d=1
d=2

∗
, t∗dl )
(qdl
(0, 0)
(q 2l , τ 2l (q 2l ) − ∆∗2l )

∗
, t∗dh )
(qdh
(0, 0)
(q 2h , τ 2h (q 2h ) − ∆∗2h )

where
∆∗2l =

∗
−π2h α(θ2h − θ2l )q2l
,

∗
∆∗2h = π2l α(θ2h − θ2l )q2l
.

In this solution, the principal only serves the type-2 agent, and s/he can offer the
efficient quantity for both demand levels and charge a higher price than the full price
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when the demand level is low and a reduced price when the demand level is high to
achieve her/his purpose when µ1 is low.

4.5.2

The Allowance is Given by the Government to At Least One Type
of Agent

The government may set an allowance to make the principal design a contract to
induce the emitters to capture as much as possible CO2 . We found that there are
two kinds of optimal solutions. The first one is capturing full quantity regardless
of the type of agent and the demand level of agents. The second one is capturing
efficient quantity for the type-1 agent and full quantity for the type-2 agent regardless
of demand levels.

4.5.2.1

Full quantities are optimal solutions. When both types of agents

choose to capture all quantities (qdn = θdn d = 1, 2 and n = l, h) and the government
will assign a large allowance to both types of agents. The agent’s information rent with
the different types and demand levels can be different. The expected information rent
given to the type-1 agent is always equal to zero; however, the expected information
rent of the type-2 agent can be positive or zero. We present two examples in the case
when the expected information rent of the type-2 agent is zero or positive.
(1) the type-2 agent’s expected information rent is zero (π2l ∆2l + π2h ∆2h = 0).
We present an example of this solution in Table 4.4 which occurs when the
constraints IR1 , IR2 , and IC12 are binding.
Table 4.4 The Expected Information Rent of the Type-2 Agent is Zero

d=1
d=2

∗
(qdl
,
(θ1l ,
(θ2l ,

t∗dl )
τ̂ (θ1l ) − ∆∗1l )
τ̂ (θ2l ) − ∆∗2l )
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∗
(qdh
,
(θ1h ,
(θ2h ,

t∗dh )
τ̂ (θ1h ) − ∆∗1h )
τ̂ (θ2h ) − ∆∗2h )

The following expands the terms in Table 4.4:

∆∗1l = −π1h · (v(θ1h , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l ))
∆∗1h = π1l · (v(θ1h , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l )) .

∆∗2l = v(θ2l , θ2l ) − π1l · v(θ2l , θ1l ) − π1h · v(θ2l , θ1h )
2l
∆∗2h = − ππ2h
· ∆∗2l .

In this solution, even though the quantities offered to all types and demand
levels of the agents are full quantities, the expected information rent of both
two types of agents is zero (E∆∗d = 0, d = 1, 2). The type-1 agent with the
high emission demand will be charged a lower price than the sacrificial price;
however, s/he will pay more price than the sacrificial price when the generated
emission is low. The type-2 agent will be charged a premium price when the
emission level is low and a reduced price when the emission level is high when
π1h is high enough.
(2) the type-2 agent’s expected information rent is positive (π2l ∆2l + π2h ∆2h > 0).
We present an example of this solution in Table 4.5 which occurs when the
constraints IR1 , IC21 , IC1hl and IC2hl are binding.
Table 4.5 The Expected Information Rent of the Type-2 Agent is Positive

d=1
d=2

∗
(qdl
,
(θ1l ,
(θ2l ,

t∗dl )
τ̂ (θ1l ) − ∆∗1l )
τ̂ (θ2l ) − ∆∗2l )
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∗
(qdh
,
(θ1h ,
(θ2h ,

t∗dh )
τ̂ (θ1h ) − ∆∗1h )
τ̂ (θ2h ) − ∆∗2h )

The following expands the terms in Table 4.5:

∆∗1l = −π1h · (v(θ1l , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l ))
∆∗1h = π1l · (v(θ1l , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l )) .

∆∗2l = δ1 − π2h · (v(θ2l , θ2h ) − v(θ2l , θ2l ))
∆∗2h = δ1 + π2l · (v(θ2l , θ2h ) − v(θ2l , θ2l )) .

and,

δ1 = π2l · max{v(θ1l , θ2l ) − v(θ1l , θ1l + ∆∗1l , v(θ1h , θ2l ) − v(θ1h , θ1h + ∆∗1h }
+π2h · max{v(θ1l , θ2h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l + ∆∗1l , v(θ1h , θ2h ) − v(θ1h , θ1h + ∆∗1h } ≥ 0.

The principal offers the full quantity for both demand levels of both two types of
agents in this solution. The net information rent of the type-1 agent is zero, and
the principal will charge a higher price when the generated emission is low and a
reduced price when the emission demand is high. However, the net information
rent of the type-2 agent is positive, and the agent with a high emission demand
must have a lower price which is less than the sacrificial price.

4.5.2.2

Efficient quantities for the type-1 agent and full quantities for the

type-2 agent are the optimal solutions. Capturing efficient quantity for the
type-1 agent and full quantity for the type-2 agent is optimal only if the distribution
for θ is partial overlapping (θ1l < θ2l < θ1h < θ2h ) and the allowance assigned to the
type-1 agent is zero, i.e., a1 = 0 but the allowance assigned to the type-2 agent is large.
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In this section, we show two examples in the case when the expected information rent
of the type-1 agent is zero or positive.
(1) the type-1 agent’s expected information rent is zero (π1l ∆1l + π1h ∆1h = 0).
We show an example of when IR1 , IR2 and IC1hl are binding in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6 The Expected Information Rent of the Type-1 Agent is Zero

d=1
d=2

∗
,
(qdl
(q 1l ,
(θ2l ,

t∗dl )
τ (q 1l ) − ∆∗1l )
τ̂ (θ2l ) − ∆∗2l )

∗
,
(qdh
(q 1h ,
(θ2h ,

t∗dh )
τ (q 1h ) − ∆∗1h )
τ̂ (θ2h ) − ∆∗2h )

The following expands the terms in Table 4.6:

∆∗1l = −π1h α(θ1h − θ1l )q1l .
∆∗1h = π1l α(θ1h − θ1l )q1l .

∆∗2l = −π2h · δ1 .
∆∗2h = π2l · δ1 .

and,
δ1 = v(θ2l , θ2h ) − v(θ2l , θ2l )

In this optimal contract, the principal provides the type-1 agent with the
efficient quantity while charging a reduced price for the high emission level
and a higher price for the low emission level. Full quantity is offered to the
type-2 agent, and s/he with low emission demand will be charged a higher
price; however, the lower price will be assigned to the high emission demand
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of the type-2 agent. What is more, the net expected information rent of both
types of agents is zero.
(2) the type-1 agent’s expected information rent is positive (π1l ∆1l + π1h ∆1h > 0).
We show an example of when IR2 and IC12 are binding in Table 4.7.
Table 4.7 The Expected Information Rent of the Type-1 Agent is Positive

d=1
d=2

∗
(qdl
,
(q 1l ,
(θ2l ,

t∗dl )
τ (q 1l ) − ∆∗1l )
τ̂ (θ2l ) − ∆∗2l )

∗
(qdh
,
(q 1h ,
(θ2h ,

t∗dh )
τ (q 1h ) − ∆∗1h )
τ̂ (θ2h ) − ∆∗2h )

The following expands the terms in Table 4.7:
When π1l = π2l ,

∆∗2l = −π2h · (v(θ2h , θ2h ) − v(θ2l , θ2l )).
∆∗2h = π2l · (v(θ2h , θ2h ) − v(θ2l , θ2l )).

and,

∆∗1l = π1l (v(θ2l , θ1l ) − v(θ2l , θ2l ) + ∆∗2l ) + π1h (v(θ2h , θ1h ) − v(θ2h , θ2h ) + ∆∗2h )
−π1h · α(θ1h − θ1l )q1l .
∆∗1h = π1l (v(θ2l , θ1l ) − v(θ2l , θ2l ) + ∆∗2l ) + π1h (v(θ2h , θ1h ) − v(θ2h , θ2h ) + ∆∗2h )
+π1l · α(θ1h − θ1l )q1l .

We present the case when π1l = π2l and the case when π1l ̸= π2l is shown in
the Appendix A.3.2.2. In this solution, the efficient quantities are given to the
type-1 agent with a positive net expected information rent.
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4.6

Numerical Solutions

We introduce the different kinds of optimal solutions when capturing all quantities
is optimal for both two types of agents. In this section, we explore the conditions
which cause different solutions and the reason why the principal prefers not to offer
all quantities to the type-1 agent in some cases.
Table 4.8 Solutions Types for Various µ1 , π1l and π2l
(a) When µ1 = 0.25

π1l
π2l = 0.25
π2l = 0.50
π2l = 0.75

0.25
▷
□
⋄

0.50
⋄
▷
⋄

(b) When µ1 = 0.50

0.75
⃝
▷
▷

π1l
π2l = 0.25
π2l = 0.50
π2l = 0.75

0.25
◁
□
⋄

0.50
▷
◁
▷

(c) When µ1 = 0.75

0.75
▷
▷
◁

π1l
π2l = 0.25
π2l = 0.50
π2l = 0.75

0.25
△
□
⋄

0.50
◁
△
□

0.75
◁
◁
▷

Note: We use (θ1l , θ1h , θ2l , θ2h ) = (2, 4, 3, 5) in Mt. Pink colors correspond to the case
that E∆2 = 0 and blue colors correspond to the case that E∆2 > 0 for F1 F2 solution.
White color represents E1 F2 solution. Different color’s degrees of pink and blue represent
different solutions.

Table 4.8 displays the six various solutions when µ1 is respectively fixed to 0.25,
0.50 and 0.75. Each color represents a unique solution. Among those colors, the
solutions represented by the pink and blue colors have one thing in common, which is
all demand levels in both types of agents capture their full demand of CO2 . However,
the white cell with a circle pattern represents another optimal solution: the type-2
agent captures full quantity while the type-1 agent captures efficient quantity.
The patterns diamond and square in the pink cells show solutions that the
expected information rent of both types of agents is zero. Among those pink cells,
the light pink cells with a diamond pattern correspond to the case when IR1 , IR2 ,
and IC12 constraints are binding, and the dark pink cells with the square pattern
correspond to the case when IR1 and IR2 bind.
Blue color cells represent the solutions when the expected information rent of
the type-1 agent is zero; however, the type-2 agent’s expected information rent is
positive. The case when IR1 and IC21 are binding is represented by the dark blue
cells with a right triangle pattern. The cornflower blue cells with the left triangle
pattern correspond to the case when IR1 , IC21 , IC1hl and IC2hl bind. What’s more,
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the sky blue cells with a triangle pattern correspond to the case when IR1 , IC21 , IC12 ,
and IC1hl bind.
As shown in Table 4.8, when π1l is low and π2l is high, the expected information
rent of the type-2 agent intends to be zero. But when µ1 = 0.25, π1l = 0.75 and
π2l = 0.25, the optimal solution is that the type-1 agent captures efficient quantities
and the type-2 agent captures the full quantities represented by the white cell with
a circle pattern. We will explore the reason why the full quantities for both types of
agents are not optimal in the following.
Table 4.9 Solution Types for Various µ1 , π1l and π2l
(a) When π2l = 0.1

π1l
µ1 = 0.05
µ1 = 0.10
µ1 = 0.15
µ1 = 0.20
µ1 = 0.25

0.05

0.15

0.25
⊕

0.35
⊕

0.45
⊕

0.55
⊕

0.65
⊕
⊕

0.75
⊕
⊕
⊖
⊖

0.85
⊖
⊖
⊖
⊖

0.95
⊖
⊖
⊖
⊖
⊖

0.65
⊕
⊕
⊕
⊕

0.75
⊕
⊕
⊕
⊕

0.85
⊕
⊕
⊖
⊕
⊕

0.95
⊖
⊖
⊖
⊖
⊖

0.65
⊕
⊕

0.75
⊕
⊕

0.85
⊕
⊕
⊖

0.95
⊕
⊕
⊕

(b) When π2l = 0.3

π1l
µ1 = 0.05
µ1 = 0.10
µ1 = 0.15
µ1 = 0.20
µ1 = 0.25

0.05

0.15

0.25
⊗

0.35
⊗
⊗

0.45
⊕
⊗
⊗

0.55
⊕
⊕
⊕
⊕

(c) When π2l = 0.5

π1l
µ1 = 0.05
µ1 = 0.10
µ1 = 0.15
µ1 = 0.20
µ1 = 0.25

0.05

0.15

0.25

0.35

0.45
⊗

0.55
⊗
⊕

To find the reason why the full quantities for both two types of agents are not
optimal when µ1 = 0.25, π1l = 0.75, and π2l = 0.25, we reduce the intervals between
µ1 , π1l and π2l changes as shown in Table 4.9. In Table 4.9, the gray cells with
no patterns represent the case that full quantities are optimal regardless of types of
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agents and demand levels. Other cells represent that efficient quantities are optimal
for the type-1 agent and the full quantities are optimal for the type-2 agent.
Among the colorful cells (not gray), the lime color cells with a minus symbol in
a circle correspond to the case when the constraints IR1 and IR2 are both binding.
The pear green cells with a plus symbol in a circle correspond to the case when IR1 ,
IR2 , and IC1hl are binding, and the corn yellow color cells with a times symbol in a
circle correspond to the case when IR2 , IC12 , and IC1hl are binding.
Table 4.9 just displays the solutions when π2l is 0.1, 0.3, and 0.5. Because if
we continue to increase the value of π2l , the optimal solutions will be full quantities
for all kinds of agents, which are the same as not increasing the value of µ1 more
than 0.25. In other words, the efficient quantities designed for the type-1 agent and
the full quantities designed for the type-2 agent are optimal only when the value of
µ2 × π2h is large. Further, the increased revenue from the type-1 agent can not reach
the increased information rent to the type-2 agent; therefore, full quantities are not
optimal for the type-1 agent when µ2 × π2h is large.
What we also noticed is that the allowance given to the agent is large (ad ≥
√
) if full quantities are designed for that agent. However, if efficient
(1 + 2) · γ+β
α
quantities are optimal for an agent, it is not necessary to assign any allowance to that
agent (ad = 0).

4.7

Comparison

In this section, we explore the difference between the non-cap-and-trade policy and
the cap-and-trade policy. The cap-and-trade policy is that the government provides
an allowance, and the emitters will pay the penalty if s/he emits the extra CO2 out
of the allowance into the air; however, the emitters can buy and sell the allowance
on the market. The non-cap-and-trade policy means that the government does not
assign any allowance to the emitters, and there is no cap-and-trade policy launched.
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The emitters will pay the penalty once s/he emits the CO2 into the air. To clearly
distinguish different contracts offered by the principal, we use various symbols to
represent different contracts shown in Table 4.10. The optimal solutions for different
Table 4.10 The Symbols of the Different Contracts
Ed
Fd
Sd
Pd
Hd
Nd

the capturing quantity of the type d agent is efficient
the type d agent captures all demand quantity
the quantities offered to low and high demand levels of the type d agent are different
the quantities offered to low and high demand levels of the type d agent are same
only serve the type d agent when the demand level is high
not serve the type d agent when the demand level is high

values of µ1 , π1l , and π2l when the demand levels of a type-1 agent are less than those
of a type-2 agent are shown in Table 4.11, 4.12, 4.13, 4.14, 4.15, and 4.16. It provides
an optimal allowance to a type-1 agent (a∗1 ) and a type-2 agent (a∗2 ), the optimal
expected information rent obtained by a type-1 agent E∆∗1 and by a type-2 agent
E∆∗2 , the principal’s expected profit (Φ∗ ), the aggregated storage quantity (EQ∗ ), the
total aggregated value of the principal and agents (ES ∗ ), and the aggregated value
of the government (EG∗ ). It also shows the optimal storage quantities by a type-1
0
0
0
0
agent (q1l
, q1h
) and by a type-2 agent (q2l
, q2h
), the optimal expected information rent

obtained by a type-1 agent E∆01 and by a type-2 agent E∆02 , the principal’s expected
profit (Φ0 ), the aggregated storage quantity (EQ0 ), the total aggregated value of the
principal and agents (ES 0 ), and the aggregated value of the government (EG0 ) when
zero allowances are given to either type of agent. The total aggregated value of the
principal and agents in the cost-sharing program is computed by the sum of the profit
of the principal and information rent from agents, i.e.,

ES =

X

µd (πdl (tdl − βqdl ) + πdh (tdh − βqdh ) + πdl ∆dl + πdh ∆dh )

d
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Further, the value of government is calculated by the penalty got from agents minus
the cost of allowance given to agents, i.e.,

EG =

X
d

4.7.1


α
α
α 
α
µd πdl ( (θdl − qdl )2 − a2d ) + πdh ( (θdh − qdh )2 − a2d )
2
2
2
2

Optimal Allowance for Partial Overlapping Demand Distributions:
θ1l < θ2l < θ1h < θ2h

Table 4.11 Partial Overlapping: when µ1 = 0.25
Cap-and-trade model
E∆∗2
51.48
0.00
0.00

T ype a∗1 a∗2 E∆∗1
F1 F2 0.6 1.5 0.00
F1 F2 0.6 2.4 0.00
E1 F2 0.0 2.2 0.00

π1l
0.25
0.50
0.75

T ype a∗1 a∗2 E∆∗1 E∆∗2
Φ∗
EQ∗ ES ∗
EG∗
F1 F2 0.6 1.2 0.00 0.00 $1, 218 3.88 $1218 $ − 167
F1 F2 0.6 1.5 0.00 40.76 $1, 015 3.75 $1056 $ − 254
F1 F2 2.0 1.8 0.00 125.34 $817 3.63 $942 $ − 490

π1l
0.25
0.50
0.75

T ype a∗1 a∗2 E∆∗1
F1 F2 0.6 0.6 0.00
F1 F2 0.6 1.2 0.00
F1 F2 0.6 1.5 0.00

E∆∗2
0.00
0.00
30.03

Φ∗
$1, 329
$1, 186
$1, 187

Non-cap-and-trade model

π1l
0.25
0.50
0.75

Φ∗
$1, 158
$861
$701

EQ∗ ES ∗
EG∗
4.25 $1381 $ − 254
4.13 $1186 $ − 631
4.00 $1187 $ − 519

EQ∗ ES ∗
EG∗
3.50 $1158 $ − 51
3.38 $861 $ − 167
3.25 $731 $ − 254

π2l = 0.25
0
0
T ype (q1l
, q1h
)
H1 E2 (0.0, 0.8)
N1 E2 (0.0, 0.0)
N1 E2 (0.0, 0.0)
π2l = 0.50
0
0
T ype (q1l
, q1h
)
H1 E2 (0.0, 2.8)
H1 E2 (0.0, 0.8)
N1 E2 (0.0, 0.0)
π2l = 0.75
0
0
T ype (q1l
, q1h
)
E1 E2 (1.8, 3.8)
H1 E2 (0.0, 3.2)
H1 E2 (0.0, 0.8)

0
0
(q2l
, q2h
)
(2.8, 4.8)
(2.8, 4.8)
(2.8, 4.8)

E∆01 E∆02
Φ0
0.00 128.25 $2, 078
0.00 0.00 $2, 061
0.00 0.00 $2, 061

EQ0 ES 0
3.37 $2206
3.22 $2061
3.22 $2061

0
0
(q2l
, q2h
)
(2.8, 4.8)
(2.8, 4.8)
(2.8, 4.8)

E∆01 E∆02
Φ0
0.00 150.00 $1, 863
0.00 85.50 $1, 665
0.00 0.00 $1, 654

EQ0 ES 0 EG0
3.37 $2013 $36
2.95 $1751 $1056
2.85 $1654 $86

0
0
(q2l
, q2h
)
(2.8, 4.8)
(2.8, 4.8)
(2.8, 4.8)

E∆01
0.00
0.00
0.00

EQ0 ES 0
3.30 $1662
2.88 $1498
2.52 $1295

E∆02
0.00
3.24
42.75

Φ0
$1, 662
$1, 495
$1, 252

EG0
$110
$116
$86

EG0
$6
$36
$76

Note: Optimal storage quantities, the aggregated storage quantity, and the principal’s
expected profit under optimal allowances vs. those under zero allowances.

Table 4.12 Partial Overlapping: when µ1 = 0.50
Cap-and-trade model
a∗1

a∗2

E∆∗1

E∆∗2

∗

Non-cap-and-trade model
∗

∗

π1l
0.25
0.50
0.75

T ype
F1 F2 1.0 1.5
F1 F2 1.6 1.5
F1 F2 2.0 1.5

Φ
148.63 $1, 049
275.63 $760
268.13 $744

EQ
ES
4.00 $1198
3.75 $1035
3.50 $1013

π1l
0.25
0.50
0.75

T ype a∗1 a∗2 E∆∗1 E∆∗2
Φ∗
F1 F2 0.6 1.2 0.0
0.00 $1, 198
F1 F2 1.4 1.2 0.0 240.24 $686
F1 F2 1.6 1.5 0.0 196.98 $558

EQ∗ ES ∗
3.75 $1198
3.50 $927
3.25 $785

π1l
0.25
0.50
0.75

T ype a∗1 a∗2 E∆∗1 E∆∗2
Φ∗
F1 F2 0.6 0.6 0.0
0.00 $1, 158
F1 F2 0.8 1.2 0.0
2.05
$808
F1 F2 1.2 1.2 0.0 157.30 $481

EQ∗ ES ∗
3.50 $1158
3.25 $810
3.00 $641

0.0
0.0
0.0

π2l = 0.25
0
0
EG
T ype (q1l
, q1h
)
$ − 232 S1 E2 (0.8, 2.8)
$ − 344 S1 E2 (0.3, 2.3)
$ − 447 S1 E2 (0.1, 0.8)
π2l = 0.50
0
0
EG∗
T ype (q1l
, q1h
)
$ − 129 S1 E2 (0.8, 3.3)
$ − 243 S1 E2 (0.8, 2.8)
$ − 344 S1 E2 (0.5, 1.8)
π2l = 0.75
0
0
EG∗
T ype (q1l
, q1h
)
$ − 51 E1 E2 (1.8, 3.8)
$ − 149 S1 E2 (0.8, 3.5)
$ − 243 S1 E2 (0.8, 2.8)
∗

0
0
(q2l
, q2h
)

E∆01 E∆02
Φ0
(2.8, 4.8) 0.00 328.50 $1, 805
(2.8, 4.8) 0.00 278.25 $1, 566
(2.8, 4.8) 0.00 108.83 $1, 386

EQ0 ES 0 EG0
3.30 $2133 $71
2.80 $1844 $130
2.30 $1495 $207

0
0
(q2l
, q2h
)
(2.8, 4.8)
(2.8, 4.8)
(2.8, 4.8)

E∆01 E∆02
Φ0
0.00 150.22 $1, 752
0.00 257.00 $1, 405
0.00 94.83 $1, 172

EQ0 ES 0 EG0
3.24 $1903 $37
2.80 $1662 $71
2.30 $1367 $130

0
0
(q2l
, q2h
)
(2.8, 4.8)
(2.8, 4.8)
(2.8, 4.8)

E∆01 E∆02
Φ0
EQ0 ES 0 EG0
0.00 0.00 $1, 662 3.30 $1662 $6
0.00 63.80 $1, 359 2.72 $1423 $41
0.00 185.50 $1, 005 2.30 $1190 $71

Note: Optimal storage quantities, the aggregated storage quantity, and the principal’s
expected profit under optimal allowances vs. those under zero allowances.

Tables 4.11, 4.12 and 4.13 illustrate the optimal solutions for both two models
where demands follow partial overlapping distributions (θ1l < θ2l < θ1h < θ2h )
Mostly, the principal will design the contracts to induce both types of agents to
capture all demands, i.e., the optimal contract type is F1 F2 when there is an allowance
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Table 4.13 Partial Overlapping: when µ1 = 0.75
Cap-and-trade model

Non-cap-and-trade model

π2l = 0.25
0
0
T ype (q1l
, q1h
)
S1 E2 (1.5, 3.5)
S1 E2 (1.3, 3.3)
S1 E2 (1.2, 2.8)
π2l = 0.50
0
0
π1l T ype a∗1 a∗2 E∆∗1 E∆∗2
Φ∗
EQ∗ ES ∗
EG∗
T ype (q1l
, q1h
)
0.25 F1 F2 0.6 1.2 0.00 0.00 $1, 198 3.75 $1178 $ − 90 S1 E2 (1.5, 3.6)
0.50 F1 F2 1.4 1.2 0.00 240.24 $686 3.50 $915 $ − 98 S1 E2 (1.5, 3.5)
0.75 F1 F2 1.6 1.5 0.00 196.98 $588 3.25 $630 $ − 159 S1 E2 (1.4, 3.1)
π2l = 0.75
0
0
)
, q1h
π1l T ype a∗1 a∗2 E∆∗1 E∆∗2
Φ∗
EQ∗ ES ∗
EG∗
T ype (q1l
0.25 F1 F2 0.6 0.6 0.00 0.00 $1, 158 3.50 $1158 $ − 51 E1 E2 (1.8, 3.8)
0.50 F1 F2 0.8 1.2 0.00 2.05
$808 3.25 $850 $ − 90 S1 E2 (1.5, 3.7)
0.75 F1 F2 1.4 1.2 0.00 154.44 $487 3.00 $597 $ − 98 S1 E2 (1.5, 3.5)
π1l
0.25
0.50
0.75

T ype a∗1 a∗2 E∆∗1 E∆∗2
Φ∗
F1 F2 1.0 1.5 0.00 148.63 $1, 049
F1 F2 1.6 1.5 0.00 275.63 $760
F1 F2 2.0 1.5 0.00 268.13 $744

EQ∗ ES ∗
EG∗
4.00 $1233 $ − 98
3.75 $933 $ − 193
3.50 $671 $ − 235

0
0
(q2l
, q2h
)
(2.8, 4.8)
(2.8, 4.8)
(2.8, 4.8)

E∆01 E∆02
Φ0
0.00 211.92 $1, 710
0.00 246.37 $1, 360
0.00 260.94 $1, 021

EQ0 ES 0 EG0
3.30 $1921 $29
2.80 $1607 $48
2.30 $1282 $71

0
0
(q2l
, q2h
)
(2.8, 4.8)
(2.8, 4.8)
(2.8, 4.8)

E∆01 E∆02
Φ0
EQ0 ES 0 EG0
0.00 95.48 $1, 696 3.25 $1792 $20
0.00 176.17 $1, 310 2.80 $1486 $29
0.00 208.64 $961 2.30 $1170 $48

0
0
)
, q2h
(q2l
(2.8, 4.8)
(2.8, 4.8)
(2.8, 4.8)

E∆01 E∆02
Φ0
EQ0 ES 0 EG0
0.00 0.00 $1, 662 3.30 $1662 $6
0.00 58.09 $1, 297 2.75 $1355 $21
0.00 140.42 $910 2.30 $1050 $29

Note: Optimal storage quantities, the aggregated storage quantity, and the principal’s
expected profit under optimal allowances vs. those under zero allowances.

assigned by the government in the market. Further, the government often allocates a
large allowance to the agent who can be induced to capture all quantities of demand.
What is more, the type-1 agent can not get the expected information rent; however,
the type-2 agent may get the expected information rent. As shown in Tables 4.11,
4.12, and 4.13, the left sides of those three tables display the optimal solutions for
the cap-and-trade model. Except for the case when µ1 = 0.25, π1l = 0.75, and
π2l = 0.25, the principal offers a full quantities contract (F1 F2 ) in other cases with a
large allowance assigned to both types of agents. When µ1 = 0.25, π1l = 0.75, and
π2l = 0.25, the type-1 agent is offered the efficient quantities for low as well as high
demand levels, and the principal designs the full quantities contract to the type-1
agent for both levels of demands, i.e., the optimal contract is E1 F2 , shown in Table
4.11.
If the cap-and-trade policy is not implemented, the type-2 agent is always offered
efficient quantities by the principal, and the type-1 agent always fails to receive a
positive expected information rent despite the principal offering several various types
of contracts to the type-1 agents.
When π1l = 0.25 and π2l = 0.75, regardless of the value of µ1 , the principal
designs the efficient quantities for both two types of agents without expected
information rent for both agents if the government does not give the agents any
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allowance (See the Right sides of Tables 4.11, 4.12, and 4.13).

Furthermore,

we observed that the expected demand of each type of agent is equivalent, i.e,
π1l θ1l + π1h θ1h = π2l θ2l + π2h θ2h .
As shown on the right side of Table 4.11, There are three different types of
contracts, H1 E2 , N1 E2 , and E1 E2 . When the principal optimally offers H1 E2 contract
to the agents, the expected information rent given to the type-2 agent is positive. If
offering E1 E2 instead of H1 E2 to agents at this time, the principal has to give the
type-2 agent more information rent to induce her/him to pick the option designed
for her/him by the principal. But once π1l increases, the revenue from serving the
type-1 agent can not reach the expected information rent given to the type-2 agent.
As a result, the principal prefers not to serve the type-1 agent, and the expected
information rent assigned to the type-2 reduces to zero. This is shown in Table 4.11,
when π1l rises to 0.50 from 0.25 and π2l is 0.25 or when π1l rises to 0.75 from 0.50,
and π2l is 0.50.
Tables 4.12 and 4.13 show another type of contract S1 E2 . The type-1 agent
is offered the separating contract without expected information rent, and the type2 agent is offered efficient quantities with positive expected information rent, and
offering efficient quantities to the type-1 agent is more costly instead of the separating
contract at that time. What is more, when there is no allowance assigned to both
types of agents, the expected captured quantity of the type-1 agent is monotonically
increasing when the value of µ1 increases (from 0.25 to 0.75). Since the revenue from
the type-1 agent plays more and more contributions and the principal purposefully
serves more quantity to the type-1 agent with the growth of the probability of being
the type-1 agent. Furthermore, the type-2 agent is offered efficient quantities without
allowance assigned to both types of agents, as shown in Tables 4.11 to 4.13.
Compared with the non-cap-and-trade policy, the cap-and-trade policy always
makes the principal offer more quantities to agents, which means EQ∗ > EQ0 . As
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shown in Tables 4.11 to 4.16, the optimal contract offered by the principal mostly is
F1 F2 , meaning agents are induced to capture all demand quantities for the cap-andtrade model. So the expected captured CO2 quantity of the non-cap-and-trade model
can not exceed the expected captured CO2 quantity of the cap-and-trade model when
capturing all demand quantities is picked by all demand levels agents respectively.
There does exist another optimal contract for the cap-and-trade model, which is E1 F2 .
E1 F2 becomes optimal when µ1 is small. Further, when µ1 is small, the principal
prefers to only serve the high demand level of the type-1 agent less than efficient
quantity or even not serve the type-1 agent and the type-2 agent always is induced to
capture his/her efficient quantity for the non-cap-and-trade model (H1 E2 or N1 E2 ). As
a result, even though when E1 F2 is the optimal contract for the cap-and-trade model,
the total expected captured CO2 when the cap-and-trade policy is implemented is
still more than the total expected captured CO2 when the cap-and-trade policy is not
implemented. The cap-and-trade policy can make the principal design the contract
to induce agents to capture more CO2 . However, the principal will sacrifice her/his
profit (Φ∗ < Φ0 ) and the whole system value is also reduced compared to the noncap-and-trade case (ES ∗ < ES ∗ ), and the government also pays the cost to induce
agents to capture more CO2 (EG∗ < EG0 ) which are also shown in Tables 4.11 to
4.16.

4.7.2

Optimal Allowance for Complete Overlapping Demand Distributions:
θ2l < θ1l < θ1h < θ2h

In section 4.7.2, we display the optimal solutions for both two models where demands
follow partial overlapping distributions (θ2l < θ1l < θ1h < θ2h ) in Tables 4.14, 4.15,
and 4.16.
The left side of each table shows the optimal solutions for the cap-and-trade
model, and there is only one type of optimal contract designed by the principal that is
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Table 4.14 Complete Overlapping: when µ1 = 0.25
Cap-and-trade model

Non-cap-and-trade model

π1l
0.25
0.50
0.75

T ype a∗1 a∗2 E∆∗1 E∆∗2
Φ∗
EQ∗ ES ∗
EG∗
F1 F2 0.6 1.6 0.00 0.00 $1, 344 4.25 $1344 $ − 287
F1 F2 0.6 2.0 0.00 0.00 $1, 240 4.13 $1240 $ − 442
F1 F2 2.7 1.4 0.00 263.69 $1, 045 4.0 $1308 $ − 471

π1l
0.25
0.50
0.75

T ype a∗1 a∗2 E∆∗1
F1 F2 0.9 1.0 0.00
F1 F2 0.6 1.2 0.00
F1 F2 0.6 1.6 0.00

E∆∗2
12.44
0.00
0.00

Φ∗
$1, 126
$1, 083
$974

π1l
0.25
0.50
0.75

T ype a∗1 a∗2 E∆∗1
F1 F2 1.5 0.8 0.00
F1 F2 1.2 0.6 0.00
F1 F2 0.9 0.8 0.00

E∆∗2
0.00
0.00
0.00

Φ∗
$752
$795
$724

EQ∗ ES ∗
EG∗
3.88 $1138 $ − 136
3.75 $1083 $ − 167
3.63 $974 $ − 287
EQ∗
3.50
3.38
3.25

ES ∗
$752
$795
$724

EG∗
$ − 149
$ − 90
$ − 98

π2l = 0.25
0
0
T ype
(q1l
, q1h
)
P1 E2 (2.0, 2.0)
P1 E2 (1.0, 1.0)
P1 E2 (0.05, 0.05)
π2l = 0.50
0
0
T ype
(q1l
, q1h
)
E1 E2 (2.8, 3.8)
P1 E2 (2.4, 2.4)
P1 E2 (2.0, 2.0)
π2l = 0.75
0
0
)
, q1h
T ype
(q1l
E1 S2 (2.8, 3.8)
E1 S2 (2.8, 3.8)
E1 S2 (2.8, 3.8)

0
0
(q2l
, q2h
) E∆01
(1.8, 4.8) 0.00
(1.8, 4.8) 0.00
(1.8, 4.8) 0.00

E∆02
Φ0
EQ0 ES 0 EG0
214.50 $2, 087 3.54 $2302 $50
168.47 $1, 977 3.30 $2145 $84
10.12 $1, 938 3.05 $1948 $130

0
0
(q2l
, q2h
) E∆01
(1.8, 4.8) 0.00
(1.8, 4.8) 0.00
(1.8, 4.8) 0.00

E∆02
Φ0
EQ0 ES 0 EG0
0.00 $1, 864 3.36 $1864 $6
16.82 $1, 752 3.08 $1769 $25
109.01 $1, 593 2.98 $1702 $30

0
0
) E∆01
, q2h
(q2l
(1.2, 4.8) 33.14
(1.4, 4.8) 18.89
(1.5, 4.8) 0.66

E∆02
0.00
0.00
0.00

Φ0
$1, 275
$1, 240
$1, 206

EQ0 ES 0 EG0
2.49 $1337 $38
2.49 $1278 $29
2.49 $1218 $22

Note: Optimal storage quantities, the aggregated storage quantity, and the principal’s
expected profit under optimal allowances vs. those under zero allowances.

Table 4.15 Complete Overlapping: when µ1 = 0.50
Cap-and-trade model
a∗1

a∗2

E∆∗1

E∆∗2

∗

Non-cap-and-trade model
∗

∗

π1l
0.25
0.50
0.75

T ype
Φ
EQ
ES
F1 F2 0.6 1.4 0.00 2.05 $1, 356 4.00 $1358
F1 F2 0.6 1.8 0.00 0.00 $1, 202 3.75 $1202
F1 F2 1.8 1.6 0.00 279.47 $704 3.50 $984

π1l
0.25
0.50
0.75

T ype a∗1 a∗2 E∆∗1 E∆∗2
Φ∗
F1 F2 1.2 0.8 0.00 139.14 $960
F1 F2 0.6 1.2 0.00 0.00 $1, 084
F1 F2 1.5 1.0 0.0 243.63 $633

EQ∗ ES ∗
3.75 $1099
3.50 $1084
3.38 $877

π1l
0.25
0.50
0.75

T ype a∗1 a∗2 E∆∗1
F1 F2 1.5 0.8 0.00
F1 F2 1.2 0.8 0.0
F1 F2 1.2 0.6 0.0

EQ∗
3.50
3.25
3.00

E∆∗2
0.00
0.00
67.64

Φ∗
$786
$756
$652

ES ∗
$786
$756
$720

π2l = 0.25
0
0
)
, q1h
EG
T ype (q1l
$ − 166 P1 E2 (2.8, 2.8)
$ − 257 P1 E2 (2.4, 2.4)
$ − 415 P1 E2 (2.0, 2.0)
π2l = 0.50
0
0
EG∗
T ype (q1l
, q1h
)
$ − 149 E1 E2 (2.8, 3.8)
$ − 129 P1 E2 (2.8, 2.8)
$ − 232 P1 E2 (2.5, 2.5)
π2l = 0.75
0
0
EG∗
T ype (q1l
, q1h
)
$ − 207 E1 S2 (2.8, 3.8)
$ − 149 E1 S2 (2.8, 3.8)
$ − 129 E1 S2 (2.8, 3.8)
∗

0
0
)
, q2h
(q2l

E∆01 E∆02
Φ0
(1.8, 4.8) 0.00 216.81 $1, 935
(1.8, 4.8) 0.00 263.31 $1, 749
(1.8, 4.8) 0.00 286.93 $1, 591

EQ0 ES 0 EG0
3.43 $2152 $47
3.32 $2012 $60
3.03 $1878 $75

0
0
(q2l
, q2h
) E∆01 E∆02
Φ0
EQ0 ES 0 EG0
(1.8, 4.8) 0.00 0.00 $1, 851 3.42 $1851 $6
(1.8, 4.8) 0.00 32.73 $1, 666 3.05 $1699 $28
(1.8, 4.8) 0.0 102.22 $1, 477 2.89 $1579 $34
0
0
(q2l
, q2h
)
(0.9, 4.8)
(1.1, 4.8)
(1.5, 4.8)

E∆01
0.00
0.00
0.00

E∆02
0.00
0.00
0.00

Φ0
$1, 452
$1, 353
$1, 255

EQ0 ES 0 EG0
2.70 $1502 $43
2.66 $1383 $31
2.67 $1264 $16

Note: Optimal storage quantities, the aggregated storage quantity, and the principal’s
expected profit under optimal allowances vs. those under zero allowances.

F1 F2 (See Tables 4.14, 4.15, and 4.16). All demand levels of both types of agents are
offered the full quantities with a large allowance given by the government; however,
the type-1 agent may acquire positive information rent instead of nothing, and the
type-2 agent gets no expected information rent. On the contrary, when µ1 π2l is large
which is shown in Table 4.16.
When the government decides not to apply the cap-and-trade policy, the optimal
solutions are shown in the left side of each table (See Tables 4.14, 4.15, and 4.16).
When E1 E2 is the optimal contract designed by the principal, the agents can be
induced to choose the efficient quantity designed for her/him without any expected
information rent given to agents. As shown in Tables 4.14, 4.15, and 4.16, when
π1l = 0.25 and π2l = 0.50 regardless of the value of µ1 , both types of agents are
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Table 4.16 Complete Overlapping: when µ1 = 0.75
Cap-and-trade model

Non-cap-and-trade model

π2l = 0.25
0
0
T ype (q1l
, q1h
)
S1 E2 (2.8, 3.5)
S1 E2 (2.7, 3.3)
S1 E2 (2.6, 2.8)
π2l = 0.50
0
0
Φ∗
EQ∗ ES ∗
EG∗
T ype (q1l
, q1h
)
$1, 085 3.63 $1085 $ − 138 E1 E2 (2.8, 3.8)
$1, 085 3.50 $1085 $ − 90 S1 E2 (2.8, 3.5)
$914 2.88 $941 $ − 90 S1 E2 (2.7, 3.1)
π2l = 0.75
0
0
)
, q1h
Φ∗
EQ∗ ES ∗
EG∗
T ype (q1l
$831 3.50 $892 $ − 297 E1 S2 (2.8, 3.8)
$791 3.13 $870 $ − 230 E1 S2 (2.8, 3.8)
$747 2.75 $756 $ − 100 E1 S2 (2.8, 3.8)

π1l
0.25
0.50
0.75

T ype a∗1 a∗2 E∆∗1
F1 F2 0.6 1.2 0.00
F1 F2 0.9 0.8 0.00
F1 F2 0.9 1.2 0.00

E∆∗2
Φ∗
35.34 $1, 307
35.34
$927
164.40 $776

π1l
0.25
0.50
0.75

T ype a∗1 a∗2 E∆∗1
F1 F2 0.9 1.2 0.00
F1 F2 0.6 1.2 0.00
F1 F2 0.6 1.2 0.00

E∆∗2
0.00
0.00
26.36

π1l
0.25
0.50
0.75

T ype a∗1 a∗2 E∆∗1
F1 F2 1.2 2.0 60.99
F1 F2 0.9 2.0 78.69
F1 F2 0.9 0.6 0.00

E∆∗2
0.00
0.00
9.15

EQ∗ ES ∗
EG∗
3.75 $1343 $ − 90
3.75 $1134 $ − 110
3.00 $941 $ − 138

0
0
(q2l
, q2h
)
(1.8, 4.8)
(1.8, 4.8)
(1.8, 4.8)

E∆01 E∆02
Φ0
0.00 143.66 $1, 863
0.00 182.57 $1, 642
0.00 201.43 $1, 431

EQ0 ES 0 EG0
3.49 $2007 $22
3.25 $1824 $28
3.00 $1632 $36

0
0
(q2l
, q2h
)
(1.8, 4.8)
(1.8, 4.8)
(1.8, 4.8)

E∆01
0.00
0.00
0.00

E∆02
0.00
39.66
76.54

Φ0
$1, 839
$1, 616
$1, 396

EQ0 ES 0 EG0
3.48 $1839 $6
3.18 $1656 $15
2.94 $1473 $20

0
0
)
, q2h
(q2l
(0.9, 4.8)
(1.1, 4.8)
(1.5, 4.8)

E∆01
0.00
0.00
0.00

E∆02
0.00
0.00
0.00

Φ0
$1, 639
$1, 472
$1, 305

EQ0 ES 0 EG0
3.12 $1664 $20
2.98 $1487 $16
2.86 $1309 $10

Note: Optimal storage quantities, the aggregated storage quantity, and the principal’s
expected profit under optimal allowances vs. those under zero allowances.

offered efficient quantities, respectively, with no expected information rent, which
means this case is cost-less for the principal in general.
Compared with the partial-overlapping distribution case, the principal does not
always offer efficient quantities to the type-2 agent when the demand distribution is
complete-overlapping. As shown in Tables 4.14, 4.15, and 4.16, the type-2 agent is
offered the separating contract when π2l = 0.75 regardless of the value of µ1 and π1l .
Offer contract E1 S2 instead of all efficient quantities since the principal has to pay
the higher information rent to the type-1 agent to induce her/him to pick efficient
quantities designed for her/him.
Further, there is another type of contract which is not mentioned before which
is P1 E2 shown in Tables 4.14 and 4.15. Except for the case when E1 E2 is the
optimal contract, all efficient quantities (qdn = q dn , d = 1, 2 and n = l, h) are
not incentive compatible anymore and the pooling contract designed to the type-1
agent and efficient contract designed to the type-2 agent become incentive compatible
when π2l = 0.25, 0.50 shown in Table 4.14 and 4.15. Those two tables also display
the type-2 agent is offered efficient quantities for both demand levels with a positive
expected information rent, and the type-1 agent is offered a pooling contract with no
expected information rent by the government.
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Similarly, when µ1 = 0.75, except for the case when π1l = 0.25 and π2l = 0.50
shown in Table 4.16, the type-2 agent is offered efficient quantities for both demand
levels with a positive expected information rent and the type-1 agent is offered a
separating contract. In this separating contract, the agent is offered a higher quantity
than her/his efficient quantity if s/he is at a higher demand level and a less quantity
than her/his efficient quantity otherwise. The pooling contract at this time is not an
incentive as this contract is not even feasible.
When the non-cap-and-trade policy is launched, similar to the partial overlapping
distribution case, the expected captured quantity of the type-1 agent is monotonically
increasing when the value of µ1 increases from 0.25 to 0.75.

But the expected

capturing quantity of the type-2 agent is monotonically decreasing with the rise of
the value of µ1 .

4.8

Managerial Insight

When the demand distribution is known, there are two levels of demand uncertain.
If the government does not launch a cap-and-trade policy, the principal offers the
efficient quantity to the agent regardless of the demand level, and the agent can
not get the expected information rent. However, when the cap-and-trade policy is
implemented on the market and the optimal allowance is allocated to the agent, the
agent has an incentive to capture all demand even without expected information
rent. Although the cap-and-trade policy can make the principal design a contract to
induce the agent to capture all quantities, the principal can set a higher price for the
agent when there is no allowance assigned to the agent. As a result, the profit of the
profit will decrease compared with the profit when the government does not give any
allowance to the agent.
When the distributions of two types of agents partially overlap, and the non-capand-trade policy is launched, the type-2 agent is always offered an efficient quantities
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contract (E2 ), and the type-1 agent can not acquire any expected information rent
regardless of the type of his contract. Further, we summarize the following insights
under this condition: (1) When the expected demand of the type-1 agent is the
same as the expected demand of the type-2 agent, the principal often designs all
efficient quantities contract, i.e., E1 E2 , to the agents with no cost overall. (2) If the
chance of being the type-1 agent with the high demand level is low, either offering a
non-participating to θ1l or not serving the type-1 agent is the optimal contract. Since
the revenue from offering more quantity to the type-1 agent can not increase as much
as the rise of the type-2 agent’s information rent. (3) When the probability of being
the type-1 agent with the high demand level increases, only serving the high demand
level of the type-1 agent and not serving the type-1 agent contracts becomes costly.
As a result, the principal offers the separating contract instead, and more expected
quantities are offered to the type-1 agent when the probability of being the type-1
agent increases.
When the demand distributions become complete-overlapping, and the chance
of having a high demand level of the type-2 agent is small without an allowance given
by the government, the principal offers efficient quantities to the type-1 agent instead
of the type-2 agent and offers the separating contract to the type-2 agent with no
expected information rent.
When the cap-and-trade policy is launched by the government, what we
conclude: (1) mostly, the policy will make the principal offer the full quantities to all
demand levels of the agents with a large allowance assigned by the government (F1 F2 ).
(2) However, when the chance of being the type-2 agent with a high demand level
becomes large, there does exist a case that full quantities contracts are not incentive
compatible for the type-1 agent even if the government sets a large allowance for
her/him. What is more, CO2 that the agent captures is even less than the efficient
quantity with an allowance. As a result, the government is not willing to assign any
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allowance to that agent who can not be motivated to capture the full demand of CO2
no matter how much allowance is given to her/him, and the principal will design
the efficient quantities contract instead with no given allowance, and full quantities
contract is designed to another type of agent with a large allowance.
The cap-and-trade policy can make the principal design the contracts to induce
agents to capture as much as CO2 they emit, and mostly the agents are induced to
capture all demand, and the captured CO2 is more compared with the non-cap-andtrade policy is implemented. However, the principal has to sacrifice her/his benefit
compared with the non-cap-and-trade case as he can not set a price as much as in the
non-cap-and-trade case. Further, the government also pays the cost as she will get
the penalty from agents and needs to pay the cost of setting the allowance to agents.

4.9

Conclusions

In this chapter, we build a principal-agent framework to explore the implications of
uncertainty in agents’ heterogeneous demands on the principal’s contracts when a
cap-and-trade policy is applied or not. We consider two types of hidden information
under the cap-and-trade case and non-cap-and-trade case separately. The first one is
the agent’s type is known by the principal and agent, but the demand level is only
known by the agent. Another one is that the principal even does not know the type
of agent; however, the agents know their types and demand levels. The principal
designs the menu of contracts for all agents, and each agent will pick the option in
the chosen contract after s/he realizes her/his demand level.
We display the analytical solutions under both types of hidden information when
the government assigns the allowance in the market, i.e., whether a cap-and-trade
policy is launched or not. We present the special types of analytical solutions when
there are two distributions for both cap-and-trade and non-cap-and-trade models.
The cap-and-trade policy and the types of demand distributions play a significant
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role in the types of optimal solutions. When a cap-and-trade policy is implemented
in the market, mostly, full quantities contracts become optimal regardless of the
demand distribution. However, efficient quantities contract to the type-1 agent, and
full quantities contract to the type-2 agent become optimal when the probability
of being the high demand level of the type-2 agent is large in partial-overlapping
distribution. When a cap-and-trade policy is implemented in the market, we just list
the analytical solutions of the all-efficient-quantities contract, and the single contract,
other types of contracts (pooling, separating, only serving high demand level) are
shown in the numerical solutions (Section 4.7).
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

In this chapter, we present the conclusions of the dissertation and discuss the future
work directions opened by this research.

5.1

Summary of Contributions

This dissertation made novel research contributions to controlling the spread of
Emerald ash borer and reducing CO2 emissions.

The high-level goal of this

dissertation is to design the principal-agent framework to optimize the collaboration
between the principal and agents.
We are among the first to apply the principal-agent framework to induce the
collaboration between the government and private landowners on managing invasive
species which is shown in chapter 2. We address a non-classical principal-agent
problem which does not meet the single-crossing property by building two cost-sharing
programs, where the reimbursement is based on either the infestation level or the
number of treated trees. We explore the impact of the government on incentives of
private landowners. Our model can also be applied to the public-private relationships
by exploring the joint resource, which can strengthen the collaborations between
public and private roles.
This is the first trying to integrate a principal-agent framework with a mixedinteger programming to address the budget allocation and make the collaboration
between the government and private landowners in Chapter 3.

To reduce the

complexity of the problem, we linearize all non-linearities. We also make use of
the machine learning method to dynamically predict the next attack rate in each site
to consider the uncertainty of the attack rate.
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Chapter 4 presents a principal-agent model to induce the emitters to capture
as much as possible CO2 through the Carbon and Storage System with or without
the cap-and-trade policy. We investigate the impact of allocating carbon allowance
to agents on the total quantities being captured and stored as well as the overall
information rent given to the agents to incentivize them to participate. We provide
analytical solutions to the special case where the allocated allowance is zero or
positive.

Through numerical analysis, we investigate the impact of providing

allowance based on the agent’s demand distribution, and we compare the optimal
solutions when either the carbon allowance is assigned or not assigned by the
government.

5.2

Future Work

This research took the first steps toward studying and addressing the application of
the principal-agent framework. There are several interesting directions that we plan
to investigate in future work.
In Chapter 2, we study the cost-sharing programs between the government and
private landowners and the optimal reimbursement to induce the participation of
private landowners. Our future work would focus on two tasks. The first one is to
develop a heuristic to find the optimal solution for the treatment-based reimbursement
model. Finding the optimal treatment decisions and the reimbursement schedule
requires a complete search with all possible combinations of treatment decisions.
Because we have been able to narrow down the structures of the optimal treatment
decisions, they can be used to reduce the search time. The second one is to provide
analytical solutions for the optimal treatment decision and the reimbursement under
each infestation level. Further, we plan to validate both models by checking the results
using data and input parameters from New Jersey against those from Minnesota.
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In Chapter 3, we develop a data-driven integrated game theory-mixed integer
programming framework to allocate the resources to management decisions in both
public and private areas over space and time to maximize the government’s profit
and save more ash trees. For future work, first, the presented MIP model could be
implemented on a larger scale beyond a five-by-five gridded landscape with a larger
number of trees in each grid cell. In this case, the cost function regarding treatment
could be defined as a non-linear function of the number of treated trees. We also can
build different cost functions among public and private sites since the government
can award a contract with a tree service company to reduce each cost.

These

modifications in cost would significantly complicate the model, thus, necessitating the
development of non-linear MIP algorithms. Furthermore, we will perform a sensitivity
analysis to explore how the change in input parameters affects optimal management
decisions. Then we will explore solution algorithms to tackle the complexity of the
MIP formulation resulting from the linearization of the non-linear inequalities and the
addition of fixed costs for treatment and removal to reduce the computation time.
In Chapter 4, we allow the expected allowance set by the government to be
un-restricted. In future work, we would like to set an upper bound for the expected
allowance. According to results obtained from the cap-and-trade model, full quantities
contracts are most likely to be optimal for both types of agents, meaning agents will
capture all demand and sell all allowance to the market. However, the selling price
of the allowance should decrease if massive emission allowances are in the trading
market. Therefore, we can build a dynamic pricing mechanism where the selling
price depends on the quantity of the total allowance on the market. What is more,
in addition to the penalty of CO2 emissions and the cost of offering the allowances,
the government may want to account for the benefit from the improvement of the
environment. In future work, we plan to consider the improvement as an additional
component of the objective function.
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APPENDIX A
MORE EXPLANATIONS FOR EACH CHAPTER

A.1
A.1.1

More Notes of Chapter 2

Relationship between the Two Cutoff Values of the High Secondperiod Attack Rate

We show that π̈ h (i) ≥ π̇ h (i) when ρ < ρ̈. The proof is separated into two cases: when
π l is low or medium and when π h is high.
Case 1: When the low second-period attack rate is low or medium
(0 ≤ π l < π̈ l ). As discussed earlier, π̇ h and π̈ h are defined as follows: π̇ h (i) :=
max{0, min{1, π l +
i
}}.
n−i

a1
ρ̄(θ+c)+β

·

l

and π̈ h (i) := max{0, min{1, π (ρ̄(θ+c)+β)+α
+
θ+c

i
}}
n−i

α+a1
θ+c

·

Because π̈ h is in between 0 and 1, we divide our discussion into two sub-cases.

Sub-case 1: If

π l (ρ̄(θ+c)+β)+α
θ+c

+

α+a1
θ+c

·

i
n−i

≥ 1, then π̈ h (i) = 1. Because π̇ h is also

·

i
n−i

< 1, then π̈ h (i) = max{0, π (ρ̄(θ+c)+β)+α
+
θ+c

between 0 and 1, π̈ h (i) ≥ π̇ h (i).
Sub-case 2: If
α+a1
· i }.
θ+c n−i

π l (ρ̄(θ+c)+β)+α
θ+c

+

α+a1
θ+c

l

a1
i
π̇ h (i) is either zero or min{1, π l + ρ̄(θ+c)+β
· n−i
}. If π̇ h (i) = 0, π̈ h (i) =

l

+
max{0, π (ρ̄(θ+c)+β)+α
θ+c

α+a1
θ+c

·

i
}
n−i

≥ 0 = π̇ h (i), i.e., π̈ h (i) ≥ π̇ h (i). Otherwise,

a1
a1
i
π̇ h (i) = min{1, π l + ρ̄(θ+c)+β
· n−i
}. Equivalently, −π̇ h (i) = − min{1, π l + ρ̄(θ+c)+β
·


l
a1
i
i
1
} ≥ − π l + ρ̄(θ+c)+β
· n−i
. Since π̈ h (i) = max{0, π (ρ̄(θ+c)+β)+α
+ α+a
· i }
n−i
θ+c
θ+c n−i

≥

π l (ρ̄(θ+c)+β)+α
θ+c

+

α+a1
θ+c

π̈ h (i) − π̇ h (i) ≥
=

·

i
,
n−i

the difference of the two cutoffs is thus

π l (ρ̄(θ+c)+β)+α
θ+c
α+π l a1
θ+c

+

+

α+a1
θ+c

·

α(ρ̄(θ+c)+β)+a21
(θ+c)(ρ̄(θ+c)+β)
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i
n−i

·


− πl +

i
.
n−i

a1
ρ̄(θ+c)+β

·

i
n−i



Because

α(ρ̄(θ+c)+β)+a21
(θ+c)(ρ̄(θ+c)+β)

·

i
n−i

≥ 0 for 0 ≤ i < n, π̈ h (i) − π̇ h (i) ≥

0 ≤ ρ < ρ̈, a1 > 0, and thus, π̈ h (i) − π̇ h (i) ≥

α+π l a1
θ+c

α+π l a1
.
θ+c

When

> 0.

Case 2: When the low second-period attack rate is high (π̈ l ≤ π l ≤ 1).
β
+
Recall π̇ h and π̈ h are defined as follows: π̇ h (i) := max{0, min{1, ρ̄(θ+c)+β

and π̈ h (i) := max{0, min{1, β+α
+
θ+c

i
}}
n−i

α+a1
θ+c

·

i
}}.
n−i

a1
ρ̄(θ+c)+β

·

Similar to the previous case,

our discussion is separated into two sub-cases.
Sub-case 1: If

β+α
θ+c

+

α+a1
θ+c

·

i
n−i

≥ 1, then π̈ h (i) = 1. Because π̇ h is also between 0

and 1, π̈ h (i) ≥ π̇ h (i).
Sub-case 2: If

β+α
θ+c

i
i
1
1
+ α+a
· n−i
< 1, π̈ h (i) = max{0, β+α
+ α+a
· n−i
}. π̇ h (i) is either
θ+c
θ+c
θ+c

β
+
zero or min{1, ρ̄(θ+c)+β
α+a1
θ+c

·

i
}
n−i

a1
ρ̄(θ+c)+β

i
}.
n−i

If π̇ h (i) = 0, π̈ h (i) = max{0, β+α
+
θ+c

≥ 0 = π̇ h (i). Therefore, π̈ h (i) ≥ π̇ h (i). Otherwise,

+
π̈ h (i) − π̇ h (i) = max{0, β+α
θ+c

Since

·

≥

β+α
θ+c

=

βa1 +α(ρ̄(θ+c)+β)
θ+c

α(ρ̄(θ+c)+β)+a21
(θ+c)(ρ̄(θ+c)+β)

·

+

i
n−i

α+a1
θ+c

·

β
a1
i
· n−i
} − min{1, ρ̄(θ+c)+β
+ ρ̄(θ+c)+β
·


β
a1
i
− ρ̄(θ+c)+β
+ ρ̄(θ+c)+β
· n−i

α+a1
θ+c

i
n−i

+

α(ρ̄(θ+c)+β)+a21
(θ+c)(ρ̄(θ+c)+β)

·

i
}
n−i

i
.
n−i

≥ 0 for 0 ≤ i < n, π̈ h (i) − π̇ h (i) ≥

When 0 ≤ ρ < ρ̈, a1 > 0, and thus, π̈ h (i) − π̇ h (i) ≥

βa1 +α(ρ̄(θ+c)+β)
.
θ+c

βa1 +α(ρ̄(θ+c)+β)
θ+c

> 0.

We can thus conclude that π̈ h (i) ≥ π̇ h (i) when 0 ≤ ρ < ρ̈.

A.1.2
A.1.2.1

Proof of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1. When no trees are infested, the objective

function value in Eq.

(2.5) is Ψ(q(0), r(0)|n, 0) = (sρ̄ + β)π l q(0) + (s − (sρ̄ +

β)π l )n − r(0). Because (sρ̄ + β)π l > 0, Ψ increases in q(0) and decreases in r(0).
From the IR and N N constraints, we get the lower bound of the reimbursement as
max{0, b1 q(0) + αn + a1 π l n}, where a1 := β − ρ(θ + c) and b1 := β − π l [ρ̄(θ + c) + β].
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Further, the IC constraints require b1 (q(0) − j) ≤ 0 for all j. The remainder of the
proof is divided into two cases: when π l is low/medium and when π l is high.
Case 1: When the low second-period attack rate is low or medium
(0 ≤ π l < π̈ l ).
In this case, b1 > 0. Since b1 (q(0) − j) ≤ 0 must hold for all j, q(0) must be less
than j ∀ 0 ≤ j ≤ n. q(0) = 0 is hence the only feasible and consequently the optimal
treatment decision. The optimal reimbursement is thus r∗ (0) = max{0, αn + a1 π l n}.
If the treatment is very effective (ρ̈ ≤ ρ ≤ 1), a1 ≤ 0 and hence r∗ (0) ≤ αn.
Otherwise, r∗ (0) = αn + a1 π l n > αn.
Case 2: When the low second-period attack rate is high (π̈ l ≤ π l < 1).
Here, b1 ≤ 0.
If b1 < 0, q(0) must equal to n to satisfy q(0) − j ≥ 0 for all j or equivalently,
b1 (q(0) − j) ≤ 0. Therefore, q(0) = n is the only feasible solution. If b1 = 0,
all IC constraints are satisfied because b1 (q(0) − j) = 0 ≤ 0 for all j. Because Ψ
increases in q(0) and IC constraints are all satisfied, it is optimal to set q ∗ (0) = n
and r∗ (0) = max{0, αn + (β − (θ + c)π l )n}. Further, when π l is greater than both
α+β
θ+c

and π̈ l , αn + (β − (θ + c)π l )n < 0, and thus, r∗ (0) = 0.

A.1.2.2

Proof of Proposition 2. When all trees are infested, the objective

function value in Eq. (2.5) is Ψ(q(n), r(n)|n, n) = ρ(s + β)q(n) − βn − r(n). Because
ρ(s + β) > 0, Ψ increases in q(n). We proceed with the proof by discussing the
optimal solution for each category of treatment effectiveness.
Case 1: When the treatment is very effective (ρ̈ ≤ ρ ≤ 1). In this case,
a1 ≤ 0.
If we set q(n) = n, then µn = 0 by definition. The IC constraints require
a1 (n − j) ≤ 0 to hold for all j. Because a1 ≤ 0, n − j must be non-negative, and thus,
all IC constraints are satisfied, making q(n) = n a feasible solution. The lower bound
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of the reimbursement obtained from the IR and N N constraints is max{0, αn + a1 n}.
Since Ψ decreases in r(n), setting it to the lower bound maximizes Ψ.
If q(n) is less than n, then µn = 1 by definition. If a1 < 0, the IC constraint
−a1 (n − q(n)) ≤ 0 is violated because n − q(n) > 0. Therefore, a feasible solution
exists only when a1 = 0. Since Ψ increases in q(n), the best solution when q(n) < n
is q(n) = n − 1. and r(n) = αn. The lower bound of r(n) is max{0, a1 q(n) + αn}
instead. However, when compared to Ψ(n, max{0, αn + a1 n}|n, n), Ψ(n − 1, αn|n, n)
is lower when a1 = 0: Ψ(n − 1, αn|n, n) − Ψ(n, max{0, αn + a1 n}|n, n) = (ρ(s + β)(n −
1) − βn − αn) − (ρ(s + β)n − βn − αn) = −ρ(s + β) < 0. Therefore, q(n) = n − 1
and r(n) = αn cannot be an optimal solution. In conclusion, the optimal solution is
q ∗ (n) = n and r∗ (n) = max{0, αn + a1 n} when the treatment ρ is very effective.
Case 2: When the treatment is not very effective (0 ≤ ρ < ρ̈). Here,
a1 > 0.
If we assume q(n) = n, then µn = 0 by definition. The lower bound of the
reimbursement is max{0, αn + a1 n}. IC constraints are satisfied if a1 (n − j) ≤ 0 for
all j. Because a1 > 0 and n − j ≥ 0 for all j, IC constraints are violated. Therefore,
q(n) can not be n.
If, on the other hand, q(n) < n, µn = 1.

The lower bound of r(n) is

max{0, a1 q(n) + αn}. To satisfy IC constraints, i.e., a1 (n − j) ≤ 0 for all j, q(n) − j
must be non-positive for all j. Consequently, q(n) = 0 is the only feasible solution,
and thus, optimal. Since Ψ decreases in r(n), r∗ (n) = αn.

A.1.2.3

Proof of Proposition 3. Recall that Proposition 3 pertains to the case

when some trees are infested, and the treatment is very effective. In this case, a1 ≤ 0.
First, we argue that the number of treated trees must be no less than the number of
infested trees (q(i) ≥ i) by showing that IC constraints are violated if q(i) < i. The
IC constraints can be re-written as (ρ̄(θ+c)+β)(π h −π l )(n−i)−a1 (i−q(i))−b1 (j−i) ≤
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a1 (i−q(i))
b1 (j−i)
+
≥ π h must hold for all
(ρ̄(θ+c)+β )(n−i) (ρ̄(θ+c)+β )(n−i)
j ∈ [i, n]. If π l is low or medium, b1 > 0. At least one of the IC constraints is

0. Equivalently, LHS =π l +

violated. Specifically, when j = i, the third term in LHS is zero. The second term is
non-positive because a1 ≤ 0 and q(i) < i. Hence, LHS≤ π l , which is less than π h by
assumption. Therefore, the IC constraint is violated. Similarly, if π l is high, b1 ≤ 0.
Here, all IC constraints are violated since LHS ≤ π l < π h . As a result, q(i) ≥ i.
The objective function value in Eq. (2.5) is thus Ψ = (s + β)ρ̄π l q(i) − ρ̄(s +
β)i + (s − (s + β)ρ̄π l )n − r(i). Because (s + β)ρ̄π l > 0, the objective value increases
in q(i) and decreases in r(i). A lower bound of r(i) obtained from the IR and N N
constraints is max{0, b1 q(i) − (θ − α − (ρ̄(θ + c) + β)π l )n + ρ̄(θ + c)i + ϕ(a0 |i)}. Further,
to satisfy the IC constraints, the following inequalities must hold simultaneously:
(ρ̄(θ + c) + β)(π l (n − q(i)) − π h (n − i)) + a1 (i − j) + β(q(i) − i) ≤ 0 for all j ∈ [0, i)
and b1 (q(i) − j) ≤ 0 for all j ∈ [i, n]. Next, we divide the proof into two cases: when
π l is low/medium and when it is high.
Case 1: When the low second-period attack rate is low or medium
(0 ≤ π l < π̈ l ). Here, b1 > 0.
In order to satisfy the IC constraints or b1 (q(i) − j) ≤ 0 for all j ∈ [i, n], q(i) − j
needs to be non-positive. We can get q(i) = i is the only feasible solution, and
thus, optimal. To minimize the objective function value, r∗ (i) = max{0, αn + a1 n −
[a1 π̄ l + (θ + c)(π h − π l )](n − i)}. r∗ (i) decreases in π h . As per its definition, π̈ h (i) =
l

1
+ α+a
· i }}, which is ≤
max{0, min{1, π (ρ̄(θ+c)+β)+α
θ+c
θ+c n−i

π l (ρ̄(θ+c)+β)+α
1
+ α+a
θ+c
θ+c

i
· n−i
. Since

l

1
αn+a1 n−[a1 π̄ l +(θ+c)( π (ρ̄(θ+c)+β)+α
+ α+a
· i −π l )](n−i) = 0, αn+a1 n−[a1 π̄ l +(θ+
θ+c
θ+c n−i

c)(π h − π l )](n − i) > 0 for all π h > π̈ h (i). Thus, r∗ (i) = αn + a1 n − [a1 π̄ l + (θ + c)(π h −
π l )](n−i) > 0. Similarly, when π h ≤ π̈ h (i), αn+a1 n−[a1 π̄ l +(θ+c)(π h −π l )](n−i) ≤ 0.
Therefore, r∗ (i) = 0.
Case 2: When the low second-period attack rate is high (π̈ l ≤ π l ≤ 1).
In this case, b1 ≤ 0. If b1 = 0, the IC constraints are satisfied automatically. Since

150

Ψ increases in q(i), setting q(i) = n is optimal. If, on the other hand, b1 < 0, q(i) − j
needs to be non-negative for all j ∈ [i, n] to satisfy the second sets of IC constraints.
Therefore, q(i) = n is the only feasible solution, and thus, optimal. To minimize
the objective function value, r(i) should take its lower bound, which is simplified to
r∗ (i) = max{0, αn + a1 n − (a1 − β + (θ + c)π h )(n − i)}. r∗ (i) decreases in π h .
Recall that π̈ h (i) is defined as π̈ h (i) = max{0, min{1, β+α
+
θ+c
is ≤

β+α
θ+c

α+a1
θ+c

·

i
}},
n−i

which

i
i
1
1
+ α+a
· n−i
. Because αn + a1 n − (a1 − β + (θ + c)( β+α
+ α+a
· n−i
))(n − i) =
θ+c
θ+c
θ+c

0, αn + a1 n − (a1 − β + (θ + c)π h )(n − i) > 0 when π h > π̈ h . Hence, r∗ (i) =
αn + a1 n − (a1 − β + (θ + c)π h )(n − i) > 0. On the other hand, when π h ≤ π̈ h ,
αn + a1 n − (a1 − β + (θ + c)π h )(n − i) ≤ 0, and thus, r∗ (i) = 0.
A.1.2.4

Proof of Proposition 4. Proposition 4 discusses the optimal solution

when some trees are infested, and the treatment is not very effective. a1 is positive in
this case. The proof is separated into two cases: when π l is low/medium and when
it is high. Each case is then further divided into two sub-cases: when π h is low and
when it is medium/high.
Case 1: When the low second-period attack rate is low or medium
(0 ≤ π l < π̈ l ). Here, b1 > 0.
Sub-case 1: When the high second-period attack rate is low (0 ≤ π h < π̇ h ).
First, we show that no feasible solutions exist when q(i) ≥ i. The IC constraints
require (ρ̄(θ + c) + β) [π l (n − q(i)) − π h (n − i)] + a1 (i − j) + β(q(i) − i) ≤ 0 for
all j ∈ [0, i) and b1 (q(i) − j) ≤ 0 for all j ∈ [i, n] to hold jointly. Because
b1 > 0, to satisfy the second set of IC constraints, q(i) = i is the only
solution that can be feasible. The first set of IC constraints are simplified
to (ρ̄(θ + c) + β)(π l − π h )(n − i) + a1 (i − j) ≤ 0 for all j ∈ [0, i). Recall that
π̇ h is defined as π̇ h (i) = max{0, min{1, π l +
πl +

a1
ρ̄(θ+c)+β

·

i
n−i

a1
ρ̄(θ+c)+β

> 0, and thus, π̇ h (i) ≤ π l +

(ρ̄(θ + c) + β)[π l − (π l +

a1
ρ̄(θ+c)+β

·

i
)](n
n−i
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·

i
}}.
n−i

a1
ρ̄(θ+c)+β

·

Since a1 > 0,
i
.
n−i

Moreover,

− i) + a1 (i − j) = 0 when j = 0.

Because the expression (ρ̄(θ + c) + β)(π l − π h )(n − i) + a1 (i − j) decreases in π h ,
(ρ̄(θ +c)+β)(π l −π h )(n−i)+a1 (i−j) > 0 when j = 0 for any π h < π̇ h . q(i) = i
is not a feasible solution since at least one of the IC constraints is violated.
Next, we examine whether a feasible solution exist when q(i) < i. In this case,
µi = 1. The objective function value in Eq. (2.5) is Ψ = ρ(s + β)q(i) + (π̄ h +
ρπ h )s(n − i) − ρ̄βi − ρ̄π l βn − r(i), which increases in q(i) and decreases in
r(i). To satisfy the IC constraints, both a1 (q(i) − j) ≤ 0 for all j ∈ [0, i) and
(ρ̄(θ + c) + β)(π h (n − i) − π l (n − j)) − a1 (i − q(i)) − β(j − i) ≤ 0 for all j ∈ [i, n]
must hold. Because a1 > 0, q(i) must be zero to satisfy the first set of the
IC constraints and q(i) < i. These constraints are simplified to (ρ̄(θ + c) +
β)(π h (n − i) − π l (n − j)) − a1 i − β(j − i) ≤ 0 for all j ∈ [i, n]. As shown earlier,
a1
i
π̇ h (i) ≤ π l + ρ̄(θ+c)+β
· n−i
. Therefore, for any π h < π̈ h , (ρ̄(θ + c) + β)(π h (n − i) −

π l (n − j)) − a1 (i − q(i)) − β(j − i) = (ρ̄(θ + c) + β)(π h − π l )(n − i) − a1 i − b1 (j − i)
a1
i
< (ρ̄(θ + c) + β)(π l + ρ̄(θ+c)+β
· n−i
− π l )(n − i) − a1 i − b1 (j − i) = −b1 (j − i) ≤ 0

since b1 > 0 and j ∈ [i, n]. As a result, the second set of IC constraints are
satisfied.
The lower bound of r(i) obtained from the IR and N N constraints is
max{0, a1 q(i) − (θ − α − (ρ̄(θ + c) + β)π h )n + (θ + c − (ρ̄(θ + c) + β)π h )i + ϕ(a0 |i)}.
This lower bound when q ∗ (i) = 0 is simplified to r∗ (i) = αn + a1 π h (n − i), which
is greater than αn since a1 > 0.
Sub-case 2: When the high second-period attack rate is medium or high.
Here π̇ h ≤ π h ≤ 1 and similar to the previous sub-case, we argue that
q(i) ≥ i when π h ≥ π̇ h . Here, µi = 0 and the objective function value is
Ψ = (s + β)ρ̄π l q(i) − ρ̄(s + β)i + (s − (s + β)ρ̄π l )n − r(i), which increases in q(i)
and decreases in r(i). The IC constraints require (ρ̄(θ + c) + β)(π l (n − q(i)) −
π h (n − i)) + a1 (i − j) + β(q(i) − i) ≤ 0 for all j ∈ [0, i) and b1 (q(i) − j) ≤ 0 for
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all j ∈ [i, n]. Since b1 > 0 and q(i) ≥ i, q(i) must be i to satisfy the second set
of IC constraints. Similar to the previous sub-case, we can show that the first
set of constraints become (ρ̄(θ + c) + β)(π l − π h )(n − i) + a1 (i − j) ≤ 0 for all
j ∈ [0, i), which are satisfied when π h ≥ π̇ h .
The lower bound of r(i) obtained from the IR and N N constraints is
max{0, b1 q(i) − (θ − α − (ρ̄(θ + c) + β)π l )n + ρ̄(θ + c)i + ϕ(a0 |i)}. Since Ψ
decreases in r(i), the lower bound maximizes Ψ. Further, the lower bound can
be simplified to max{0, αn + a1 n − [a1 π̄ l + (θ + c)(π h − π l )](n − i)}, which
l

a1
i
1
decreases in π h . Recall that π h := max{0, min{1, α+π
+ α+a
· n−i
}}. Because
θ+c
θ+c
α+π l a1
θ+c

1
+ α+a
· i . For any π h < π̈ h , αn+a1 n−[a1 π̄ l +(θ +c)(π h −
θ+c n−i
i
h

la
α+a1
i
1
(n − i) = 0. On
π l )](n − i) > αn + a1 n − a1 π̄ l + (θ + c) α+π
+
·
θ+c
θ+c
n−i

a1 > 0, π h ≤

the other hand, when π h ≥ π̈ h , αn + a1 n − [a1 π̄ l + (θ + c)(π h − π l )](n − i) ≤ 0.
Therefore, r∗ (i) = 0.
Case 2: When the low second-period attack rate is high (π̈ l ≤ π l < 1). In
this case, b1 ≤ 0.
Sub-case 1: When the high second-period attack rate is low. Here, 0 ≤ π h <
π̇ h . We first show that no feasible solutions exists when q(i) ≥ i. The IC
constraints are simplified as follows: (ρ̄(θ + c) + β)(π l (n − q(i)) − π h (n − i)) +
a1 (i − j) + β(q(i) − i) ≤ 0 for all j ∈ [0, i) and b1 (q(i) − j) ≤ 0 for all j ∈ [i, n].
Because b1 ≤ 0, q(i) = n. At least one of the first set of the IC constraints is
violated when π h < π̇ h . Therefore, q(i) = n is not a feasible solution. Next,
using the same logic as Sub-case 1 of case 1, we can conclude that it is optimal
to set q ∗ (i) = 0 and consequently r∗ (i) = αn + a1 π h (n − i).
Sub-case 2: When the high second-period attack rate is medium or high.
Here π̇ h ≤ π h ≤ 1.

As established earlier, when π h > π̇ h , q(i) ≥ i.

Since µi = 0, the objective function value is Ψ = (s + β)ρ̄π l q(i) − ρ̄(s +
β)i + (s − (s + β)ρ̄π l )n − r(i), which increases in q(i) and decreases in
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r(i).

To satisfy the IC constraints, two sets of conditions need to hold:

(ρ̄(θ + c) + β)(π l (n − q(i)) − π h (n − i)) + a1 (i − j) + β(q(i) − i) ≤ 0 and
b1 (q(i) − j) ≤ 0 for all j ∈ [i, n). Because b1 ≤ 0, q(i) = n is the only feasible
solution that meets the second set of the IC constraints.
A lower bound obtained from the IR and N N constraints when q ∗ (i) = n is
simplified to max{0, αn+a1 i+β(n−i)−(θ+c)π h (n−i)} , which decreases in π h .
For any value any π h < π̈ h , αn+a1 i+β(n−i)−(θ+c)π h (n−i) > αn+a1 i+β(n−

i
1
i) − (θ + c)π̈ h (n − i) ≥ αn + βn − ρ(θ + c)i − (θ + c) β+α
+ α+a
· n−i
(n − i) = 0.
θ+c
θ+c
On the other hand, when π h ≥ π̈ h , αn + a1 i + β(n − i) − (θ + c)π h (n − i) ≤ 0,
and thus, r∗ (i) = 0.
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A.2
A.2.1
A.2.1.1

More Notes of Chapter 3

Game-theory Model
Model Notion.

Table A.1 Notations
Input parameters:
Ni1
The number of ash trees a landowner has in site i at the beginning.
πi1
The first-period attack rate in site i, i.e., the probability that an ash
tree is infested with the EAB. π̄ = 1 − π.
1
Ii
The infestation level (number of infested trees) in period one in site i
follows a binomial distribution with rate πi1 : Ii1 ∼ B(Ni1 , πi1 ).
c1
Cost of inspecting an ash tree.
c2
Cost of treating an ash tree.
c3
Cost of removing a dead tree.
ρ
Treatment success rate. ρ̄ = 1 − ρ.
θ
Marginal value of a landowner having a surviving ash tree.
α
Marginal value the city forester has for a healthy ash tree.
2
πh,i
The high (resp. low) second-period attack rate, i.e., the probability
2
(resp. πl,i ) that a healthy ash tree will become infested in period 2 in site i if the
number of treated trees in period one is less than
(resp. greater than or equal to) the number of infested trees.
2
2
2
2
2
2
πl,i
< πi1 < πh,i
; π̄h,i
= 1 − πh,i
; π̄l,i
= 1 − πl,i
.
Value function:
v(p, d)
The value function of the city forester of having p surviving ash trees
while losing d trees either untreated or unsuccessfully-treated
at the end of the second period: v(p, d) = s · p − β · d.
V (p)
The value function of the landowner having p surviving ash trees
at the end of the second period: V (p) = θ · p.
Decision variables only applicable to the infestation-based reimbursement model:
qS,i
The number of healthy trees a landowner will treat given Ii1 out of
Ni1 ash trees, and the treated healthy trees will become EAB resistant.
qI,i
The number of infested trees a landowner will treat given Ii1 out of
Ni1 ash trees.
qi
The number of trees a landowner will treat given Ii1 out of Ni1 ash
trees are infested. qi can be greater than, equal to, or less than
Ii1 . qi = qS,i + qI,i . If qi < Ii1 , qS,i = 0, otherwise, qI,i = Ii1 .
ri
Reimbursement offered to the landowner for having Ii1 infested ash
trees.
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A.2.1.2

Formulation. This section simply shows the game theory model applied

to the private site i and mentioned in schema 3.3.4. Let θ denote the landowner’s
marginal value of a healthy ash tree, and a0 represents not participating in the costsharing program, then his expected utility given the infestation level (Ii1 ) in site i is
as follows:

ϕ(a0 |Ni1 , Ii1 ) =



2
2

θπ̄l,i
Ni1 − c3 πl,i
Ni1




if Ii1 = 0

2
2
θπ̄h,i
(Ni1 − Ii1 ) − c3 (Ii1 + πh,i
(Ni1 − Ii1 )) if 0 < Ii1 < Ni1





−c3 Ni1
if Ii1 = Ni1 ,

(A.1)

2
2
2
2
where π̄l,i
= 1 − πl,i
and π̄h,i
= 1 − πh,i
.

First, if there are no infested trees (Ii1 = 0) in the first period, the attack rate
2
2
Ni1 trees are expected to be infested
, and therefore, πl,i
in the second period is πl,i
2
and die without treatment. The term π̄l,i
Ni1 in Equation (A.1) is the landowner’s
2
2
Ni1 dead
value of having π̄ l n surviving trees while c3 πl,i
Ni1 is the cost of removing πl,i

trees. Second, if some trees are infested (0 < Ii1 < Ni1 ) in period one, inaction will
2
lead to an increased attack rate (πh,i
), the expected trees to be infested in period two
2
2
(Ni1 − Ii1 ) trees will die, and the removal cost
is πh,i
(Ni1 − Ii1 ). A total of Ii1 + πh,i
2
(Ni1 − Ii1 )). The landowner’s expected utility is thus the
associated is c3 · (Ii1 + πh,i
2
difference between the value of healthy trees, θ · π̄h,i
(Ni1 − Ii1 ), and the removal cost.

Last, if all trees are already infested in the first period, a lack of treatment would
result in the death of all. The landowner would incur a removal cost of c3 Ni1 .
If the private landowner does participate in the cost-sharing program, the
landowner’s expected utility considering two scenarios: (1) when qi < Ii1 in site i
in period 1, where qi = qS,i + qI,i and qS,i = 0 as qi < Ii1 .
ϕ(qi , ri |Ni1 , Ii1 , qi < Ii1 ) = θ · p1 + ri − c1 · Ni1 − c2 · t1 − c3 · d1 .
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(A.2)

The first two terms in Equation (A.2) are the landowner’s value of having p1 surviving
2
2
trees, p1 = ρqi +π̄h,i
(Ni1 −Ii1 )+ρπh,i
(Ni1 −Ii1 ), and the reimbursement received from the

city forester. The left three terms represent the surveillance cost, the treatment cost
2
2
(Ni1 −Ii1 ),
(Ni1 −Ii1 ), and the removal cost where d1 = Ii1 −ρqi + ρ̄i πh,i
where t1 = qi +πh,i

respectively.
(2) when qi ≥ Ii1 in site i in period 1
ϕ(qi , ri |Ni1 , Ii1 , qi ≥ Ii1 ) = θ · p0 + r1 − c1 · Ni1 − c2 · t0 − c3 · d0 .

(A.3)

The first two terms in Equation (A.3) are the landowner’s value of having p0 surviving
2
2
trees, p0 = qi − ρ̄Ii1 + π̄l,i
(Ni1 −qi )+ρπl,i
(Ni1 −qi ) and the reimbursement received from

the city forester. The left three terms represent the surveillance cost, the treatment
2
(Ni1 − qi ), and the removal cost where d0 =
cost where t0 = Ii1 + (qi − Ii1 ) + πl,i
2
ρ̄i Ii1 + ρ̄i πl,i
(Ni1 − qi ), respectively.

The game-theory model is listed in the following:





max Ψ(qi , ri |Ni1 , Ii1 ) = µ1i · α · p1 − c2 · d1 + µ̄1i α · p0 − c2 · d0 − ri
qi ,ri

(A.4)

Subject to:
• IR
ϕ(qi , ri |Ni1 , Ii1 ) ≥ ϕ(a0 |Ni1 , Ii1 ) i ∈ Γr

(A.5)

ϕ(qi , ri |Ni1 , Ii1 ) ≥ ϕ(g, ri |Ni1 , Ii1 ) ∀0 ≤ g ≤ Ni1 , i ∈ Γr

(A.6)

• ICIi1 g
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• NN
qi , ri ≥ 0 i ∈ Γr

(A.7)

The objective function shown in Equation (A.4) is the net expected utility of the city
forester, which has two scenarios: (1) when qi < Ii1 (or equivalently, µti = 1) and (2)
when qi ≥ Ii1 (or µ1i = 0). The first term of the objective function is the value of
having p1 surviving trees at the end of the second period minus the penalty for losing
d1 trees when qi < Ii1 . Similarly, the second term of the objective function is the
difference between the value of having p0 surviving trees and the penalty for losing
d0 trees when qi ≥ Ii1 . For simplicity, we assume that the penalty associated with a
dead tree is equal to the cost of its treatment. The last term is the cost of providing
the financial award to the landowner.
The individual rationality (IR) constraint ensures the landowner has enough
incentive to participate in the cost-sharing program. The incentive compatibility
(ICj ) constraints induce the landowner to treat the number of trees designed by the
city forester qi based on the infestation level (Ii1 ), rather than another treatment
decision (g) in site i in period 1. The non-negativity constraints (N N ) ensure that
both qi and ri are non-negative.
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A.3
A.3.1
A.3.1.1

More Notes of Chapter 4

The Proof of Propositions
The Proof of Proposition 5.

Proof. When D = 1 and N = 1 and the allowance ad = 0, the problem becomes

2
max Φ = − α2 qdn
+ α(θdn −

γ+β
)qdn
α

− ∆dn

s.t.

∆dn ≥ 0

(IRd )

and

qdn ≥ 0

(N Ndn )

There is only one type of agent with one level demand, so the problem is under
complete information and the principal can get the maximum profit when the
information rent ∆∗dn = 0. What is more, the principal’s profit is convex function
with respect to qdn and

∂Φ
∂qdn

= −αqdn + α(θdn −

γ+β
),
α

so the optimal contract is

shown as follows:

∗
= θdn −
qdn

A.3.1.2

γ+β
α

= q dn ,

∗
∗
, θdn ) − ∆∗dn = τ (qdn
) = τ (q dn ) = tdn .
t∗dn = v(qdn

(A.8)

The Proof of Proposition 6.

Proof. When D = 1 and N = 1 and the allowance ad > 0, the problem actually is

max Φ = v(qdn , θdn ) − ∆dn − βqdn
s.t.

∆dn ≥ 0

(IRd )

and

qdn ≥ 0

(N Ndn )
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Similar as the Proof A.3.1.1, the principal can get the maximum profit when the
information rent ∆∗dn = 0 and the problem becomes the maximize problem i.e. Φ =
v(qdn , θdn ) − βqdn when qdn ≥ 0. Figure A.1 and A.2 show the plots between Φ
√
√
and qdn when ad < (1 + 2) γ+β
and ad ≥ (1 + 2) γ+β
respectively. The points in
α
α
those two figures are listed in Table A.2. As shown in Table A.2, Φ|A = Φ|C > Φ|B .
√
√
√
When 0 < ad < (1 + 2) γ+β
, ( 2 − 1)ad − γ+β
< 0 and (1 + 2)ad + γ+β
> 0,
α
α
α
√
√
√
so α2 (( 2 − 1)ad − γ+β
)((1 + 2)ad + γ+β
) is negative when ad < (1 + 2) γ+β
α
α
α
and non-negative otherwise. Therefore, Φ|A = Φ|C > Φ|D if the allowance is less than
√ γ+β
√
and
Φ|
=
Φ|
<
Φ|
if
the
allowance
is
more
than
or
equal
to
(1+
2) α .
(1+ 2) γ+β
A
C
D
α

Table A.2 The Points in Figures A.1 and A.2
Point A
Point B
Point C
Point D

qdn
θdn − ad − γ+β
α
θdn − ad
√
θdn − ad + (1 + 2) γ+β
α
θdn

Φ
α
(θ − ad −
2 dn
α
(θ − ad −
2 dn
α
(θ − ad −
2 dn
α
(θ − ad −
2 dn

Figure A.1 Φdn when 0 < ad < (1 +

γ+β 2
)
α
γ+β 2
)
α
γ+β 2
)
α
γ+β 2
)
α

− α2 ( γ+β
)2
α
√
+ α2 (( 2 − 1)ad −

√

γ+β
)((
α

2 + 1)ad +

γ+β
)
α

√ γ+β
2) α .

The blue dotted curve line shows the case when 0 ≤ qdn ≤ θdn − ad and the
red dotted line shows the case when θdn − ad < qdn ≤ θdn . The point A is the top
point of the blue dotted curve. The point B is the intersection point of these two
curves. And the point D is the upper boundary point. As shown in Figure A.1, Φ
reaches the maximum value when qdn = θdn − ad −
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γ+β
α

i.e. at the point A. So when

0 < ad < (1 +

√ γ+β
2) α , the optimal quantity and price are

qdn = θdn − ad −

(a) Φdn when ad < θdn −

γ+β
α

(A.9)

= q dn − ad , tdn = τ (qdn )

γ+β
α

(b) Φdn when θdn −

γ+β
α

≤ ad < θdn

(c) Φdn when ad ≥ θdn

Figure A.2 Φdn when ad ≥ (1 +

√

2) γ+β
.
α

Figure A.2 shows the different trends of Φ when vary qdn at the various ad when
√
ad ≥ (1 + 2) γ+β
. There are four different highlighted points in the figure.
α
The plot of Φ when ad < θdn −

γ+β
α

is shown in Figure A.2(a). In this case,

according to Eq. 4.1, Φ is equal to τ̂ (qdn )−βqdn when qdn ≤ θdn −ad and τ (qdn )−βqdn
otherwise. Φ is non-negative for all qdn . The maximum value of Φ is at the point D.
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Figure A.2(b) illustrates the case that the principal earns a non-positive utility
√
√
when 0 ≤ qdn ≤ θdn −ad . Φ|D −Φ|B = α2 (( 2−1)ad − γ+β
)(( 2+1)ad + γ+β
). Because
α
α
√
√
ad ≥ ( 2 + 1) γ+β
, ( 2 − 1)ad − γ+β
≥ 0. We can get Φ|D ≥ Φ|B . As a result, the
α
α
point D is the optimal point of the plot in Figure A.2(b).
When ad > θdn , Φ increases in qdn . The plot of Φ is shown in Figure A.2(c). The
principal gets the optimal utility when the agent captures all emission. In conclusion,
√
when ad ≥ (1 + 2) γ+β
, the optimal quantity and price are
α

(A.10)

qdn = θdn , tdn = v(qdn , θdn )

In summary, the maximum capturing CO2 quantity with the minimum allowance
are shown as follows:

a∗d = (1 +

A.3.1.3

√

∗
2) γ+β
, qdn
= θdn , t∗dn = τ̂ (θdn ).
α

(A.11)

The Proof of Proposition 7.

Proof. When D = 1 and N = 2 and the allowance ad = 0, the problem becomes
2
max Φ = πdl ( − α2 qdl
+ α(θdl −

s.t.

and

γ+β
)qdl
α

2
− ∆dl ) + πdh ( − α2 qdh
+ α(θdh −

γ+β
)qdh
α

− ∆dh )

πdl ∆dl + πdh ∆dh ≥ 0

(IRd )

∆dh − ∆dl ≥ α(θdh − θdl )qdl

(ICdhl )

∆dl − ∆dh ≥ v(qdh , θdl ) − v(qdh , θdh )

(ICdlh )

qdn ≥ 0

(N Ndn )
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The principal can get the maximum profit when the expected information rent
πdl ∆∗dl + πdh ∆∗dh = 0. What is more, the principal’s profit is convex function with
respect to qdl , qdh and

∂Φ
∂qdn

= −αqdn +α(θdn − γ+β
) (n = l, h), so the optimal capturing
α

quantity for different demand level is shown as follows:

γ+β
α

∗
qdn
= θdn −

and

= q dn ,

(A.12)

n = l, h

and,
πdl ∆∗dl + πdh ∆∗dh = 0,
∆∗dh − ∆∗dl ≥ α(θdh − θdl )q dl ,

(A.13)

∆∗dl − ∆∗dh ≥ v(q dh , θdl ) − v(q dh , θdh )

So we can have,

∆∗dl = −πdh (ω(v(q dh , θdl ) − v(q dh , θdh )) + ω̄α(θdh − θdl )q dl ) < 0,
∆∗dh = πdl (ω(v(q dh , θdl ) − v(q dh , θdh )) + ω̄α(θdh − θdl )q dl ) > 0,
and

(A.14)

ω ∈ [0, 1]

From above, the optimal price offered by the principal is shown in the following:

∗
t∗dn = v(qdn
, θdn ) − ∆∗dn = v(q dn , θdn ) − ∆∗dn = t(q dn ) − ∆∗dn ,

and

A.3.1.4

n = l, h

The Proof of Proposition 8.
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(A.15)

Proof. When D = 1 and N = 2 and the allowance ad > 0, the problem actually
becomes

max Φ = πdl (v(qdl , θdl ) − ∆dl − βqdl ) + πdh (v(qdh , θdh ) − ∆dh − βqdh )
s.t.

and

πdl ∆dl + πdh ∆dh ≥ 0

(IRd )

∆dh − ∆dl ≥ v(qdl , θdh ) − v(qdl , θdl )

(ICdhl )

∆dl − ∆dh ≥ v(qdh , θdl ) − v(qdh , θdh )

(ICdlh )

qdn ≥ 0

(N Ndn )

The principal can get the maximum profit when the expected information rent
πdl ∆∗dl + πdh ∆∗dh = 0 and the problem i.e.

max

Φ=

P

πdn (v(qdn , θdn ) − βqdn ),

qdl ,qdh

∆dh − ∆dl = ω(v(qdh , θdh ) − v(qdh , θdl )) + ω̄(v(qdl , θdh ) − v(qdl , θdl )).
and

(A.16)

ω ∈ [0, 1].

First, we just consider the non-constraint problem max

Φ=

P

πdn (v(qdn , θdn )−

qdl ,qdh

βqdn ). The principal gets the maximum profit when v(qdl , θdl ) − βqdl and v(qdh , θdh ) −
βqdh get the maximum value respectively. According to A.3.1.2, when 0 < ad <
√
(1 + 2) γ+β
, the optimal quantity is,
α

qdn = θdn − ad −

γ+β
α

= q dn − ad

(n = l, h)

(A.17)

Then we check the solutions we get if make IC1hl and IC1lh satisfied i.e. the inequality
equation v(qdh , θdh ) − v(qdh , θdl ) ≥ v(qdl , θdh ) − v(qdl , θdl ) satisfied.
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When θdh − θdl ≤

γ+β
α

v(qdh , θdh ) − v(qdh , θdl ) − (v(qdl , θdh ) − v(qdl , θdl ))
(A.18)

= α(θdh − θdl )(qdh − qdl )
= α(θdh − θdl )2 > 0

When θdh − θdl >

γ+β
α

and θdh − ad −

γ+β
α

< θdl

v(qdh , θdh ) − v(qdh , θdl ) − (v(qdl , θdh ) − v(qdl , θdl ))
2
2
= − α2 qdh
+ (α(θdh − ad ) − γ)qdh − ( α2 qdh
− (α(θdl − ad ) + γ)qdh + α(θdl − ad )2 )

−α(θdh − θdl )qdl
2
= −αqdh
+ α(θdh − ad + θdl − ad )qdh − α(θdl − ad )2 − α(θdh − θdl )qdl
2
)qdh − α(qdl +
= −αqdh
+ α(qdh + qdl + 2 γ+β
α

γ+β 2
)
α

− α(qdh − qdl )qdl

qdh − α( γ+β
)2 − 2α γ+β
qdl
= 2α γ+β
α
α
α
= 2α γ+β
(θdh − θdl −
α

1 γ+β
)
2 α

>0
(A.19)

When θdh − θdl >

γ+β
α

and θdh − ad −

γ+β
α

≥ θdl

v(qdh , θdh ) − v(qdh , θdl ) − (v(qdl , θdh ) − v(qdl , θdl ))
2
2
= − α2 qdh
+ (α(θdh − ad ) − γ)qdh − ( α2 θdl
− (α(θdl − ad ) + γ)θdl + α(θdl − ad )2 )

−α(θdh − θdl )qdl
2
2
≥ − α2 qdh
+ (α(θdh − ad ) − γ)qdh − ( α2 qdh
− (α(θdl − ad ) + γ)qdh + α(θdl − ad )2 )

−α(θdh − θdl )qdl > 0
(A.20)
In summary, the solutions we get make IC1hl and IC1lh satisfied. So when 0 < ad <
√
(1 + 2) γ+β
, the optimal quantities and price are
α
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∗
, t∗dl )
(qdl
(q dl − ad , τ̄ (q dl − ad ) − ∆∗dl )

d

∗
, t∗dh )
(qdh
(q dh − ad , τ̄ (q dh − ad ) − ∆∗dh )

where
∗
∗
∗
∗
∆∗dl = −πdh [ω · (v(qdh
, θdh ) − v(qdh
, θdl )) + ω̄ · (v(qdl
, θdh ) − v(qdl
, θdl ))] ,
∗
∗
∗
∗
∆∗dh = πdl [ω · (v(qdh
, θdh ) − v(qdh
, θdl )) + ω̄ · (v(qdl
, θdh ) − v(qdl
, θdl ))] .

(A.21)

and ω ∈ [0, 1].

A.3.1.5

The Proof of Proposition 9.

Proof. Similar as Proof A.3.1.4, when ad ≥ (1 +

qdn = θdn

√

, the optimal quantity is,
2) γ+β
α

(n = l, h)

(A.22)

Then we check the solutions we get if make IC1hl and IC1lh satisfied i.e. the inequality
equation v(qdh , θdh ) − v(qdh , θdl ) ≥ v(qdl , θdh ) − v(qdl , θdl ) satisfied.

v(qdh , θdh ) − v(qdh , θdl ) − (v(qdl , θdh ) − v(qdl , θdl ))

(A.23)

= v(θdh , θdh ) − v(θdl , θdh ) > 0

In summary, the solutions we get make IC1hl and IC1lh satisfied. So when ad ≥
√
(1 + 2) γ+β
, the optimal quantities and price are
α
d

∗
(qdl
, t∗dl )
(θdl , τ̂ (θdl ) − ∆∗dl )
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∗
(qdh
, t∗dh )
(θdh , τ̂ (θdh ) − ∆∗dh )

where
∆∗dl = −πdh [ω · v(θdh , θdh ) + ω̄ · v(θdl , θdh ) − v(θdl , θdl )] ,
∆∗dh = πdl [ω · v(θdh , θdh ) + ω̄ · v(θdl , θdh ) − v(θdl , θdl )] .

(A.24)

and ω ∈ [0, 1].

A.3.2

Analytical Solutions for None Overlapping and Complete Overlapping
Distributions

A.3.2.1

Non-overlapping Distribution Case. When the distribution is not

overlapping, the optimal quantities and prices are The quantities are always full

d = 1, 2

∗
, t∗dl )
(qdl
(θdl , τ̂ (θdl ) − ∆∗dl )

∗
, t∗dh )
(qdh
(θdh , τ̂ (θdh ) − ∆∗dh )

quantities, however, the prices are different depending on the different binding
constraints. The value of each information rent is listed in the following when the
different constraints are binding.
(1) IR1 , IR2 , IC1hl are binding.

∆∗ll = −π1h (v(q1l , θ1h ) − v(q1l , θ1l )) .

∆∗lh = π1l (v(q1l , θ1h ) − v(q1l , θ1l )) .

∆∗2l = −π2h (ω · (v(q2h , θ2h ) − v(q2l , θ2l )) + (1 − ω) · (v(q2l , θ2h ) − v(q2l , θ2l ))) .
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∆∗2h = π2l (ω · (v(q2h , θ2h ) − v(q2l , θ2l )) + (1 − ω) · (v(q2l , θ2h ) − v(q2l , θ2l ))) .

ω ∈ [0, 1]
(2) IR1 , IC21 , IC2hl are binding.
When a1 ≤ 2, Let,

τ1 = v(q1l , θ2l ) − v(q1h , θ2l ) + v(q1h , θ1h ) − v(q1l , θ1l ).

∆∗1l = −π1h τ1 .

∆∗1h = π1l τ1 .

τ2 = π2l (v(q1h , θ2l ) − v(q1h , θ1h )) + π2h (v(q1h , θ2h ) − v(q1h , θ1h )) + ∆1h .

∆∗2l = τ1 − π2h τ2 .

∆∗1h = τ1 + π2l τ2 .

When a1 > 2,
Let,

δ1 = ω1 · min{v(θ1l , θ2h ) − v(θ1h , θ2h ) + v(θ1h , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l ), v(θ1h , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l )}
+(1 − ω1 ) · max{v(θ1l , θ2l ) − v(θ1h , θ2l ) + v(θ1h , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l ), v(θ1l , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l )}
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∆∗1l = −π1h δ1
∆∗1h = π1l δ1

Let,
δ2 = π2l · (v(θ1h , θ2l ) − v(θ1h , θ1h ) + ∆∗1h )
π2h · (v(θ1l , θ2h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l ) + ∆∗1l ) .

∆∗2l = δ2 − π2h · (v(θ2l , θ2h ) − v(θ2l , θ2l ))
∆∗2h = δ2 + π2l · (v(θ2l , θ2h ) − v(θ2l , θ2l )) .

(3) IR1 , IC21 , IC1hl , IC2hl are binding.

∆∗1l = −π1h · (v(θ1l , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l ))
∆∗1h = π1l · (v(θ1l , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l )) .

Let,
δ2 = π2l · (v(θ1l , θ2l ) − v(θ1l , θ1l ) + ∆∗1l )
π2h · (v(θ1h , θ2h ) − v(θ1h , θ1h ) + ∆∗1h )

∆∗2l = δ2 − π2h · (v(θ2l , θ2h ) − v(θ2l , θ2l ))
∆∗2h = δ2 + π2l · (v(θ2l , θ2h ) − v(θ2l , θ2l )) .
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(4) IR1 , IC21 are binding.
Let,

δ1 = ω1 · min{v(θ1l , θ2h ) − v(θ1h , θ2h ) + v(θ1h , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l ), v(θ1h , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l )}
(1 − ω1 ) · max{v(θ1l , θ2l ) − v(θ1h , θ2l ) + v(θ1h , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l ), v(θ1l , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l )}.

∆∗1l = −π1h · δ1
∆∗1h = π1l · δ1 .

Let,

δ2 = ω2 · min{v(θ2l , θ1l ) − v(θ2h , θ1l ) + v(θ2h , θ2h ) − v(θ2l , θ2l ),
v(θ2l , θ1h ) − v(θ2h , θ1h ) + v(θ2h , θ2h ) − v(θ2l , θ2l ), v(θ2h , θ2h ) − v(θ2l , θ2l )}
+(1 − ω2 ) · (v(θ2l , θ2h ) − v(θ2l , θ2l )) .

∆∗2l = π2l · (v(θ1h , θ2l ) − v(θ1h , θ1h ) + ∆∗1h ) + π2h · (v(θ1l , θ2h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l ) + ∆∗1l ) − π2h · δ2
∆∗2h = π2l · (v(θ1h , θ2l ) − v(θ1h , θ1h ) + ∆∗1h ) + π2h · (v(θ1l , θ2h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l ) + ∆∗1l ) + π2l · δ2 .

and ω1 , ω2 ∈ [0, 1].
A.3.2.2

Partial overlapping distribution case. When the distribution is

partial overlapping (θ1l < θ2l < θ1h < θ2h ), there are two kinds of optimal quantities
offered to the type-1 agent: efficient quantities and full quantities.
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First, we list the analytical solutions when the efficient quantities are offered to
the type-1 agent. The optimal quantities and prices are shown in the following: The
∗
,
(qdl
(q 1l ,
(θ2l ,

d=1
d=2

t∗dl )
τ (q 1l ) − ∆∗1l )
τ̂ (θ2l ) − ∆∗2l )

∗
,
(qdh
(q 1h ,
(θ2h ,

t∗dh )
τ (q 1h ) − ∆∗1h )
τ̂ (θ2h ) − ∆∗2h )

value of information rent depends on the different binding constraints.
(1) IR2 and IC12 are binding.

When π1l > π2l ,

∆∗2l = −π2h · min{v(θ2h , θ2h ) − v(θ2l , θ2l ),
1
π1l −π2l

(π1l (v(θ2l , θ1l ) − v(θ2l , θ2l )) + π1h (v(θ2h , θ1h ) − v(θ2h , θ2h )))}

∆∗2h = π2l · min{v(θ2h , θ2h ) − v(θ2l , θ2l ),
1
π1l −π2l

(π1l (v(θ2l , θ1l ) − v(θ2l , θ2l )) + π1h (v(θ2h , θ1h ) − v(θ2h , θ2h )))}.

When π1l < π2l ,

∆∗2l = −π2h · max{v(θ2h , θ2l ) − v(θ2l , θ2l ),
1
π1l −π2l

(π1l (v(θ2l , θ1l ) − v(θ2l , θ2l )) + π1h (v(θ2h , θ1h ) − v(θ2h , θ2h )))

v(θ2l , θ1h ) − v(θ2h , θ1h ) + v(θ2h , θ2h ) − v(θ2l , θ2l )}
∆∗2h = π2l · max{v(θ2h , θ2l ) − v(θ2l , θ2l ),
1
π1l −π2l

(π1l (v(θ2l , θ1l ) − v(θ2l , θ2l )) + π1h (v(θ2h , θ1h ) − v(θ2h , θ2h )))

v(θ2l , θ1h ) − v(θ2h , θ1h ) + v(θ2h , θ2h ) − v(θ2l , θ2l )}.
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When π1l = π2l and ω2 ∈ [0, 1],

∆∗2l = −π2h · [ω2 · (v(θ2h , θ2h ) − v(θ2l , θ2l ))
+(1 − ω2 ) · max{v(θ2h , θ2l ) − v(θ2l , θ2l ), v(θ2l , θ1h ) − v(θ2h , θ1h )
+v(θ2h , θ2h ) − v(θ2l , θ2l )}]
∆∗2h = π2l · [ω2 · (v(θ2h , θ2h ) − v(θ2l , θ2l ))
+(1 − ω2 ) · max{v(θ2h , θ2l ) − v(θ2l , θ2l ), v(θ2l , θ1h ) − v(θ2h , θ1h )
+v(θ2h , θ2h ) − v(θ2l , θ2l )}].

and,

∆∗1l = π1l (v(θ2l , θ1l ) − v(θ2l , θ2l ) + ∆∗2l ) + π1h (v(θ2h , θ1h ) − v(θ2h , θ2h ) + ∆∗2h )
−π1h α(θ1h − θ1l )q1l
∆∗1h = π1l (v(θ2l , θ1l ) − v(θ2l , θ2l ) + ∆∗2l ) + π1h (v(θ2h , θ1h ) − v(θ2h , θ2h ) + ∆∗2h )
+π1l (θ1h − θ1l )q1l .

(2) IR1 , IR2 and IC1hl are binding.
∆∗1l = −π1h (v(q1l , θ1h ) − v(q1l , θ1l )) .
∆∗1h = π1l (v(q1l , θ1h ) − v(q1l , θ1l )) .
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Let,

ζ = ω · min{v(θ2l , θ1h ) − v(θ2h , θ1h ) + v(θ2h , θ2h ) − v(θ2l , θ2l ),
v(θ2h , θ2h ) − v(θ2l , θ2l )}
+(1 − ω) · max{ π12h · (π1l v(θ2l , θ1l ) + π1h v(θ2l , θ1h ) − v(θ2l , θ2l )) ,
v(θ2l , θ2h ) − v(θ2l , θ2l )}

∆∗2l = −π2h ζ.
∆∗2h = π2l ζ.

(3) IR1 and IR2 are binding.
Let,

ζ1 = ω1 · min{v(q1l , θ2l ) − v(q1h , θ2l ) + v(q1h , θ1h ) − v(q1l , θ1l ),
v(q1l , θ2h ) − v(q1h , θ2h ) + v(q1h , θ1h ) − v(q1l , θ1l ),
v(q1 h, θ1h ) − v(q1h , θ1l )}
+(1 − ω1 ) · max{ π11h · (π2l v(q1l , θ2l ) + π1h v(q1l , θ2h ) − v(q1l , θ1l )) ,
v(q1l , θ1h ) − v(q1l , θ1l )}

ζ2 = ω2 · min{v(θ2l , θ1l ) − v(θ2h , θ1l ) + v(θ2h , θ2h ) − v(θ2l , θ2l ),
v(θ2l , θ1l ) − v(θ2h , θ1l ) + v(θ2h , θ2h ) − v(θ2l , θ2l ),
v(θ2h , θ2h ) − v(θ2l , θ2l )}
+(1 − ω2 ) · max{ π12h · (π1l v(θ2l , θ1l ) + π1h v(θ2l , θ1h ) − v(θ2l , θ2l )) ,
v(θ2l , θ2h ) − v(θ2l , θ2l )}

173

∆∗1l = −π1h · ζ1
∆∗1h = π1l · ζ1
∆∗2l = −π2h · ζ2
∆∗2h = π2l · ζ2 .

Then we show the analytical solutions when the full quantities are offered to
the type-1 agent.The optimal quantities and prices are The quantities are always

d = 1, 2

∗
, t∗dl )
(qdl
(θdl , τ̂ (θdl ) − ∆∗dl )

∗
, t∗dh )
(qdh
(θdh , τ̂ (θdh ) − ∆∗dh )

full quantities, however, the prices are different depends on the different binding
constraints. The value of each information rent is listed in the following when the
different constraints are binding.
(1) IR1 , IR2 , IC12 are binding.

∆∗2l = v(θ2l , θ2l ) − π1l · v(θ2l , θ1l ) − π1h · v(θ2l , θ1h )
2l
∆∗2h = − ππ2h
· ∆∗2l .

Let,

δ1 = ω1 · (v(θ1h , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l ))
+(1 − ω1 ) · max{v(θ1l , θ2l ) − v(θ1h , θ2l + v(θ1h , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l ),
v(θ1l , θ2l ) − v(θ1h , θ2l + v(θ1h , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l ), v(θ1l , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l )}
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∆∗1l = π1h · δ1
∆∗1h = −π1l · δ1 .

(2) IR1 , IC21 , IC1hl , IC2hl are binding.

∆∗1l = −π1h · (v(θ1l , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l ))
∆∗1h = π1l · (v(θ1l , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l )) .

Let,

δ2 = π2l · max{v(θ1l , θ2l ) − v(θ1l , θ1l + ∆∗1l , v(θ1h , θ2l ) − v(θ1h , θ1h + ∆∗1h }
+π2h · max{v(θ1l , θ2h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l + ∆∗1l , v(θ1h , θ2h ) − v(θ1h , θ1h + ∆∗1h }.

∆∗2l = δ2 − π2h · (v(θ2l , θ2h ) − v(θ2l , θ2l ))
∆∗1h = δ2 + π2l · (v(θ2l , θ2h ) − v(θ2l , θ2l )) .

(3) IR1 , IC21 .
∆∗1l = −π1h · (v(θ1l , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l ))
∆∗1h = π1l · (v(θ1l , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l )) .

Let,
δ1 = v(θ2h , θ2h ) − v(θ2l , θ2l ) if v(θ2l , θ1h ) − v(θ2h , θ1h ) + v(θ2h , θ2h ) − v(θ2l , θ2l ) <
v(θ2l , θ2h ) − v(θ2l , θ2l ),

175

δ1 = v(θ2l , θ1h ) − v(θ2h , θ1h ) + v(θ2h , θ2h ) − v(θ2l , θ2l ) if v(θ2l , θ1h ) − v(θ2h , θ1h ) +
v(θ2h , θ2h ) − v(θ2l , θ2l ) ≥ v(θ2l , θ2h ) − v(θ2l , θ2l )

δ1′ = v(θ2l , θ2h ) − v(θ2l , θ2l )

δ2 = π2l · max{v(θ1l , θ2l ) − v(θ1l , θ1l + ∆∗1l , v(θ1h , θ2l ) − v(θ1h , θ1h + ∆∗1h }
+π2h · max{v(θ1l , θ2h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l + ∆∗1l , v(θ1h , θ2h ) − v(θ1h , θ1h + ∆∗1h }.

∆∗2l

= δ2 − π2h · (ω · δ1 + (1 − ω) · δ1′ )

∆∗2hl = δ2 + π2l · (ω · δ1 + (1 − ω) · δ1′ )

(4) IR1 , IC12 , IC21 , IC1hl are binding.

∆∗1l = −π1h · (v(θ1l , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l ))
∆∗1h = π1l · (v(θ1l , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l )) .

Let,

∆2 = π2l · (v(θ1l , θ2l ) − v(θ1l , θ1l ) + ∆∗1l ) + π2h · (v(θ1h , θ2h ) − v(θ1h , θ1h ) + ∆∗1h )
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∆∗2l = v(θ2l , θ2l ) − π1l · v(θ2l , θ1l ) − π1h · v(θ2l , θ1h )
∆∗2h =

A.3.2.3

1
π2h

· (δ2 − π2l · ∆∗2l ) .

Complete overlapping distribution case. When the distribution is

complete overlapping, the optimal quantities and prices are The quantities are always

d = 1, 2

∗
, t∗dl )
(qdl
(θdl , τ̂ (θdl ) − ∆∗dl )

∗
, t∗dh )
(qdh
(θdh , τ̂ (θdh ) − ∆∗dh )

full quantities, however, the prices are different depends on the different binding
constraints. The value of each information rent is listed in the following when the
different constraints are binding.
(1) IR1 , IC12 , IC21 are binding.
When π1l ≥ π2l ,

∆∗1l = −π1h · max{v(θ1l , θ2h ) − v(θ1h , θ2h ) + v(θ1h , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l ),
v(θ1h , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l )}
∆∗1h = π1l · max{v(θ1l , θ2h ) − v(θ1h , θ2h ) + v(θ1h , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l ),
v(θ1h , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l )}

When π1l < π2l ,

∆∗1l = −π1h · (v(θ1h , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l ))
∆∗1h = π1l · (v(θ1h , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l ))
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and,

∆∗2l = v(θ2l , θ2l ) − π1l v(θ2l , θ1l ) − π1h v(θ2l , θ1h )
∆∗2h =

1
π2h

· (π2l (v(θ1l , θ2l ) − v(θ1l , θ1l )) + π2h (v(θ1h , θ2h ) − v(θ1h , θ1h ))

+(π1l − π2l ) · (∆∗1h − ∆∗1l ) − π2l ∆∗2l )

(2) IR1 , IC21 are binding.

∆∗1l = −π1h (ω · (v(θ1h , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l )
+(1 − ω) · max{0, v(θ1l , θ2h ) − v(θ1h , θ2h ) + v(θ1h , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l )})
∆∗1h = π1l (ω · (v(θ1h , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l ))
+(1 − ω · max{0, v(θ1l , θ2h ) − v(θ1h , θ2h ) + v(θ1h , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l )})

ω ∈ [0, 1] Let,

δ = π2l (v(θ1l , θ2l ) − v(θ1l , θ1l ) + ∆∗1l ) + π2h (v(θ1h , θ2h ) − v(θ1h , θ1h ) + ∆∗1h )

∆∗2l = δ − π2h (ω · (v(θ1h , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l )
+(1 − ω) · max{0, v(θ1l , θ2h ) − v(θ1h , θ2h ) + v(θ1h , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l )})
∆∗2h = π1l (ω · (v(θ1h , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l ))
+(1 − ω) · max{0, v(θ1l , θ2h ) − v(θ1h , θ2h ) + v(θ1h , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l )})
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(3) IR2 , IC12 are binding.
When v(θ1l , θ2h ) − v(θ1h , θ2h ) + v(θ1h , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l ) ≥ v(θ1l , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l ),

δ = ∆∗1h − ∆∗1l = ω · max{v(θ1l , θ2h ) − v(θ1h , θ2h ) + v(θ1h , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l ),
v(θ1h , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l )}
+(1 − ω) · (v(θ1l , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l ))

When v(θ1l , θ2h ) − v(θ1h , θ2h ) + v(θ1h , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l ) < v(θ1l , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l ),

δ = ∆∗1h − ∆∗1l = ω · (v(θ1h , θ1h ) − c(θ1l , θ1l )) + (1 − ω) · (v(θ1l , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l ))

And ω ∈ [0, 1].

∆∗2l = −π2h (v(θ2l , θ1h ) − v(θ2h , θ1h ) + v(θ2h , θ2h ) − v(θ2l , θ2l ))
∆∗2h = π2l (v(θ2l , θ1h ) − v(θ2h , θ1h ) + v(θ2h , θ2h ) − v(θ2l , θ2l ))

π1l ∆∗1l + π1h ∆∗1h = π1l v(θ2l , θ1l ) + π1h v(θ2l , θ1h ) − v(θ2l , θ2l ) + ∆∗2l = δ ′

∆∗1l = δ ′ − π1h δ
∆∗1h = δ ′ + π1l δ
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(4) IR1 , IR2 , IC12 are binding.
Let,

δ=

1
π1l −π2l

· (π2l (v(θ1l , θ1l ) − v(θ1l , θ2l )) + π2h (v(θ1h , θ1h ) − v(θ1h , θ2h )))

π1l ̸= π2l

When π1l > π2l ,

∆∗1l =

−π2h (ω · min{v(θ1h , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l ), δ}
+(1 − ω) · max{v(θ1l , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l ),
v(θ1l , θ2h ) − v(θ1h , θ2h ) + v(θ1h , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l )})

∆∗1h = π2l (ω · min{v(θ1h , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l ), δ}
+(1 − ω) · max{v(θ1l , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l ),
v(θ1l , θ2h ) − v(θ1h , θ2h ) + v(θ1h , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l )})

When π1l < π2l ,

∆∗1l =

−π2h (ω · (v(θ1h , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l ))
+(1 − ω) · max{v(θ1l , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l ),
v(θ1l , θ2h ) − v(θ1h , θ2h ) + v(θ1h , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l )})

∆∗1h = π2l (ω · (v(θ1h , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l ))
+(1 − ω) · max{v(θ1l , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l ),
v(θ1l , θ2h ) − v(θ1h , θ2h ) + v(θ1h , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l )})
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When π1l = π2l and ω ∈ [0, 1],

∆∗1l =

−π2h (ω · (v(θ1h , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l ))
+(1 − ω) · max{v(θ1l , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l ), δ,
v(θ1l , θ2h ) − v(θ1h , θ2h ) + v(θ1h , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l )})

∆∗1h = π2l (ω · (v(θ1h , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l ))
+(1 − ω) · max{v(θ1l , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l ), δ,
v(θ1l , θ2h ) − v(θ1h , θ2h ) + v(θ1h , θ1h ) − v(θ1l , θ1l )})

and,
∆∗2l = v(θ2l , θ2l ) − π1l v(θ2l , θ1l ) − π1h v(θ2l , θ1h )
1l
∆∗2h = − ππ2h
(v(θ2l , θ2l ) − π1l v(θ2l , θ1l ) − π1h v(θ2l , θ1h ))
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Food vs. biofuel: An

optimization approach to the spatio-temporal analysis of land-use competition
and environmental impacts. Applied Energy, 140:418–434.
[47] Cobuloglu, H. I. and Büyüktahtakın, İ. E. (2017).
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